As part of the ceasefire, the following conditions apply:
- A clear separation and identification of the "moderate" elements from the extremist.
- Syrian government to stop flying combat missions where the "moderate" opposition is present.
- Allow unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access to all besieged and hard-to-reach areas.
- US and Russia coordinated military strikes against the extremist elements (ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham).
The primary goals of the ceasefire are two folds. First, to provide much needed humanitarian relief to affected civilians, with a priority given to the besieged city of Aleppo in Northern Syria. Second, to make a coordinated effort against the extremist elements, though no clear efforts have been made as of yet as the details of the ceasefire threatens to stop the cooperation before it begins.
Interestingly, some of the "moderate" elements have voiced their concerns on how the ceasefire may disproportionately benefit the pro-government forces. This paper will look the possible benefits and downsides to the ceasefire for each affected party to ascertain the possible outcome after the initial seven day period.
Affected Parties of Interest
Of the parties involved in the Syrian conflict, this analysis will focus on the following groups and how they are affected by the Syrian ceasefire of September 12, 2016 to September 19, 2016.
- Pro-government forces (Syrian Armed Forces, paramilitary, and Hezbollah)
- "Moderate" opposition forces (SDF, FSA, and other minor/local rebel elements)
- Extremist opposition forces (primarily ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Nusra)
- Foreign Powers (this grouping will cover the US, Russia, and Turkey)
- Civilians
Pro-Government Forces
The pro-government forces have been taking an aggressive stance in taking back territory from the opposition and has regularly challenged contested cities in the last few months. Being on the offensive, the exclusive nature of the ceasefire has some key benefits for the pro-government forces. ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham are excluded from the ceasefire and are targets of the coordinated efforts of the US-Russia operations following the ceasefire. This allows the pro-government forces to essentially "divide and conquer" the opposition.
The condition of the ceasefire requiring "moderate" rebels to separate from extreme elements is key to this "divide and conquer" strategy. While some of the moderates share a common enemy in targeting ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (though FSA and other smaller regional actors have frequently coordinated and cooperated with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), the fact that these extremist elements target and pose a threat to the pro-government forces means that they have to stretch their resources across many areas. The ceasefire will allow the pro-government forces to first, eliminate the extremist elements, then to deal with the more poorly equipped and less capable moderate elements who are far more likely than the former to either concede or make concessions.
Furthermore, by implementing a ceasefire, the more technologically equipped pro-government force has a clear first-strike advantage in being able to engage first with overwhelming force via air support and artillery before an adequate response can be mounted. While it remains to see whether the pro-government forces will violate the ceasefire to target the "moderates", the condition of requiring them to separate from extremist elements creates an ambiguity by which they can conduct operations without clear consequences for violation.
Moderate Opposition Forces
While the broad definition of "moderate" opposition forces does not do the diverse groups with their own interests fair justice, for the purposes of this analysis, they are similarly impacted by the ceasefire and will be considered under this single classification.
The condition of requiring "moderates" to separate from the extremist elements is a key downside that may play a significant role in the coming days. For the opposition forces that employ limited to extended cooperation with extremist elements, the condition of breaking ties may prove fatal to their battlefield capacity. They are left with two choices; remain as they are and face the threat of a combined US-Russia air strikes and coordinated pro-government assaults, or separate and abide by the ceasefire as part of the "moderate" elements and hope that the deal of the ceasefire is upheld by the pro-government forces and Russia. Regardless of the choice, they face the threat of limited to full extermination or in the case of separation, a loss in operational capacity and limiting of options for future alliances with the larger opposition forces (ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham).
For those who are not technically part of any extremist elements, they still face the threat of attacks from the pro-government forces and Russia. Given the complexity of the relations in the conflict, it remains difficult to prove or disprove such relations. Without a clearly defined mechanisms for repercussions for violating the ceasefire, the pro-government forces may be liable, as they've done in previous ceasefires, to engage where favorable. Though this will likely result in a swift dissolution of the ceasefire, the first-striker would stand to gain a significant tactical advantage.
