Change in Turkey's Relative Geo-Political Power

During the course of the Syrian conflict, Turkey has proven itself an unwieldy ally in the US's fight against Assad and ISIL. Given their own interests in the region and preferred outcome of the conflict, their willingness to follow US leadership has always been questionable. However, recent developments in Turkey have changed the landscape and understanding these new developments is critical to identifying their immediate goals and objectives and their consequent actions into the near future.

These new developments have significant implications to shaping the future of Syria, whether it be favorable to US interests or not, and to the power balance of the Middle East. In no particular order, these points of interests are as follows: the failed coup d'etat and the consequent centralization of power, deepening of partnership with the Russian Federation, and the recent fracturing and uncertainty of the EU following the "Brexit".

The Coup D'etat
Following the failed coup d'etat, President Erdogan has continued to crack down on various elements of the military, judiciary, and other state elements(of particular note, the removal of state educators is especially interesting, as it may be due to his fears of a deep infiltration of Gulenist supporters in state positions). The impact of this is that all the branches of the government has been consolidated under the power of the President. This was accomplished by the three months of "state of emergency" powers bestowed by the constitution, allowing him to circumvent both domestic and international law.

Historically, the Turkish military were institutionally separated from the civilian government to pose as the final check and balance to the direction of the country. However, the indiscriminate purging of both low and high level members of the military will have a strong chilling effect in discouraging any future attempts for another coup d'etat. With no formal domestic institutions hindering Erdogan, he will have less difficulty in executing plans to their security interests in the Middle East.

Russian Relations
Modern Turkey-Russia relations were built on mutual economic and security interests and both benefited from the partnership. The 2015 incident where Turkey shot down a Russian plane severely soured this relation and the economic and any potential military cooperation between the two were immediately cut. In June, 2016, President Erdogan has personally expressed regret over the incident and have made earnest effort to normalize the relation, which has been met with open reciprocation by Russia. Shortly after, Russia followed with resumption of economic relations and promises of close military cooperation for operations in Syria (presumably for targeting mutual adversaries, namely Kurdish rebels and ISIL).

While Turkey often leverages its western partnership for many of its economic and geo-political interests, the normalization of Turkey-Russian relations allows for recourse for when and if it would face western opposition. That is not to say that their partnership with Russia is a de facto replacement over the west, but having multiple avenues for cooperation opens up new possibilities as well as providing leverage when negotiating with the west. The sharing of military intelligence in particular for operations in Syria is noteworthy given their recent military actions against Kurds in Syria.

EU Membership and Syrian Refugees
EU membership has been long sought after by Turkey for the economic agreements and freedom of movement it would be inducted into. While there are a variety of concerns with the EU members regarding the possible economic and political consequences with Turkey's inclusion into the EU, this is something that has been in consideration for some time. To this point, Turkey has held an unfavorable position in this negotiation, but the recent events in Syria has changed the tide in Turkey's favor. The sudden influx of refugees in particular have proven to be an insurmountable challenge without the full cooperation of Turkey, which it promises in return for visa-free travel for Turks in the Schengen zone.

The recent "Brexit" has also stirred and challenged the status-quo of Turkey-EU negotiations. With the proposed exit of the UK from the EU, trust in the stability of the EU has waned. This may have the consequence of lowering the bargaining power of the EU in regards to Turkey and even potentially change Turkey's mind as to whether they want to commit to a full membership status with a potentially failing union.

Conclusion - Turkey and the Immediate Future
In a span of a single year, the ability for Turkey to act in its own interest without the cooperation of the west and its overall bargaining power has increased substantially. Just in 2016, Erdogan has managed to solidify his domestic power base and consolidate state entities under his control. Internationally, they have formed strong partnership with Russia who is likely to show greater tolerance for Turkey's pursuit of security interests in the region. The Syrian refugee crisis has managed to shift the balance of power in favor of Turkey, giving them significant leverage in negotiations, which they will likely utilize in the near future (as they've already done in regards to freedom of movement for Turks in EU).

With that in mind, Turkey is in a highly favorable position where the west cannot reasonably limit or pose credible threat to prevent Turkey from acting unilaterally for its own benefit. While Turkey may exercise caution in exercising their expanded boundaries and powers, it is likely that they will continue to do so until the political climate undergoes another shift against their favor.

