Traditional conceptualizations of rationality describes a thought process that is based on reason and fact. Competing modern theories offer a different idea, where the concept of rationality does not make an objective judgement on the quality of the process, but rather considers the thought process within the circumstances of the actor, and how certain choices may be more likely in a given situation. In Political Science, the concept of rationality is often used to explain actions of a state, or in the case of authoritative governments, the actions of a single entity (dominant party or individual). This is a useful tool for political analysts to quantify the decisions of their subject as well as to create predictive models for their future actions.
This alternative conceptualization of rationality is especially critical when trying to understand the actions of "rogue" entities. Given the unique circumstances in which these entities often operate in, it can be very difficult for western born and bred analysts to fully understand seemingly "irrational" actions by these actors that might as well be completely mad. This can be attributable to one of the most common cognitive traps for intelligence analysis, where one's own perspective and values are projected onto the subject.
In the case of North Korea, it can be especially frustrating trying to understand the motivations behind their threats of war and military actions that only lead to tarnishing the North Korea's international reputation and economic prosperity as they are stamped with sanctions and admonished for their hostility. The issue of analyzing North Korea has been more important than it has ever been as they increasingly take the role of the belligerent against South Korea, Japan, and the US by their continued missile tests, and threats of war.
Within the past two years, North Korea has increasingly stepped up their nuclear weapons research and continues to make improvements to their missile delivery capabilities. With each successive test, North Korea has been met with harsh criticisms and economic sanctions. Given the importance of economic prosperity in maintaining a non democratic rule (there is a correlation between relative economic prosperity and the attitude of the populace towards non democratic governments), it would seem folly in knowingly act in a way that would garner further economic sanctions.
However, North Korea is in a unique situation where the general population has exceedingly low capacity for revolution for a number of reasons, leaving the military and the Worker's Party of Korea the only possible avenues of threat to Kim Jong Un's position. When this is taken into consideration, the relative economic prosperity of the country as a whole may be less threatening to the existence of the regime than strife from the upper echelons of the government and military.
By taking the role of the belligerent, North Korea accomplishes two goals; appeasing the military by adherence to the Songun principle, and consolidating hard power into the hands of the top leaders of the military (as Kim Jong Un is considered the commander in chief, this would mean development of the highest grade of military might is in his direct purview of control). In addition, once the long range nuclear missile capabilities of North Korea is realized, it acts as the ultimate tool of deterrence and potentially preventing any direct military actions against the regime in the foreseeable future.
The interesting question then is at which point does military belligerency become a less favorable course of action over diplomacy? From my conjecture, North Korea has to meet several key conditions. First, it must feel secure, which should be facilitated by completion of their ICBM program, allowing them to deliver their nuclear warhead across the Pacific Ocean to hit key areas of the US. Second, the continued degeneration of the cult of personality as the generational divide from Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. This will force North Korea to seek additional sources of legitimacy over grand idolization of their supreme leader. Third, increased standard of living, via economic prosperity and increased access information from outside of North Korea. Currently, it is only the social and political elites that enjoy the privilege of having access to goods and information from outside of the country, but even if the regime does not specifically seek to raise the overall standard of living, it will inevitably climb as North Korea as a whole becomes more prosperous (even if their relative GDP does not increase, given sufficient time, their absolute wealth should increase). Having met basic needs and having greater awareness of the world at large, the revolutionary capabilities of the general population will rise, which will make appeasing them a greater priority for the regime.
While I do not believe that the North Korean regime will eventually self destruct, playing the waiting game with North Korea is a risky approach given the destructive capability it holds against South Korea and potentially Japan and US if it refines its ICBM technology. If posed with an extreme existential crisis, it is not unfathomable that they would be willing to risk extreme military action in a bid for survival at great cost. There could be two possible scenarios in which such a case is possible. Internal dissent, causing North Korea to instigate action to assert internal solidarity, and external threat, causing North Korea to play brinkmanship to gamble for respite.Given that a general principle that should be followed is that one should not corner North Korea with an ultimatum that threatens its existence.
No comments:
Post a Comment