Saturday, January 27, 2018

North Korea: Nuclear Diplomacy

"Let us sit about, and speak feverishly. Chatting into the wee hours of..."
- Micolash

As a North Korea watcher, the recent fervor of activity, discourse, and interest in the ongoing dilemma of the divided Koreas has been exhilarating and seeing so many people taking an interest in what is normally a niche subject is heartening. However, as with any topic that has a sudden influx of interested persons, talks of ridicule, fantasy, and general ignorance are abound. And with a topic that has so very captured the imagination of every persons with its striking relevance in our daily lives (whether it be the mockery of Presidential tweets or dismay of nuclear war), accurate portrayals, realistic expectations, and measured responses are paramount to the formulation of a well informed public consciousness befitting of our country.

The Triad of the Koreas and the States
The current administration of the United States of America (from hereon, USG) has drawn a strict line on the ground in the terms of negotiation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (from hereon, DPRK). The preconditions to any diplomatic talks is complete denuclearization with no exception, and with no formal diplomatic relation between the two nations, any discussions that occur happen through allied proxies. DPRK on the other hand, has voiced desire, and intent in their willingness to engage in talks without any definitive preconditions or want for guarantees, allowing for greater flexibility. Similarly, the Republic of Korea (hereon, ROK) has shown far greater willingness to engage in talks without being tied to the same line that the USG has drawn, following the promises of conciliatory policy towards the DPRK by President Moon Jae-In.

Given the inflexibility of the USG stance, the DPRK and ROK has engaged in talks and to the surprise of many, quickly resulted in an agreement of participation of the DPRK in the Pyeongchang Olympic games and even agreeing to a combined DPRK-ROK women's hockey team for the winter games. The swiftness of the talks and outcome cannot be understated. Within a span of a single week, the two countries went from a state of high tension to discussing the Olympic games, and even as far as combining the national teams under a single banner of a unified Korea. This speaks volumes of the differences in the sensibilities of the USG and ROK vis-a-vis the DPRK "problem" and the willingness of ROK to breakaway from the USG led bloc, making the rigid USG stance untenable as a leader in Asian International Relation matters.

Live by the Sword, Survive by the Sword
Presently, the topic of a nuclear capable DPRK is of highest importance to the USG vis-a-vis their command of the Pacific and Asia, and more recently, a developing homeland threat. While the USG has repeatedly admonished the DPRK for its insistence at nuclear development, claiming it to be highly destabilizing to the region. From the perspective of the DPRK however, stability in the greater region does not affect them in the same manner as the more advanced nations they are surrounded by. Since the armistice of the Korean war, the DPRK has felt a continual presence of an existential threat from both friend and foe. Being in such a precarious position, surrounded not just by overwhelming economic, political, and military might, but also by nuclear weapons, the DPRK has felt a strong desire for nuclear equilibrium as a guarantor of survival.

Interestingly, Kim Jong Un has proclaimed the recent nuclear advancements and successes as proof of having attained a functional and ready nuclear force, and in accordance to the doctrine of dual-track nuclear and economic development, the country will pursue economic betterment. While this is clearly not a proclamation of ceasing further nuclear development, it does in a way signal how the party perceives the progress of nuclear development; that is to say, they feel that they've achieved some minimum threshold needed for a functional nuclear force. In addition to the renewed efforts of diplomatic engagement with ROK, the implication seems to be that the DPRK feels that they've achieved the initial goals of nuclear development (first, as a military deterrence, and second, as a bargaining tool).

Final Thoughts
The USG has managed to sustain a  position of no-position for decades; by demanding the impossible, they maintained the status-quo of not having to deal with the complexities of negotiating and defining a clear foreign policy strategy. Meanwhile, the DPRK has managed to not only narrowly skirt a potential war in the Korean peninsula, it has also gained a powerful military and political tool, and has already wielded it to great effect against the ROK. The gambit of complete non-compliance in face of the entire international community including its few allies did not dissuade them, nor were they dissuaded by the impressive sanctions regime which they've managed to circumvent with surprising grace and agility. And its rewards were handsome and invaluable, cementing Kim Jong Un's rule over the party and country, ensuring the state's survival for the foreseeable future, gained international respect (or fear) and prominence as a nuclear power, and a power bargaining tool.