The Situation
The DPRK continues to defy the the international community as it successively tests missiles and nuclear bombs, with the latest nuclear test achieving a yield in excess of 100 kilotons to most estimates, and an array of successful missile tests of varying ranges, capable of hitting targets as far as the US west coast. In response, the UN has levied numerous sanctions and strengthened existing ones to cover not just materials in direct support of military efforts, but to also cover goods and necessities of every day North Koreans. Yet, to the dismay of the rest of the world, the DPRK seems inexplicably resilient against any efforts to dissuade them from their pursuit of nuclear power, and each successive test realizes the worst of our fears; a nuclear DPRK with the capability to carry out its abhorrent threats of complete annihilation of the US and its allies.
There is a growing international unity against the DPRK, and even its closest allies have joined in on the chorus, calling for a cessation of escalatory actions. Despite having quite literally the world against them, Kim Jong Un has made it clear that he has no intent on yielding and will complete his nuclear program at all costs (there is likely no real end to the DPRK's nuclear effort, only a bare minimum threshold of acceptable capability). What are the forces that convince the DPRK that they must develop a capable nuclear force without regard for the costs involved?
In the public consciousness, a common and convenient excuse is to attribute Kim Jong Un with mental instability. Suffice to say, calling someone irrational has the magical explanatory powers for everything without delving into the complexity that is the machination of East Asia geopolitics. Not only is this a poor excuse for unwilling to exercise any critical thinking to properly understand this very dangerous and uncertain situation, it also undermines the severity of the threat in the public consciousness. For the past several decades, the world has continued to laugh at the DPRK. Then they tested their first nuclear bomb. The world continued to laugh at the DPRK. Then they continually tested and succeeded in refining their missile capability. Still, the world continues to laugh at the DPRK, and now they have the ability to shoot missiles with nuclear bombs across the Pacific and destroy American cities. Will we still be laughing moments before a missile lands on our cities?
Nuclear Power at All Costs
What are the factors that influence DPRK's decision making in their willingness to undergo any and all punishment to pursue nuclear power?
- Nuclear Deterrence
- Internal Political Forces
- Ineffective Sanctions Regime
Each of these forces provide the push and pull incentives that inform their conclusion in believing that ultimately, the benefits of attaining a powerful nuclear force outweighs the costs associated with its pursuit. As consequence of these numerous factors influencing their thinking, the prospect of a cessation, let alone a disarmament agreement is a distant fantasy.
Nuclear Deterrence
The most clear benefit behind a nuclear DPRK is classic nuclear deterrence. While the modern landscape has given rise to asymmetric warfare without triggering a MAD scenario, nuclear weapons remain one of the surest ways to dissuade an opponent from engaging in conventional warfare. More interestingly, not only has history solidified their belief for a need for nuclear deterrence, but recent actions by the current administration has given them ample real-time validation of their beliefs.
In recent memory, the US military has acted with the explicit intent to dispose of foreign leaders in three cases: Iraq, Libya, and Syria. These historical cases paint a clear picture in the mind of DPRK; if you are considered an undesirable by the US, you will be subject to military attack.
Iraq
- Dismantled its WMDs
- Unable to trust them, US invades
- Saddam Hussein was executed
Libya
- Discontinued its WMD development after witnessing the Iraq War
- US and coalition forces "intervene"
- Gaddafi is killed by rebels
Syria
- Has chemical weapons, but not the means to threaten US
- US assists anti-government forces in an attempt to remove Assad from power
In a more recent and perhaps most important example, the US and Iran had forged an agreement where Iran would cease nuclear development in exchange for lifting of sanctions. Despite abiding by the terms of the agreement, and having US and international agencies inspect and confirm compliance, the US is threatening to break the agreement. Given these examples, it is unlikely that the DPRK would be inclined to barter in exchange for disarmament.
The message is indisputable; those the US consider an "axis of evil" will not be tolerated and if circumstances permit, they will be dealt with. With that in mind, there is a clear incentive for the DPRK to establish nuclear deterrence, as they believe it to be not just essential to, but perhaps the means of survival itself.
Asymmetrical Equilibrium
Another curious factor in the establishment of a nuclear deterrent is the asymmetry between the DPRK and the US (similarly applicable to ROK and Japan). The idea of MAD was a semi-functional doctrine was during the Cold War era, where the major powers wielded sufficient destructive power to ensure total annihilation of each other. The theory posits that, given sufficient advancement of military capability, the potential of mutual destruction will create, albeit uneasy disincentive for wars. For a variety of reasons, the MAD doctrine as a theory has shown to be ineffective in face of limited and asymmetrical war.