Perhaps the one of the few favorable outcome of the ceasefire if properly upheld is the brief respite in the fighting. As the opposition forces are often limited in size, capacity, and unstructured, they likely do not enjoy the advantage of having a robust military organizational capability, namely the use of rotating forces with reserves. While the pro-government forces are able to replenish battle-fatigued troops with fresh reserves on a rotating basis in a structured manner, the militia-like nature of the rebels makes this unlikely for them to employ to proper benefit. The pause in fighting will allow the rebels, who are mostly on the defensive as of September 2016, to get some R&R and time to rebuff their fortifications.
If the full conditions of the ceasefire were to be upheld, the final outcome would still be a net negative to the opposition. As discussed earlier regarding the pro-government forces "divide and conquer" strategy, the loss of a significant threat (extremist elements) would allow the pro-government forces to focus their efforts on eliminating local rebel forces piece by piece. While the "moderates" may be opposed to the extremist elements on an ideological level, their continued existence and threat to the pro-government forces is essential for their continued struggle against Assad.
Extremist Opposition Forces
While the original mission of the ceasefire was to make a concerted effort against the extremist elements, there has been difficulties in actualizing this goal. The tenuous nature of the ceasefire makes it exceedingly difficult for building trust between the factions. The recent incident in Deir ez-Zur has shown the fragility of trust as Russia accuses the US of failing to appropriately coordinate their action in the area, resulting in the death of government forces and potentially aiding ISIL in their efforts against Deir ez-Zur.
Vitaly Churkin, the Russian representative in UN has expressed that this incident has served to further erode their trust in the US's willingness to work with Russia to subdue ISIL and have called into question as to whether there will be any future cooperation after such an incident. With friction between the US and Russia in effectively working together against the extremist elements, it remains questionable as to whether this ceasefire will yield in any effective multilateral action against ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.
US
US officials and representatives still maintain that Assad must be removed from office for a transition of government to occur. However, this rhetoric has seen increasingly less usage in recent months perhaps attributed to the realization of the infeasibility of such a demand. It may also be possible that the US still maintains such a condition internally but have opted to backseat it for convenience as such a stance would make cooperation with Russia difficult.
Given their current position, the US has backed itself into a corner from which it cannot achieve all of its objectives in Syria without prolonging the conflict in hopes of change in circumstances. Without deep commitment, the US backed rebels cannot defeat the pro-government forces, but the current US political climate prevents another case of Iraq with American boots on the ground. Defeating ISIL would eventually result in the defeat of the rebels by process of elimination once the largest threat to Assad's regime (ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) are sufficiently subdued or entirely eliminated. Without complete abandonment of either objective, the "best" move for the US to achieve both is to engage in a war of attrition to test the resolve of Russia and pro-government backers.
Russia
In light of the corner that US has been driven into, Russia's position appears very favorable. Furthermore, the domestic political climate is in high approval of Putin's foreign policy and he encounters little resistance to his ventures in Syria. The economic sanctions against Russia have also proven to be limited in its effectiveness as the Russian economy has slowly started to recover and has been projected to return to positive growths by end of 2017 (World Bank's Russian Economic Report No. 35). The US presidential election will be of great interest for Russia in how the new government will handle Syria, to either deeper involvement or withdrawal. In either case, Russia is in a favorable situation where they will achieve objective victory through US withdrawal or stalemate continued limited involvement by the US.
Civilians
One of the primary purpose of the ceasefire was to provide aid to the affected civilians, particularly those in Aleppo. However, coordination and trust issues have hampered the ability for foreign aid to cross into Syria as they either lack permission to enter or lack confidence in the the guarantee of safety. On September 17, 2016, Vitaly Churkin has made comments in regards to a finalization of an agreement for aid to enter Aleppo via the Castello road. It remains to be seen if such agreements hold and if sufficient aid can be delivered in a short time period, as the ceasefire is due for renewal by September 19, 2016.
Conclusion
The Syrian ceasefire of September 12, 2016 is aimed at providing relief to affected civilians and for coordinating action against extremist elements of the opposition forces. However, the impact of the ceasefire for the involved parties are disproportionate in that it favors the pro-government forces. Given the limited military capability of the rebels and unwillingness for deep involvement by the US, there is no viable alternative in face of this unfavorable deal.
