Introduction
Following the recent and short lived ceasefires of early November, pro government forces have made concerted effort to claim the remainder of rebel controlled areas of Eastern Aleppo. They were met with limited resistance and made successive gains as the rebels opted to retreat and regroup in fear of being cut-off from each other. While there has been a renewed attempt at a limited ceasefire (conducted unilaterally by pro government forces after rejecting a ceasefire motion from the UN) to evacuate both civilians and provide the rebels with an option to abandon their territory, the fall of Aleppo is inevitable and likely will happen in the coming months before the half of 2017. With the fall of Aleppo, the future of Syria will be on the discussion table between the major power brokers at play. As it stands, the following parties will see an opportunity to influence the shaping of Syria post-conflict to various effect: Russia, Iran, Turkey, and smaller Syrian regional agents.
Russia
Russia's involvement in the Syrian conflict is multifaceted, ranging from their interests in maintaining/expanding their geopolitical sphere of influence, concerns over the availability of Middle Eastern oil for the European market, and maintaining the Russian naval installation in Tartus, Syria. However, the immediate effect of a favorable outcome in the Syrian Conflict for the Russians is in ensuring the existence of the Tartus naval facility, as well as opening up the possibility of additional bases. The naval facility in Tartus serves to expand the range of operations of Russian naval crafts deployed in the Mediterranean Sea, and more specifically, allow the resupply and repairing of vessels without necessitating a transit through the Bosphorus Strait. Given the tenuous nature of Turkey-Russia relations, unhindered usage of the strait is not guaranteed, which then could be a focal point of weakness for the Russian Navy's ability to project its power into the Mediterranean.
While a second naval isn't out of the question, an air base would serve to allow Russia to not only project sea power, but also air power without having to rely on the good will of Iran to conduct effective air missions. As previous incidents in the Syrian Conflict has shown, the compliance of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq are essential for the utilization of their air space and can be revoked. There is the outstanding question of the possible repercussions of having an air base that can become "cutoff" from the main body of Russia on the circumstances of political good will of tenuous allies, it is nonetheless something they might pursue.
Iran
As a dedicated strategic ally of Syria, Iran has invested significantly in ensuring the preservation of Assad's rule and to use it as a staging ground from which they can project their power throughout different areas in the region. With the successful suppression of anti government elements, Iran will seek to solidify its position in Syria to increase its effectiveness in conducting operations beyond, as well as within Syria. Iran has made it clear that they have intentions of establishing naval bases in Syria, and while this may come into conflict of the existing Russian naval base and may not materialize in the near future, the continued presence of Iranian military is guaranteed.
Turkey
Although late into the conflict, Turkey has quickly become a significant player through their Operation Euphrates Shield, entering Northern Syria to engage what they call terrorist elements of Kurdish PYG. While Turkish operations against Kurdish elements is not new, the recent political climate in Turkey along with a string of terrorist attacks have resulted in an escalation of operations against PKK, and now, the PYG and YPG. Turkey maintains a stance of hostility against Assad's regime, but have opted to intervene militarily to subdue ISIL and Kurdish rebels. In recent statements, Turkey has made it public their desire to establish military bases in Syria. Given the contentious nature of Turkey's relationship with Syria and its primary backers, the feasibility of such an endeavor remains questionable. Regardless, it is expected that there will be a continuation of Turkish presence for the near future as they pursue ISIL and Kurds in both Syria and possibly Iraq (Turkey's comments on their interests in intervening in the battle for Monsul has been met with objection by Iraq, but given the presence of PKK in Iraq, it remains to be seen if Turkey's security interests supersedes Iraq's unwillingness).
Syrian Militias
The breath of the Syrian Conflict encompassed all regions of the country and the capacity for Assad's forces were limited even from the early stages, necessitating the recruitment of regional militias. As a result of the prolonged conflict, the formal government forces has suffered from extreme demoralization, desertion, suffering from a myriad of organizational problems. The phenomenon of the prevalence of regional militias in the Middle East is commonly observed and often act as points of sectarianism and later, violence on political or religious lines of contention. Based on Russian reports, the growing inability of the formal military has led to the empowering of militias. To reduce the likelihood of a recurring civil war, the regional militias must be demilitarized, but with the poor state of the SAF (Syrian Armed Forces), this will be a difficult feat that will face intense opposition.
A Divided Syria
With the coming end of the Syrian Conflict, the future of Syria will be shaped by the dominant power brokers involved in the conflict. Although Assad has managed to maintain his rule without compromise to his status as President, he will have to rely on the help of his allies in maintaining order and engaging in reconstruction efforts. This will come at a cost as Syria become host to foreign forces for the foreseeable future and will have to juggle power and political relations with local militias.
Although the major foreign powers involved all have voiced their interest in establishing a base of sorts, it remains to be seen whether a compromise can be made. For Syria, reconstruction efforts and foreign aid might be the leveraging point that will make them concede to becoming host to more foreign military bases. However, I remain skeptical on whether those foreign powers can come to an agreement on their willingness to engage in co-occupancy. The prospect of an Iran-Russia co-occupancy may be more likely due to the close alignment of Syria-Iran-Russia, but Turkey remains the odd one out, viewed with suspicion by the three.
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