Specifically, in the case of the relation between the DPRK and the US, history has proven that limited and asymmetrical confrontation will not lead to a unilateral nuclear response on the part of the US, let alone a tit-for-tat response against DPRK for its belligerence. Examples range from limited artillery exchanges resulting in the death of ROK civilians, torpedoing of a ROK naval vessel, and cyber-attacks against Japanese companies. In each of these cases, the US and its allies did not respond in kind, but often opted for soft measures via sanctions and the likes.
Specifically, in the case of the relation between the DPRK and the US, history has proven that limited and asymmetrical confrontation will not lead to a unilateral nuclear response on the part of the US, let alone a tit-for-tat response against DPRK for its belligerence. Examples range from limited artillery exchanges resulting in the death of ROK civilians, torpedoing of a ROK naval vessel, and cyber-attacks against Japanese companies. In each of these cases, the US and its allies did not respond in kind, but often opted for soft measures via sanctions and the likes.
This concept of asymmetry allows for a formulation of "equilibrium" of sorts, in the sense that mere possession of nuclear weapons will create deterrence without needing to match the US in quantity or quality. This is especially evident in light of the relative threshold for pain that each side is willing to endure. The US, as a far more prosperous and privileged country would be far less willing to incur costs to their own livelihood, especially in the event of a DPRK transgression that affects ROK or Japan, but not the US directly. This among many others are points of leverage that the DPRK has in establishing an asymmetrical equilibrium of deterrence with its relatively inferior conventional and nuclear force.
Perpetual Revolutionary State
Perpetual Revolutionary State
As a prerequisite to maintaining a revolutionary state, there is a necessity to establish and maintain an "enemy". As discussed in previous articles, the existence of the revolutionary state has a complex push and pull mechanism. Not only are those in power rewarded for maintaining the status quo, they would be susceptible to a blow-back if the process of national development falls out of their control. The foundation upon which the current regime is built is not conducive to a dramatic change in economic or political ideology. By upholding the status quo, the regime is able to express a high level of control, and thereby direct the means and rate at which the country transform.
Exaltation of the KPA
One of the core components of a revolutionary state and one of the founding principles of the DPRK is the exaltation of the KPA (Korean People's Army). The tenuous grip of the Kim family over the country was originally built upon a socialist and anti-imperialist platform, which necessitates exaltation of the People's Army as the manifestation of the "struggle" against the oppressors. This sort of high valuation of the military comes at a cost. The regime secures its rule through a high concentration of power and violence within a highly stratified elite, but that same apparatus, being one of the very few pillars of power within the state, has the means to remove the family from power.
In a sort of way, the regime is held upright and entrapped by the same group, preventing it from straying off-course, lest it beget violent backlash. The importance of the military was well understood by Kim Jong Un. As he came into power, the Worker's Party and the KPA saw dramatic changes as senior members were swiftly replaced with members directly loyal to Kim Jong Un, and even went as far as eliminating his estranged half-brother to limit the possibility of a regime change.
The development of a nuclear force is one of the greatest achievement and power that a military force can attain. As such, its development has a multifaceted incentive of being materially important to national security as a deterrence as well as serving to place emphasis on the importance of the KPA to the very survival of the country. It is a powerful propaganda tool that glorifies the military and its achievements, deters outside forces from engaging in conventional warfare, and serves as a powerful negotiating tool.
Limited External Leverage
The DPRK sits in a rather peculiar position with its nuclear development that makes it especially difficult to deal with. While there are some limited analogue in the nuclear development of other countries such as Iran, the DPRK has a unique position that heavily limits the ability of the international community to compel them to abandon its efforts. Unlike many other countries, the DPRK does not value their public face (nearly as much as others) in the global scene, making any form of public shaming or admonishment moot. For a number of reasons not fully explored here, the DPRK does not rely on its reputation nearly as much as other countries for trade, nor does it have a significant expat or diplomatic presence outside of the country, making such efforts very limited in effect.
Sanctions have also been historically ineffective for a number of reasons. The DPRK has practiced the principle of Juche (self-sufficiency) for decades, and while they are far from being completely independent from the outside world, they are careful in becoming too reliant on foreign trade. China, the largest importer and exporter with the DPRK, often takes a soft stance in enforcing sanctions, and coupled with the self enforcing and self reporting nature of UN sanctions, having a significant impact on DPRK trade is exceedingly difficult. Even when properly enforced, the DPRK has proven to be elusive and very proficient in bypassing sanctions by setting up proxy companies, dealing through intermediates, and having a large illicit network that wouldn't be subject to the law in the first place.