As to what Turkey will do in the future is not certain as Erdogan has shown himself to be a dual figure of both practicality and passion, making him a difficult figure to predict. That being said, based on the current trajectory, the following can be expected to occur in the immediate future:

• Conduct limited military operations against Kurdish rebels which may expand to Iraq.
• Cooperate with Russia with the goal of returning stability to Syria under their terms.
• Seek limited integration into EU while not fully committing to full membership.

Additional Thoughts

The economic and political situation in the Middle East appear ripe for Turkey to make a move to establish itself as a dominant figure in a new Middle East power order. This is especially true when considering the recent drop of petroleum prices that severely damaged the economies of other major players. With the economic and political climate in their favor, Turkey has an opportunity to steer the direction of the Middle East's future. This is not something that they will simply squander.

The Syrian Dilemma: A Practical Solution

The Syrian Civil War rages on well into 2016 with no clear end. While the conflict showed a lot of promise with increasing foreign involvement and refocusing of priorities against the common opposition, ISIS and Al-Nusra proves to be more can capable of holding onto key parts of the region. The prolonged US commitment and the inability to put a closure to the war has been poorly received and some have begun to voice their opinions. In a recent internal memo, dozens of frustrated State Department officers signed a critique of Obama's administration's approach to the conflict.

Specifically, the memo calls for direct use of military force to enforce the CoH that is still in effect, but violated to no consequence. The result of such a stance, the memo notes, is that by raising the cost of violation, the immediate negative impact on civilians in the affected areas would be minimized and would facilitate a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.

While this approach might have some desired effect (namely, allowing relief to civilians and concentrating efforts to subduing the common opposition), it fails to achieve the an important objective set by Obama. While the primary intent behind US involvement in this conflict is to put an end to it, Obama has made it definitively clear that Assad must be removed from office. However, the situation in Syria at the moment is not ideal for accomplishing all of these different objectives simultaneously and an attempt to do so will yield undesired outcomes. In this article, I will discuss the current political climate in the Middle East and how the objective of removing Assad from office is infeasible without significant costs or compromises.

Russia
Ever since Russia entered the conflict in support of Assad, they have been a significant barrier for the US in expediting a favorable conclusion where he is removed from power. The goals of Russia is relatively clear. Establish some level of stability to where Russian interests in the region, that is, sale of military hardware and maintaining the Tartus Base, is secure. While Assad himself is not critical to Russia's interest, their vested interest in Syria's patronage and lease of land is crucial to their objectives in the region.

Initially, the Russians were committed to securing Assad's regime by conducting air strikes against the anti-government forces, but as the costly conflict rages on, they appear to  be less than enthusiastic about a prolonged conflict. Not only did they agree to the initial CoH, but have also reaffirmed their ongoing adherence to the ceasefire and have actively participated in talks with the US regards to prioritizing the elimination of ISIS and Al-Nusra.

However, Russia's diminished patience and willingness to consider a compromise in combating the common opposition should not be equivocated to abandoning their interests in Syria. If provoked with the possibility of an overt change of regime by the US, an idle reaction is unlikely. Putin has been more than willing to show that Russia will not tolerate western powers interfering with its interests, even to the point of bringing Russia to the brink of a recession under sanctions.

Not only did the sanctions fail to prompt the desired reaction, the Russian economy is recovering (though, this is not to say it is booming as it still remains in single percentage points of contraction, but this is a marked improvement over the the double digit percentage point contractions Russia experienced in 2014-2015) and is projected to return to pre-sanction levels by 2017-2018 at its current pace. Furthermore, maintaining sanctions, let alone increasing them, will prove challenging as many European countries benefited from trading with Russia, nor is the possibility of EU breakdown doing the sanctions any service.

