The Workers' Party of Korea and the 7th Congress: Future Implications of Peace and Cooperation

In recent months, there has been an outburst of activities as the UN passed Resolution 2270 in response to the North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles tests and the North Korean party's Congress was held with international coverage. The UN Resolution rebuffed its sanctions and demands against North Korea, and its severity and compliance by the international community will likely have serious impact on the North Korean economy. Some have taken these developments as indicative of an imminent collapse of the North Korean state. However, such predictions are neither new nor are such claims any more likely than it had been in the past. The 7th Congress has been very insightful in understanding the state of North Korea and stand antithetical to the claims to their impending demise. This article will explore some of the recent revelations made by the Congress and implications behind the UN Resolution.

The North Korean Party and Stability

The stability of the North Korean government is often called into question in regards to its possible longevity. Over the recent years, some of the strongest indicators of possible internal strife and lack of unity within the Workers' Party of Korea was during the change in leadership from Kim Jong Il to his son, Kim Jong Un. The transition was followed by attempts to consolidate power and complying party unity through purges and executions. While the true extent of the purges are unlikely to be revealed, many of the high profile members thought to have been removed from power or executed resurfaced during the Congress, with some bearing lower status, and others in more important positions. In light of recent events, it is more likely that the purges were less indicative of instability and were more focused on establishing a power foundation for Kim Jong Un's rule.

I myself have questioned the continued stability of the North Korean state given the ongoing dilemma of legitimacy (namely, through leader exaltation, extreme military preference, and anti-colonialism) and have posited in the past that it may be inevitable for the party to pursue legitimacy via economic prosperity. As seen during the Congress, Kim Jong Un acknowledged the importance of economic development and has gone as far as praising the improvements made by changes to agriculture models (smaller work teams, and allowing greater share for producers). The Congress also marked the announcement of a five-year economic plan, and while no details were provided, it shows a refocusing of priorities. If the state was so mired by internal conflict or instability, economic plans would be the least of their concerns.

The 7th Congress was a hallmark of solidarity within the Workers' Party of Korea, reaffirming the power under Kim Jong Un, and establishing a new position of "Chairman", reminiscent of the position held by Mao Zedong in PRC. While the position itself is unlikely to bestow Kim Jong Un with any explicit powers that he doesn't already have as First Secretary, this is an interesting development in conjunction with the numerous promotions and demotions in the recent years in building a power base for his rule. It will be fascinating to see if and how reforms are advanced with the power of party solidarity (this is especially reminiscent of the power consolidation in CPC by Mao Zedong, followed by massive projects to reform the country's economy). If anything, the North Korean state has never been more stable and capable than in the past several decades.

International Integration

The Congress showed many signs of North Korea's possible willingness to integrate itself into the international community. First, the decision to include foreign journalists to "cover" (regrettably, the journalists were not given full access to cover the event from within the auditorium, but the gesture itself was very telling) the monumental event was not only surprising, but also very promising in that it was a clear sign that they wanted the world to know of North Korea's plans and intentions going into the future with Kim Jong Un at the helm of the country.

Some of the topics discussed in the Congress also directly addressed the international community and brought to attention topics of great interest. The most significant were those that directly addressed the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons development and call for cessation by the UN. What was surprising was not the acknowledgement of the opposition against North Korea's nuclear weapons development efforts, but that Kim Jong Un noted the following, "responsible nuclear weapons state, our Republic will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes, ... and it will faithfully fulfill its obligation for non-proliferation and strive for the global denuclearization." (7th Congress, Kim Jong Un's speech translated by the Korean Central News Agency). While this can easily be discounted as obligatory lip service, even such an interpretation has substantial implications in that it may be indicative of North Korea's concern over their international appearance and willingness to show their intentions to the rest of the world.

Furthermore, the recent speech delivered by Kim Jong Un makes it clear that North Korea is not against (and to some degree, has been) making significant efforts towards negotiating with South Korea and the US in discussing its nuclear capabilities. To quote: "The WPK and the DPRK government will improve and normalize the relations with those countries which respect the sovereignty of the DPRK and are friendly towards it, though they had been hostile toward it in the past". North Korea has made significant efforts towards negotiating with South Korea and the US in discussing its nuclear developments. Unfortunately, their honest efforts to integrate has been met with cold indifference by South Korea and US as they refuse to come to negotiations before North Korea makes serious efforts to stop nuclear developments. This may be a terrible opportunity lost as such a diplomatic stance being so outright unequivocally rejected might reflect negatively on Kim Jong Un, who may be forced to take a more hawkish stance to maintain party solidarity and control over the state. It would not be surprising that after being so utterly rejected by the international community that they become secluded and detached from the rest of the world again.

Conclusion

In a previous article, I posited the notion that nuclear security is one of the conditions that must be met before diplomacy can become a more viable option over military belligerency. It is interesting that following a successful nuclear test, and display of some level of advancement to their missile delivery system, the state has been more amicable in extending a diplomatic hand. The manner in which the North Korean state has handled the tests and international response is reflective of their foreign policy strategy of nuclear deterrence into formal diplomacy.

