US and North Korea: Nuclear Brinksmanship

Between August 8 and August 14, the US and North Korea exchanged heated threats, escalating to nuclear brinksmanship and promises of absolute annihilation. Events of this type typically do not warrant a second thought given the almost casual nature and frequency in which the two countries exchange threats and the lack of genuine concern from said threats. However, this particular instance deserves closer scrutiny for a number of reasons. The unprecedented nature of the threat (typically, the threats are one sided, coming from a belligerent North Korea, but this time, it was instigated by the US in a fashion not too different from the hermit kingdom), the particular circumstances that led to it, and the current political climate in regards to NK-US relations.

The Backdrop

The following recounts the key moments of this event in chronological order

August 8 - The Washington Post publishes, "North Korea now making missile-ready..."

August 8 - President promises, "fire and fury", against further North Korean threats

August 8 - North Korea to review operational plans for missile strike against Guam.

August 9 - North Korea details operational plan against Guam

August 10 - President doubles down on threat against North Korea

August 10 - China's President issues statement, will stand by NK if attacked, but will not if it attacks

August 10 - USAF indicates readiness of bombers at Guam

August 11 - President delivers a more subdued statement on NK without any additional threats following a security briefing

August 11 - President tweets, "Military solutions are now fully in place,locked and loaded..."

August 13 - NSC Advisor, McMaster asserts that war is not imminent

August 14 - Sec. DoD, James Mattis warns an attack against Guam is war, but emphasizes will not start one unprovoked

August 14 - North Korea admonishes US for its aggressive statements and warns of attack if aggression continues

Escalation in such a rapid manner took the world for a spin, as statements from each side came one after another, raising the stakes further. With the situation mostly defused, the world may soon forget this event as another set of empty threat by the "crazy" hermit kingdom. But the circumstances surrounding this event is very peculiar and among North Korean watchers (I find such a label very apt for a number of reasons, as we are mere observers of limited privy into the actual machinations of the North Korean state and often powerless to act in a meaningful way), this incident warrant closer examination on many levels.

The Impetus

According to The Washington Post (WaPo), a report dated July 28 notes that, "The IC assesses North Korea has produced nuclear weapons for ballistic missile delivery, to include delivery by ICBM-class missiles,". The DIA and the ODNI declined to comment on the document. Hours later, during a White House brief on the opioid crisis, when a reporter asks for a comment on the WaPo report, the President threatens with, "fire and fury".

Points of Interest

1. Is this a genuine article of the DIA?

Reluctance on the part of the DIA and ODNI to comment on the WaPo report is not indicative of its legitimacy, and while NBC News reported that, based on confidential disclosures of unnamed sources, other members of the IC do indeed agree, for the public, veracity of WaPo's report remains wholly unconfirmed (this is not to say that it is not genuine, but it remains a point of interest given that this was the start of the incident).

2. Was the President aware of the report, as either a WaPo and/or a DIA product?

Listening to the transaction between the questioner and the President, this question remains unanswered. Here is the transcript in full:

Reporter - "Any comments on the report on North Korea's nuclear capabilities?"

President - "North Korea, must not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen. He has been very threatening beyond a normal state, and as I said, they will be met with fire and fury, and frankly power, likes of which the world has never seen before."

The answer is highly peculiar, especially the first part in context of the question. The WaPo's publication had nothing in regards to a North Korean threat, nor has there been any new threats made at the time of the questioning. It is unclear whether the President referring to threats categorically, or if he misinterpreted the question as being asked about a particular threat (one perhaps that he is not aware of). Or it is entirely possible that the President did understand the context of the question and simply answered in his own fashion, where he clearly defines a point of contention (the threat) in order to form an aggressive stance towards it (I concede that this one is highly dubious, but for the sake of being charitable, it remains, even if remote, a possibility). Following the last possibility (the President understood the context of the question), does his answering give credence to the legitimacy of WaPo's report? Given the above scenarios, I posit the following possibilities

• The President was not aware of WaPo's report (given they are roughly 1-2 hours apart, this is entirely possible) and misunderstood the question and opted to sternly warn North Korea
• Unwilling to confirm or deny the WaPo report, the President opts to sternly warn North Korea
• Wishing to maintain a "strong front" despite the lack of legitimacy of WaPo's report, the President opts to sternly warn North Korea

Did the President threaten nuclear war with the North Koreans due to a misunderstood question or perhaps without knowing the legitimacy (or even the cognizance of its existence) of the WaPo/DIA report? If we consider that the WaPo notes July 28 as the date of the document, there are only 11 days between it and the President's statement. Therefore, we must also consider the possibility that even if the DIA report is genuine, it may have yet to reach the ears of the President (additionally, the President at the time was away from the White House in New Jersey, giving further credence to such a possibility).