Assad
While the initial efforts of the CoH yielded significant gains as the combined efforts of the signatories of the CoH gained significant ground against ISIS and Al-Nusra, progress has steadily waned (recently, pro-government forces lost southern Aleppo to Al-Nusra). In spite of their combined efforts, the opposition remains strong and the prospects of defeating them can be compromised if the brunt of the ground forces (pro-government elements) become weaker. Given the precarious state of the union of the pro-government forces, forcibly removing Assad from power can have a fractionalizing effect on the temporary "alliance (this including the foreign powers, moderate rebels, and pro-government forces that are prioritizing on the elimination of the common opposition for the duration of the CoH).

In the event that the US does force the issue of instigating a transition of power by overtly forcing Assad to leave office, there would be negative consequences to follow. For one, a political transition would shift the priorities of  the country. With a vacuum of power left by the previous regime, different groups would contend for control of the new government. As a result, the ability to coordinate offensives would falter and so too the capacity to subdue the opposition. This would put Syria at risk of falling to the extremists, which would either force the US to commit further into Syria. Furthermore, the military support that the government begets from its alliance with Iran would not necessarily hold if Assad were to be removed from power by the US.

Forcibly removing Assad or pressuring him through direct confrontation would do little in the way of swaying the Syrian population to be favorable of a regime change. In fact, such a course of action would only serve to reinforce the negative imagery of the US and may push moderates over to the other camp. Instead, if the removal of Assad were the utmost priority in this conflict, a war of attrition would be the strategy of choice. A prolonged conflict would lead to growing internal discontent (both civilian as well as military) which then could be leveraged for a negotiation. However, this is an infeasible course of action given that the US also aims to minimize the war's impact on the civilians and are not keen on allowing ISIS or Al-Nusra to regain ground in Syria thanks to a weakened pro-government force.

The Iranian support of Assad's regime is also a major barrier to this objective. Not only do they provide materialistic support, Iran is also deeply vested in the survival of Assad's regime. Syria is a critical geopolitical ally against its rivals in the Middle East. Not only would a forced removal of Assad prolong the conflict, it would also harm US-Iran relations (given the huge ordeal that was necessary to mend US-Iran relations souring it again in mere months would be a definite loss). Given the reoccurring nature of terrorism, keeping up partnership with Iran will be essential in the ongoing fight against ISIS as well as handling future outbreaks of conflict.

The Practical Solution
The issue with the Syrian Conflict boils down to the inability to achieve the objective of removing Assad from power without significant political and material costs. Not only does it have unacceptably high costs, the course of actions necessary to fulfill such an objective would also run counter to the greater regional goal of subduing ISIS. Rather than compromising on many fronts to achieve an ideological goal of removing an "evil authoritarian", it is more politically and materially practical to abandon the notion that Assad absolutely must leave office.

That being said, this is not a dismissal of the issues that Syria suffered from while under Assad's rule. Rather, the alternative is not any more favorable than the status quo, and may have far more negative consequences as a result of trying to "save" Syria from the Assad regime. In fact, such an assessment is neither new or particularly revealing as other analysts have also made similar claims to the dangers of a Syrian regime change (most notably, assessments made by the DIA discussed in this article: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n01/seymour-m-hersh/military-to-military).

In conclusion, the most sensible course of action would be to abandon the goal of removing Assad and instead focus on the effort in subduing ISIS and Al-Nusra and bringing stability to the country. As to what could be done afterwards, Syria would be in a position where they require significant foreign aid to recover. This is where support should come with conditions for Syria to providing a more inclusive political process and integrate neutral third party observers to ensure that they are conducted in a fair manner. If the intent of the US is to allow a chance for the moderate dissenters to have a voice in the new government, the elimination of the common opposition takes precedence (to ensure a peaceful transition, the CoH will have to be strictly upheld as suggested by the State Department officers after the elimination of the opposition).

The Workers' Party of Korea and the 7th Congress: Future Implications of Peace and Cooperation

In recent months, there has been an outburst of activities as the UN passed Resolution 2270 in response to the North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles tests and the North Korean party's Congress was held with international coverage. The UN Resolution rebuffed its sanctions and demands against North Korea, and its severity and compliance by the international community will likely have serious impact on the North Korean economy. Some have taken these developments as indicative of an imminent collapse of the North Korean state. However, such predictions are neither new nor are such claims any more likely than it had been in the past. The 7th Congress has been very insightful in understanding the state of North Korea and stand antithetical to the claims to their impending demise. This article will explore some of the recent revelations made by the Congress and implications behind the UN Resolution.