Interestingly, the current sanctions regime is tougher and more thorough than anything before. More countries are actively participating in limiting their interaction on both an economic and diplomatic level with the DPRK, and its key allies have started to enforce the sanctions more stringently. In a recent move, the US Treasury was given authority to act against businesses that partake in activities to the benefit of the DPRK. Whether the Treasury will actually go after businesses in an aggressive manner is yet unknown, but this is a move that can have huge implications on the ability for the DPRK to evade sanctions in countries that are may have typically been inclined to look the other way in the past.
Conclusion
For decades, the DPRK has put economic development subservient to national security, culminating to the ultimate form of deterrence by nuclear force. This slow crawl towards the realization of a nuclear DPRK has been a long process, and with each step, the international community sought to dissuade them from achieving it. The DPRK is determine to fulfill their nuclear aspirations, and dissuasion seem impossible. Given the myriad of factors that push and pull them towards this goal, the world cannot expect to simply threaten them into compliance. We must approach the problem with care and work to unravel each of these motivating factors in tandem, rather than simply trying to hammer them into submission via sanctions and nothing else.
Exaltation of the KPA
One of the core components of a revolutionary state and one of the founding principles of the DPRK is the exaltation of the KPA (Korean People's Army). The tenuous grip of the Kim family over the country was originally built upon a socialist and anti-imperialist platform, which necessitates exaltation of the People's Army as the manifestation of the "struggle" against the oppressors. This sort of high valuation of the military comes at a cost. The regime secures its rule through a high concentration of power and violence within a highly stratified elite, but that same apparatus, being one of the very few pillars of power within the state, has the means to remove the family from power.
In a sort of way, the regime is held upright and entrapped by the same group, preventing it from straying off-course, lest it beget violent backlash. The importance of the military was well understood by Kim Jong Un. As he came into power, the Worker's Party and the KPA saw dramatic changes as senior members were swiftly replaced with members directly loyal to Kim Jong Un, and even went as far as eliminating his estranged half-brother to limit the possibility of a regime change.
The development of a nuclear force is one of the greatest achievement and power that a military force can attain. As such, its development has a multifaceted incentive of being materially important to national security as a deterrence as well as serving to place emphasis on the importance of the KPA to the very survival of the country. It is a powerful propaganda tool that glorifies the military and its achievements, deters outside forces from engaging in conventional warfare, and serves as a powerful negotiating tool.
Limited External Leverage
The DPRK sits in a rather peculiar position with its nuclear development that makes it especially difficult to deal with. While there are some limited analogue in the nuclear development of other countries such as Iran, the DPRK has a unique position that heavily limits the ability of the international community to compel them to abandon its efforts. Unlike many other countries, the DPRK does not value their public face (nearly as much as others) in the global scene, making any form of public shaming or admonishment moot. For a number of reasons not fully explored here, the DPRK does not rely on its reputation nearly as much as other countries for trade, nor does it have a significant expat or diplomatic presence outside of the country, making such efforts very limited in effect.
Sanctions have also been historically ineffective for a number of reasons. The DPRK has practiced the principle of Juche (self-sufficiency) for decades, and while they are far from being completely independent from the outside world, they are careful in becoming too reliant on foreign trade. China, the largest importer and exporter with the DPRK, often takes a soft stance in enforcing sanctions, and coupled with the self enforcing and self reporting nature of UN sanctions, having a significant impact on DPRK trade is exceedingly difficult. Even when properly enforced, the DPRK has proven to be elusive and very proficient in bypassing sanctions by setting up proxy companies, dealing through intermediates, and having a large illicit network that wouldn't be subject to the law in the first place.
Interestingly, the current sanctions regime is tougher and more thorough than anything before. More countries are actively participating in limiting their interaction on both an economic and diplomatic level with the DPRK, and its key allies have started to enforce the sanctions more stringently. In a recent move, the US Treasury was given authority to act against businesses that partake in activities to the benefit of the DPRK. Whether the Treasury will actually go after businesses in an aggressive manner is yet unknown, but this is a move that can have huge implications on the ability for the DPRK to evade sanctions in countries that are may have typically been inclined to look the other way in the past.
Conclusion
For decades, the DPRK has put economic development subservient to national security, culminating to the ultimate form of deterrence by nuclear force. This slow crawl towards the realization of a nuclear DPRK has been a long process, and with each step, the international community sought to dissuade them from achieving it. The DPRK is determine to fulfill their nuclear aspirations, and dissuasion seem impossible. Given the myriad of factors that push and pull them towards this goal, the world cannot expect to simply threaten them into compliance. We must approach the problem with care and work to unravel each of these motivating factors in tandem, rather than simply trying to hammer them into submission via sanctions and nothing else.
No comments:
Post a Comment