With the lack of progress in achieving a non-military solution to the DPRK's continued belligerence in regards to nuclear development, the possibility of a limited attack (bloody nose) looms menacingly above our heads. In its essence, the use of violence is the physical manifestation of political discourse. That is to say, violence is never a means and an end to itself, but rather, a continuation, and most often, the apex of a conversation between two states. As such, the pursuit of military action must not be an invocation of emotional response, and instead, must be part of a considered and deliberate stratagem to elicit specific reactions.
The Feasibility of Limited Attack
The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (M.A.D.) tells us that the possession of weapons of mass destruction between opposing parties will lead to a scenario in which use of the weapons will result in a full-scale exchange, ensuring the total annihilation of all parties involved. And interestingly, the scale of the destructive power of nuclear weapons allows for a equilibrium between parties of asymmetric nuclear capability. This is in part due to the relative "risk" that is involved in a nuclear exchange, and the asymmetry of "pain tolerance" between states of very disproportionate economic power. To use a silly analogy, a nuclear fight is like that of two people in a pit of oil, one with a single match, and the other, with a whole box of matches.
However, the existence of nuclear weapons is not an end to traditional forms of conflict, and certainly not an end to limited military actions or exchanges between nations. As history has shown us, the military rivalry between the US and Soviet Union did not spell an end to the conflict, and while it did have the effect of preventing a full-out war between the two nations, conflict via proxies took the stage as the language of violence during the Cold War. And similarly, the history between the US (and by association, the ROK) and the DPRK is riddled with small exchanges, and although the DPRK lacked the means of a nuclear strike against either US or ROK in the past, they were not foreign to showing their willingness to use military action.
If the US were to hold itself to its words, the possibility of a limited attack seems very real. With the US unwilling to yield in its demand for de-nuclearization, the continued development of both delivery methods and stockpile may force a response. Alternatively, there is also the possibility that the ordeal with the DPRK will end similarly to Obama's administration's demand for Assad to step down. This demand was not reasonable given the scale of commitment of the US (which severely hampered our ability to leverage our wants in the situation), and despite that, the US maintained this position until the problem became obsolete with the change of the Presidency (though the new incumbent may feel less regard for upholding the threats and promises of the previous administration, the inability to enforce the "red line" serves to undermine US leadership and credibility). Like Syria, the current administration may elect for the same "solution", opting for no real actions while the DPRK continues to defy the US.
The Carrot and Stick
The Trump administration's policy towards the DPRK is as follows: There is no acceptable alternative for the US but for complete de-nuclearization of the DPRK. And unfortunately, there has been no clear details as to what form of de-nuclearization would be acceptable to the US, making it not only a categorical antithesis to the nuclear policy of the DPRK, but also a non-negotiable starting point.
In the use of a limited attack, the US would have to communicate clear terms under which the US will exercise the use of further violence if demands are not met. These terms however, cannot be total de-nuclearization of the country, and must allow for a condition that can reasonably be fulfilled by the opposing party (or at least a demand that can be entertained and perhaps negotiated upon). However, diplomacy has a pre-requisition of mutual trust, and with the hostility and clear lack of trust shown between the two countries, the likelihood of success seem dim (from the perspective of the DPRK, it would be prudent to wait for a new administration that more closely embodies the traditional inclinations of the US, which would make far stabler grounds for negotiations).
Furthermore, the recent successes of talks between the DPRK and ROK will be a challenging roadblock for the US in terms of negotiating with the DPRK. ROK's breakaway from the bloc of US led sanctions against DPRK weakens US bargaining position, especially given the fact that any limited attack against DPRK would require close cooperation and buy-in to the plan by the ROK. And having finally managed to find some common ground and deescalation to the situation, a move to introduce military action into the situation would likely garner harsh repudiation by the international community, isolating the US in its negotiation efforts and possibly endangering the sanctions regime (which is already faltering for innumerable reasons).
Conclusion
In the present scenario, it is difficult to imagine a positive outcome to a limited attack, which would only serve to validate DPRK's efforts for self defense, isolate the US from its allies in negotiations, and escalate tensions when it was just on its way down. As discussed in previous works, the DPRK is not in a position to be negotiated to total nuclear disarmament and a limited attack with such preconditions would necessitate a hard reaction from the DPRK. And with the talks with DPRK and ROK progressing, a limited attack would serve to derail those talks, sour our relation with the ROK, and would ultimately do disservice to the effort of pacifying the peninsula.
While the likelihood of a positive outcome from a limited attack is very slim, the US has maneuvered itself into a terrible position, where we must choose from bad and worse options. And with the credibility of the US at risk, and with the long term dangers of "kicking the can" down the road yet again, military action is still a very real possibility. There is also the added domestic political situation to consider, where the need for domestic approval for midterm elections and a second term Presidency may trump (no pun intended) the negative consequences of such actions.
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