The North Korean Party and Stability

The stability of the North Korean government is often called into question in regards to its possible longevity. Over the recent years, some of the strongest indicators of possible internal strife and lack of unity within the Workers' Party of Korea was during the change in leadership from Kim Jong Il to his son, Kim Jong Un. The transition was followed by attempts to consolidate power and complying party unity through purges and executions. While the true extent of the purges are unlikely to be revealed, many of the high profile members thought to have been removed from power or executed resurfaced during the Congress, with some bearing lower status, and others in more important positions. In light of recent events, it is more likely that the purges were less indicative of instability and were more focused on establishing a power foundation for Kim Jong Un's rule.

I myself have questioned the continued stability of the North Korean state given the ongoing dilemma of legitimacy (namely, through leader exaltation, extreme military preference, and anti-colonialism) and have posited in the past that it may be inevitable for the party to pursue legitimacy via economic prosperity. As seen during the Congress, Kim Jong Un acknowledged the importance of economic development and has gone as far as praising the improvements made by changes to agriculture models (smaller work teams, and allowing greater share for producers). The Congress also marked the announcement of a five-year economic plan, and while no details were provided, it shows a refocusing of priorities. If the state was so mired by internal conflict or instability, economic plans would be the least of their concerns.

The 7th Congress was a hallmark of solidarity within the Workers' Party of Korea, reaffirming the power under Kim Jong Un, and establishing a new position of "Chairman", reminiscent of the position held by Mao Zedong in PRC. While the position itself is unlikely to bestow Kim Jong Un with any explicit powers that he doesn't already have as First Secretary, this is an interesting development in conjunction with the numerous promotions and demotions in the recent years in building a power base for his rule. It will be fascinating to see if and how reforms are advanced with the power of party solidarity (this is especially reminiscent of the power consolidation in CPC by Mao Zedong, followed by massive projects to reform the country's economy). If anything, the North Korean state has never been more stable and capable than in the past several decades.

International Integration

The Congress showed many signs of North Korea's possible willingness to integrate itself into the international community. First, the decision to include foreign journalists to "cover" (regrettably, the journalists were not given full access to cover the event from within the auditorium, but the gesture itself was very telling) the monumental event was not only surprising, but also very promising in that it was a clear sign that they wanted the world to know of North Korea's plans and intentions going into the future with Kim Jong Un at the helm of the country.

Some of the topics discussed in the Congress also directly addressed the international community and brought to attention topics of great interest. The most significant were those that directly addressed the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons development and call for cessation by the UN. What was surprising was not the acknowledgement of the opposition against North Korea's nuclear weapons development efforts, but that Kim Jong Un noted the following, "responsible nuclear weapons state, our Republic will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes, ... and it will faithfully fulfill its obligation for non-proliferation and strive for the global denuclearization." (7th Congress, Kim Jong Un's speech translated by the Korean Central News Agency). While this can easily be discounted as obligatory lip service, even such an interpretation has substantial implications in that it may be indicative of North Korea's concern over their international appearance and willingness to show their intentions to the rest of the world.

Furthermore, the recent speech delivered by Kim Jong Un makes it clear that North Korea is not against (and to some degree, has been) making significant efforts towards negotiating with South Korea and the US in discussing its nuclear capabilities. To quote: "The WPK and the DPRK government will improve and normalize the relations with those countries which respect the sovereignty of the DPRK and are friendly towards it, though they had been hostile toward it in the past". North Korea has made significant efforts towards negotiating with South Korea and the US in discussing its nuclear developments. Unfortunately, their honest efforts to integrate has been met with cold indifference by South Korea and US as they refuse to come to negotiations before North Korea makes serious efforts to stop nuclear developments. This may be a terrible opportunity lost as such a diplomatic stance being so outright unequivocally rejected might reflect negatively on Kim Jong Un, who may be forced to take a more hawkish stance to maintain party solidarity and control over the state. It would not be surprising that after being so utterly rejected by the international community that they become secluded and detached from the rest of the world again.

