The North Korean Problem

The Background
Recent political events have once again have brought the Korean peninsula to the forefront of international news. With the election of a new US President who promises much more strident stance against enemies of the nation, coupled with the new successor to the DPRK regime who promises security and prosperity in face of international oppression, the world is bearing witness to the threat of unprecedented nuclear war. At the same time, ROK has undergone a series of political turmoil through the Presidential scandal and the question of Asia power balance between physical security and economic prosperity. Complicating the matters further, PRC has been slowly undergoing a transformation in its political climate as President Xi consolidates power directly under his purview, which is becoming scarily reminiscent of a more rigid and top down political structure as was in PRC's recent past, reversing the gradual slope towards democratic forms of governance in the recent years.

While such a threat has often come and gone in the past, the sheer political circumstances of the period has brought the threat closer to reality than perhaps it ever has. Those that may dispute the likelihood of an actual conflict point to past instigation by the DPRK where actual physical confrontations were had and some number of lives lost, but never materialized into a full blown war. As fortuitous as it may be that the current round of escalations did not end up in any firing of weapons with the intent to kill, the precariousness of the current political situation with the real threat of increasingly advanced weaponry being deployed on either side drastically raises the costs of exercising restraint and being on the receiving end of a first strike. Unlike the past, the DPRK is gradually losing the assurance of a "Chinese Option" as the PRC shows a greater willingness to concede to international demands for punishing DPRK for its actions.

Although it is unlikely that a single incident will trigger outright war between the two nations, the rate of escalation, due to the nature of the close proximity of the two countries with advanced weaponry, will be exceedingly fast. To be sure, the threshold for war still remains relatively high and single minor incidents of physical altercations will not likely lead to war; however, the world is seeing an unprecedented level of political and military uncertainty that will have lasting impact into the relation of key nations invested in the Korean peninsula. While many believe that based on a superficial view of just the military capabilities of the DPRK versus the ROK/US, the clear gap in capabilities would disproportionately favor the ROK/US, and therefore dissuade any attempts by the DPRK. However, a modern Korean War would not be a conventional war that is decided on sheer military firepower or technological prowess.

China
The primary concerns of the PRC as it pertains to the DPRK can be summed in almost exclusively security concerns. In part due to the hostilities between the two Koreas, both PRC and the US are heavily invested in the region both militarily and politically. The maintinance of the balance of power in the East Asia has been a highly contested issue and will continue to be the case as the PRC becomes increasingly capable, both militarily and economically, to challenge the dominance of US influence in the region.

Specifically, the continued existence of the DPRK is a crucial matter for PRC for security reasons due to the close relationship the ROK shares with the US as a host to a sizable US military force. For the same reason the US was opposed to the deployment of Soviet weapons into Cuba during the Cold War, PRC is opposed to any form of increase in US military presence in the Pacific, let alone directly in the Korean peninsula. The concerns of a close proximity of US force to the Chinese mainland at the current moment is in part alleviated by the physical separation provided by the existence of the DPRK, and thus its fall would be a major concern to PRC for that reason alone.

With respect to the PRC's security interests in the Korean peninsula, any action that escalates buildup of forces or raises the likelihood of war is detrimental to their interest. The ongoing nuclear development and consequent deployment of THAAD is one example of such escalation. While the escalation of threats and counter-threats have yet to breach the threshold for war, the breakout of formal conflict has the consequence of potentially resulting in the defeat of the DPRK.

Such would be an unacceptable outcome for the PRC and would be enticed to act in one of two ways; assist in repelling the ROK/US forces to prevent the defeat of the DPRK, or invade the DPRK in a simultaneous attack as ROK/US draws the attention of the vast majority of the KPA forces in a bid to establish a buffer zone against the ROK and the Chinese mainland. As to which would yield in a more favorable outcome is difficult to surmise given that it would be contingent on the circumstances of the conflict and results of the first 48 hours of the conflict. On the same token, it does not seem likely for the PRC to risk open conflict against the US to ensure the survival of an ally of limited use that offers arguably net negative returns, and is increasingly troublesome to support.

DPRK
Given the exceedingly precarious situation of their existence, the tension in the Korean peninsula is of utmost concern to the DPRK. With very few allies to rely on and with numerous foes to be cautious for (of both internal and external sources), the foremost matter of the state is survival. This is the prime impetus for the majority of their actions, such as the development of an effective nuclear arsenal to provide the "ultimate" deterrence against external forces, while cultivating unquestionable obedience and loyalty to combat internal dissent.

While the development of advanced weaponry helps even the odds against their inability to match the ROK/US forces in conventional means (both in sheer size and effectiveness), it has resulted in responses in kind through deployment of additional troops and weaponry as well as increase in frequency and breadth of exercises and drills by the ROK/US. A resumption of the Korean War is certainly the last resort for those involved, but doubly so for the DPRK. Despite the rhetoric of a strongman and bravado against its foes, a conventional war would without question end poorly for everyone involved.

In order for the DPRK to commit to an actual war, there must be sufficient expectation of a positive outcome, or conversely, belief that their existence is at an eminent threat. The former may seem unusual given the clear superiority of the ROK/US forces over the KPA. However, it is important to consider the various elements of asymmetry in the two nations that go beyond purely military capability. To list a few, there are likely differences in the willingness to engage in total war, the willingness to violate international norms and laws, and the consideration (or lack thereof) for collateral damage to civilians and non military infrastructures. These self imposed "conditions" of warfare would be a significant factor in determining whether the DPRK has a realistic chance of not necessarily conventional victory over ROK/US, but a means by which they can bargain for a favorable outcome.