Rather than an imminent collapse, the North Korean state has never been so unified and so capable as it is now. Not only have they attained limited nuclear proficiency, and possibly the ability to project its nuclear power well beyond its immediate region through a intercontinental missile delivery system, they have attained party unity to action reforms. Moreover, they have shown full willingness to negotiate the matter of nuclear development and the sanctions against them. While it is unlikely that they will surrender current and future developments as Iran has done, the possibility of a non-conflict resolution seems realistic.

The Syrian Civil War: Victorious Ceasefire

After nearly five years of conflict, the Syrian Civil War saw a brief respite with the truce on the 27th of February, 2016. The idea behind it was simple; bring the primary belligerents to the table and discuss terms of each party and to allow humanitarian efforts to be deployed to the war stricken regions. However, the the temporary cessation of hostilities between the "moderate" rebels and the government forces opened the opportunity for redirection of their focus to a common enemy, the ISIL. The initial expectations of the truce was very straight forward. With the combined efforts of all parties, the greater evil was to be swiftly defeated, allowing for the rebels and the government to non violently settle their differences through diplomacy, not war.

In the first few months of the ceasefire, the diplomatic efforts seemed to be a resounding success as neither side dared to be the first in challenging the limits and focused their efforts in routing ISIL. The initial success of the ceasefire and consecutive victories against ISIL gave hope to the possibility of bringing the Syrian Civil War to a diplomatic conclusion, but underneath the facade of cooperation, the Syrian government forces saw an opportunity to their predicament.

Leading up to the ceasefire, the Syrian government suffered increasing criticism from the international community as attention from the Ukraine crisis shifted to the middle east (a common trend in the pattern of a prolonged conflict getting little to no attention in the first two years, gaining increasing attention for the following two years, and then fading into obscurity and left to be resolved by more directly invested parties). The increase in international attention not only brought political pressure to form a transitional government, but bolstered the ranks of the rebels and terrorists as they found success in local and international recruitment.

Given the nature of the conflict, the government forces are stretched thin across large amounts of territories against a multifaceted enemies. This poses several key challenges to the government forces, making the fight against the opposition particularly difficult. Because the opposition is composed of many factions, they lack a single command or logistics structure. This means that successive victories do not necessarily impact the opposition in a negative way as it would if they were a single entity.

Compounding to this issue is the fact that the vast majority of the opposition forces are local rebels, meaning that they can spring out in grassroots fashion from a number of locations, even from government controlled territories. Gaining territory and maintaining effective control over it requires rather heavy investment if the locals of the area have anti-government (more specifically, anti-Assad, as there are rebel groups that support the existence of a greater Syrian government, but not with Assad in power) sentiments.

With these conditions in mind, the ceasefire accomplished several key political and military goals for the government forces. First, the ceasefire gave the Syrian government reprieve from criticism by showing that they were "considering" diplomacy (although I would posit that they never really intended to listen to the opposition). It also effectively stopped large scale fights for a good duration, allowing the international focus in Syria to drop out of the spotlight in favor of other hot new topics. Another tactic employed during the ceasefire was propaganda to convince rebels to lay down their arms and to reintegrate to the state's fold. The lull in fighting was an excellent opportunity for the Syrian government to convince tired insurgents to surrender with the promise of being treated amicably.

Second, groups that were not part of the ceasefire agreement were open targets. While the most prominent groups not part of the ceasefire are ISIL and Al Nusra, any number of small factions could have also been excluded from the ceasefire. In addition, given the contentious nature of rebel factions and alliances, it is not an impossibility for the government forces to single out a group as being "terrorists". Even when the government forces violate the ceasefire against a single group, it is very unlikely that they are to suffer any consequences as the tangentially related rebel groups have little vested interest in coming to their aid. Rather, it is more likely that assisting would result in them getting singled out as well (Russia has adamantly claimed that they will retaliate with force against any groups that violate the ceasefire, although this undoubtedly do not apply to the government forces).

While the initial goals of the United States were to bring down Assad's government and to defeat ISIL, at the current time, it is likely that Assad will not step down, as he is in the best position he has been since the start of the civil war. The ceasefire was intended as a means of putting the civil war on hold to stem the growing tide of ISIL, but it has been instrumental in shifting the balance greatly in favor of the Syrian government. Through the ceasefire, they were able to play the idea of vanguard against terrorists, and starting the process of dividing and conquering all opposition.

While the idea of a transitional government may have been a possibility to save himself, Assad is no longer fearful of losing his station, and will not consider a move in which his power is called into question. In fact, it is entirely possible that Syria went into the ceasefire with no intentions of making peace with the rebels in the first place. According to UN diplomats, the Syrian government representative does not give any consideration to the propositions of the opposition, and acts only to mock and provoke them.

The Syrian Civil War has raged on for more than five years, and it is far from over. Territories have been taken, and retaken by countless factions, and lands continue to change hands to this day and the Syrian government have yet to resolve fundamental political, social, and economic issue that resulted in the rise of the rebellions. I don't doubt that the conflict will continue to rage for several more years to come. However, it is clear that the rebels no longer have the sufficient strength and support to bring the Syrian government to a compromise.