Conclusion

In a previous article, I posited the notion that nuclear security is one of the conditions that must be met before diplomacy can become a more viable option over military belligerency. It is interesting that following a successful nuclear test, and display of some level of advancement to their missile delivery system, the state has been more amicable in extending a diplomatic hand. The manner in which the North Korean state has handled the tests and international response is reflective of their foreign policy strategy of nuclear deterrence into formal diplomacy.

Rather than an imminent collapse, the North Korean state has never been so unified and so capable as it is now. Not only have they attained limited nuclear proficiency, and possibly the ability to project its nuclear power well beyond its immediate region through a intercontinental missile delivery system, they have attained party unity to action reforms. Moreover, they have shown full willingness to negotiate the matter of nuclear development and the sanctions against them. While it is unlikely that they will surrender current and future developments as Iran has done, the possibility of a non-conflict resolution seems realistic.

The Syrian Civil War: Victorious Ceasefire

After nearly five years of conflict, the Syrian Civil War saw a brief respite with the truce on the 27th of February, 2016. The idea behind it was simple; bring the primary belligerents to the table and discuss terms of each party and to allow humanitarian efforts to be deployed to the war stricken regions. However, the the temporary cessation of hostilities between the "moderate" rebels and the government forces opened the opportunity for redirection of their focus to a common enemy, the ISIL. The initial expectations of the truce was very straight forward. With the combined efforts of all parties, the greater evil was to be swiftly defeated, allowing for the rebels and the government to non violently settle their differences through diplomacy, not war.

In the first few months of the ceasefire, the diplomatic efforts seemed to be a resounding success as neither side dared to be the first in challenging the limits and focused their efforts in routing ISIL. The initial success of the ceasefire and consecutive victories against ISIL gave hope to the possibility of bringing the Syrian Civil War to a diplomatic conclusion, but underneath the facade of cooperation, the Syrian government forces saw an opportunity to their predicament.

Leading up to the ceasefire, the Syrian government suffered increasing criticism from the international community as attention from the Ukraine crisis shifted to the middle east (a common trend in the pattern of a prolonged conflict getting little to no attention in the first two years, gaining increasing attention for the following two years, and then fading into obscurity and left to be resolved by more directly invested parties). The increase in international attention not only brought political pressure to form a transitional government, but bolstered the ranks of the rebels and terrorists as they found success in local and international recruitment.

Given the nature of the conflict, the government forces are stretched thin across large amounts of territories against a multifaceted enemies. This poses several key challenges to the government forces, making the fight against the opposition particularly difficult. Because the opposition is composed of many factions, they lack a single command or logistics structure. This means that successive victories do not necessarily impact the opposition in a negative way as it would if they were a single entity.

Compounding to this issue is the fact that the vast majority of the opposition forces are local rebels, meaning that they can spring out in grassroots fashion from a number of locations, even from government controlled territories. Gaining territory and maintaining effective control over it requires rather heavy investment if the locals of the area have anti-government (more specifically, anti-Assad, as there are rebel groups that support the existence of a greater Syrian government, but not with Assad in power) sentiments.

With these conditions in mind, the ceasefire accomplished several key political and military goals for the government forces. First, the ceasefire gave the Syrian government reprieve from criticism by showing that they were "considering" diplomacy (although I would posit that they never really intended to listen to the opposition). It also effectively stopped large scale fights for a good duration, allowing the international focus in Syria to drop out of the spotlight in favor of other hot new topics. Another tactic employed during the ceasefire was propaganda to convince rebels to lay down their arms and to reintegrate to the state's fold. The lull in fighting was an excellent opportunity for the Syrian government to convince tired insurgents to surrender with the promise of being treated amicably.

Second, groups that were not part of the ceasefire agreement were open targets. While the most prominent groups not part of the ceasefire are ISIL and Al Nusra, any number of small factions could have also been excluded from the ceasefire. In addition, given the contentious nature of rebel factions and alliances, it is not an impossibility for the government forces to single out a group as being "terrorists". Even when the government forces violate the ceasefire against a single group, it is very unlikely that they are to suffer any consequences as the tangentially related rebel groups have little vested interest in coming to their aid. Rather, it is more likely that assisting would result in them getting singled out as well (Russia has adamantly claimed that they will retaliate with force against any groups that violate the ceasefire, although this undoubtedly do not apply to the government forces).