3. Why did North Korea telegraph their operational plan to strike Guam?

Historically, threats by North Korea follow a particular archetype; bombastic and fantastical to the point where it is clearly identifiable as mere rhetoric rather than credible threats. As such, the explicit details released by North Korea is a drastic departure from the norm. I posit the following which is my speculation as to why they decided to telegraph their plan.

As with any significant change in personnel in the US government, the North Koreans are undoubtedly interesting in testing the boundaries of their relationship with the new President. Observation of US politics since the new presidency would have shown North Korea that the new President is fond of showmanship and use of hyperbolic statements to leverage relations. Following the "fire and fury" statement, North Korea was interested in using the opportunity to test, and perhaps extend the boundary of what actions are permissible while avoiding physical confrontation. Furthermore, given the lack of relative confidence levels of verifying the veracity of such threats of a new President, North Korea had to prepare/respond in some fashion regardless.

By telegraphing its exact plans to strike Guam, North Korea signals to the world exactly what it intends in order to avoid a potential incident (or at least limiting the fallout/response of an incident) if they felt compelled to carry out its plan. According to General Kim Rak Gyom of Strategic Force of the KPA, the plan are as follows: Simultaneous fire of four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range strategic ballistic rockets, crossing Shimane, Hiroshima, and Kochi Prefectures of Japan, traveling for a total distance of 3,356.7 km for 1,065 seconds before hitting the waters 30 to 40 km away from Guam. There are several elements here worthy of consideration.

• Number and type of rockets to be used to avoid misinterpretation and inappropriate reaction by the US
• Notes crossing of Japanese airspace to assuage potential concerns from Japan
• Notes flight time and exact location of target to telegraph trajectory to avoid misreads of missile destination
• Specifies hitting water to telegraph their intent to use force, but not directly on a civilian or military target

Additionally, the North Koreans had the foresight of adding that the execution of the plan would be contingent upon the leader's will, leaving themselves an out to the situation if necessary. This leads me to believe that the North Koreans were very much serious on making real on their threat and wanted the world to know this.

The Outcome

After several days of back and forth, the situation has finally calmed on August 14, as US officials made it clear that while the US is militarily ready to respond to any threat, there will not be a preemptive strike against North Korea as the President may have alluded to. Similarly, North Korea has made the statement that they will not go forward with the plan on attacking Guam at the current time.

Most people will look back on this event as nothing more than another one of North Korea's "shenanigans", but in truth, we bore witness to the foundation of North Korea/US relations for the duration of our current presidency.

From this event, North Korea has learned a wealth of information that will be to their benefit.

• The President makes hyperbolic statements without the intent to act upon them
• US officials will contradict the rhetoric espoused by the President
• Functionally, US foreign policy towards North Korea has not visibly changed
• China has limits in its patience towards North Korea's antics, but their fundamental security interests have not changed in relation to the US
• If they elect to interpret the President's response as confirmation of the DIA assessment, they now have knowledge of the fact that the US IC considers their nuclear capability as having advanced significantly

As North Korea continues to advance its ICBM technology, we will see a continuance of similar incidents into the foreseeable future. North Korea deems its nuclear capability an absolute requirement to its survival, and the US considers a fully nuclear capable (ability to threaten mainland US is the next step, as they are likely more than capable of threatening South Korea and Japan already) to be absolutely unacceptable. With neither side showing willingness to yield and with official channels of diplomacy effectively broken (North Korea and US do not maintain an embassy in each other's countries, and while there are back-channels for talks with North Korea, officials caution against optimism), tensions will reignite, each time hotter than before.