The latter scenario is also a growing concern as each side threatens preemptive action in response to the increasing threat of the other. The ROK/US concerns over the development of an effective nuclear weapons delivery system has led to thinly veiled suggestions of preemptive action to prevent the DPRK from attaining said capability. Conversely,  the DPRK has threatened action against what they perceive as invasion and assassination operations exercises by the opposition, and have regularly produced and distributed written and video content of promising destruction of their enemies. Fortunately, these threats have been limited to just words without any significant action behind them. However, the reality of the preemptive strike for either side cannot be ignored; given sufficient reason and appropriate circumstances, either side may become convinced that the threat of the opposition can only be dealt with by a swift and overwhelming first strike.

ROK/US
Unlike the DPRK which, through political ideological as well as practical reasons, have long yearned for and called for reunification, the ROK is less than enthused at the prospect of reunification (the DPRK would stand to gain from such a scenario, but the ROK would face a torrent of political, social and economic complications of integrating a largely unskilled and disconnected population not to mention political conflict due to sharing a border with the Chinese mainland). Instead, the primary concern of ROK/US largely rests in trying to maintain a level of stability while counter balancing the growing Chinese power and influence in the region. At the same time, security concerns must be weighed against economic interests of the two nations, particularly in maintaining a level of working relationship with the PRC.

The rising tensions in the Korean peninsula is a large concern for the ROK/US, where the inevitably of a nuclear DPRK (although they claim to being a nuclear power currently, their means of delivery, yield of warheads, and quantity have yet to raise sufficient concern to warrant immediate action) puts them in a difficult situation. Policy makers and experts disagree as to whether diplomatic or military means are the most effective in deescalating and slowing down the development of nuclear capability and so far, DPRK has made it the highest priority of the state and have accelerated development without pause.

Although there are insufficient motivating factors for ROK/US to start a war unprovoked, the continued development of nuclear capability has put the possibility of a preemptive strike a reality. In its current state, diplomatic relation between the ROK/US and the DPRK is at an all time low, and the soft leverages against DPRK through its allies have also diminished and military measures have served to only antagonize and accelerate development efforts. The latest efforts have amounted to further sanctions against DPRK persons and corporations to increase the economic pressure. While arguably, decrease in foreign capital and procurement of vital goods will hinder nuclear development, it will do little to change the driving incentives that have led to it in the first place.

With the current level of missile delivery system, the DPRK is able to threaten the ROK but not the US. However, there is a clear effort to attain reliable ICBM capability to deliver nuclear warheads across the Pacific. While there is no certainty as to how the US would react if the DPRK was able to successfully demonstrate ICBM capability, it would undoubtedly raise grave concerns. Without additional privy to operational plans at a military level, I can only give conjectures, but it is not unreasonable to think that if the DPRK were seen to be making a clear move for war by means of troop movement or significant missile site activity, the chances of a preemptive strike in lieu of a DPRK attack is possible.

Final Thoughts
For the major actors involved in the Korean peninsula tension, each side has their own share of interests, concerns, and threshold for war. The rising tension in the peninsula have yet to break this theoretical threshold, but the rise is indisputable, and the prospect of war have never been as high as it is now. In spite of the doom and gloom however, reality suggests there is still much headroom left sans any unforeseen disaster immediately triggering a hostile military response. This is because for those involved, a Korean war would serve to threaten not only threaten to permanently damage the stability in the region, and whether victorious or not, those involved will likely suffer significant casualties in both lives and livelihood.

In lieu of an actual conflict that brings about the formal end of the Korean War with a violent conclusion, it is more likely that we will bear witness to a DPRK limping along into the future for at least the next several decades under Kim Jong Un's rule. The next pivotal shift will come with the end of the current generation where we will see either a continuation of the Kim regime with a Kim progenitor, or a more party based rule akin to the PRC. As the DPRK continues to grow economically, the country will see the standard of living gradually rise, and eventually, there will be a necessity to, at least partially, integrate itself with the global community.

From a ROK/US perspective, a war is only as likely as it is to start it themselves. However, the stakes of inaction as the DPRK develops its nuclear capability is not an effective long term solution. While inaction may avoid war in the immediate present, there is no guarantee that it will in prevent all future Korean wars. The peculiarity of DPRK's political environment leaves ample room for scenarios in which, given certain conditions are met, may be inclined to force a confrontation. With recent developments in the DPRK/PRC relation and US/PRC relation, new avenues of leverage against the DPRK may appear in the form of more effective sanctions. While historically, sanctions have never been sufficiently effective in inducing compliance from the DPRK, genuine cooperation and political pressure by the PRC may yield favorable results.

With a new ROK president who promises increased effort to resolve the issue by diplomatic means, I am hopeful of new positive developments. I acknowledge the myriad of criticisms that exist against previous diplomatic efforts, particularly those against the Kaesong industrial project. And given that Moon Jae-In has made it clear that the resumption of the Kaesong project is in serious consideration, skepticism to the diplomatic efforts are not unfounded. However, many experts, including myself (to be clear, I consider myself a hobbyist, not an expert) firmly believe that a general rise in economic well-being is a key means by which the DPRK can transform into a less hostile state (or at least a more predictable one). At the same time, I am also cognizant of the fact that in the current state of affairs, an influx of funds will most certainly be utilized in nuclear and related military projects without any benefit to the common North Korean at large. I am cautiously hopeful that a combination of diplomatic re-engagement with economic integration with carefully designed actions targeting military procurement and development will have a meaningful effect and avoid a Korean War.