Due to the lack of sufficient US-Russia coordination, the possibility of adequately delivering aid and combating the extremists are doubtful. The "moderate" rebels and the US are left in a situation where the successful accomplishment of the ceasefire objectives would contribute to their eventual defeat, and a partially successful accomplishment to continue their stalemate against Assad's forces. With either side unwilling to concede or make concessions, this conflict is expected to carry on into an indeterminate amount of time into the future.
While the original mission of the ceasefire was to make a concerted effort against the extremist elements, there has been difficulties in actualizing this goal. The tenuous nature of the ceasefire makes it exceedingly difficult for building trust between the factions. The recent incident in Deir ez-Zur has shown the fragility of trust as Russia accuses the US of failing to appropriately coordinate their action in the area, resulting in the death of government forces and potentially aiding ISIL in their efforts against Deir ez-Zur.
Vitaly Churkin, the Russian representative in UN has expressed that this incident has served to further erode their trust in the US's willingness to work with Russia to subdue ISIL and have called into question as to whether there will be any future cooperation after such an incident. With friction between the US and Russia in effectively working together against the extremist elements, it remains questionable as to whether this ceasefire will yield in any effective multilateral action against ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.
US
US officials and representatives still maintain that Assad must be removed from office for a transition of government to occur. However, this rhetoric has seen increasingly less usage in recent months perhaps attributed to the realization of the infeasibility of such a demand. It may also be possible that the US still maintains such a condition internally but have opted to backseat it for convenience as such a stance would make cooperation with Russia difficult.
Given their current position, the US has backed itself into a corner from which it cannot achieve all of its objectives in Syria without prolonging the conflict in hopes of change in circumstances. Without deep commitment, the US backed rebels cannot defeat the pro-government forces, but the current US political climate prevents another case of Iraq with American boots on the ground. Defeating ISIL would eventually result in the defeat of the rebels by process of elimination once the largest threat to Assad's regime (ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) are sufficiently subdued or entirely eliminated. Without complete abandonment of either objective, the "best" move for the US to achieve both is to engage in a war of attrition to test the resolve of Russia and pro-government backers.
Russia
In light of the corner that US has been driven into, Russia's position appears very favorable. Furthermore, the domestic political climate is in high approval of Putin's foreign policy and he encounters little resistance to his ventures in Syria. The economic sanctions against Russia have also proven to be limited in its effectiveness as the Russian economy has slowly started to recover and has been projected to return to positive growths by end of 2017 (World Bank's Russian Economic Report No. 35). The US presidential election will be of great interest for Russia in how the new government will handle Syria, to either deeper involvement or withdrawal. In either case, Russia is in a favorable situation where they will achieve objective victory through US withdrawal or stalemate continued limited involvement by the US.
Civilians
One of the primary purpose of the ceasefire was to provide aid to the affected civilians, particularly those in Aleppo. However, coordination and trust issues have hampered the ability for foreign aid to cross into Syria as they either lack permission to enter or lack confidence in the the guarantee of safety. On September 17, 2016, Vitaly Churkin has made comments in regards to a finalization of an agreement for aid to enter Aleppo via the Castello road. It remains to be seen if such agreements hold and if sufficient aid can be delivered in a short time period, as the ceasefire is due for renewal by September 19, 2016.
Conclusion
The Syrian ceasefire of September 12, 2016 is aimed at providing relief to affected civilians and for coordinating action against extremist elements of the opposition forces. However, the impact of the ceasefire for the involved parties are disproportionate in that it favors the pro-government forces. Given the limited military capability of the rebels and unwillingness for deep involvement by the US, there is no viable alternative in face of this unfavorable deal.
Due to the lack of sufficient US-Russia coordination, the possibility of adequately delivering aid and combating the extremists are doubtful. The "moderate" rebels and the US are left in a situation where the successful accomplishment of the ceasefire objectives would contribute to their eventual defeat, and a partially successful accomplishment to continue their stalemate against Assad's forces. With either side unwilling to concede or make concessions, this conflict is expected to carry on into an indeterminate amount of time into the future.
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