While the initial goals of the United States were to bring down Assad's government and to defeat ISIL, at the current time, it is likely that Assad will not step down, as he is in the best position he has been since the start of the civil war. The ceasefire was intended as a means of putting the civil war on hold to stem the growing tide of ISIL, but it has been instrumental in shifting the balance greatly in favor of the Syrian government. Through the ceasefire, they were able to play the idea of vanguard against terrorists, and starting the process of dividing and conquering all opposition.

While the idea of a transitional government may have been a possibility to save himself, Assad is no longer fearful of losing his station, and will not consider a move in which his power is called into question. In fact, it is entirely possible that Syria went into the ceasefire with no intentions of making peace with the rebels in the first place. According to UN diplomats, the Syrian government representative does not give any consideration to the propositions of the opposition, and acts only to mock and provoke them.

The Syrian Civil War has raged on for more than five years, and it is far from over. Territories have been taken, and retaken by countless factions, and lands continue to change hands to this day and the Syrian government have yet to resolve fundamental political, social, and economic issue that resulted in the rise of the rebellions. I don't doubt that the conflict will continue to rage for several more years to come. However, it is clear that the rebels no longer have the sufficient strength and support to bring the Syrian government to a compromise.

China: A People's Republic

From the perspective of an outsider, the actions of the Chinese government can often be difficult to understand. How is it possible that the two seemingly conflicting ideologies of free market economics and a highly authoritarian government not only coexist, but also deepen simultaneously? The state not only adopted a capitalistic model, but also increasingly opted for more market oriented over state planned economics. And at the same time, the strength and overwhelming dominance of the CPC in the daily lives of the people has not waned, but rather increased since the incumbency of Xi Jinping as the General Secretary. While China is a complex beast to analyze, if it is approached with an appropriate mindset and understanding of the political and economic circumstances of China, it is possible to decipher the motivations behind the state's actions.

Perhaps the most significant event that can be credited for many of China's recent political strategy is the ongoing economic downturn starting from the financial crisis of 2008. Prior to the crisis, China enjoyed fantastic GDP growth figures, often nearing double digits and at many points well exceeding 10% annual growth. During these periods of extreme growth, general sentiments towards the government and its economic and political policies were very positive, owing to increases in the country's economic well being, rising standards of living, and increase in Chinese international presence and prominence via trade.

While the crisis did not stop China from making significant economic gains and maintaining respectable GDP growth figures, China has suffered from several consecutive years of decrease in growth percentages (the crisis however is not the singular factor in decrease in growth, as China moves from an industrial economy to a post-industrial is associated with slower growth and decreases in certain sectors of the economy). As the country sees year on year decrease in growth, it is unlikely that the current levels of economic development will garner the same amount of support it provided in the past (a significant majority of people transitioned from a rural to urban lifestyle, seeing drastic changes to their standards of living and personal wealth in a short period of time, as the economy matures and the levels of urbanization slows, most people will see much slower and incremental gains from economic policies). As a result, public opinion of the government's economic policies is likely to be more heavily scrutinized. Furthermore, such a scenario is ideal for internal political competitors and opponents to leverage for change and challenge the current administration under Xi Jinping.

In response, China's recent political policies have had a clear trend towards consolidating internal power and eliciting favor from the general populace. For example, when taking office as the General Secretary of the CPC, Xi Jinping promoted a campaign of anti-corruption within the party, targeting various high level officials and incriminating them with charges and stripping them of position and power. These internal "witch hunts" ultimately serve two primary purposes. First, by eliminating specific high members, Xi Jinping and his faction are able to consolidate power as to prevent an opposition from undermining his authority. Second, it helps achieve a positive view of the state and party by showing that no single member, high or low, are immune from scrutiny.

In a more recent example, along with a consolidation of the various armed forces of the state, Xi Jinping took on a new title of Commander in Chief in addition of being the chairman of the party's Central Military Commission. This is reflective of China's increasingly assertive foreign policy and further consolidation of political as well as direct military control under Xi Jinping and his faction. Furthermore, it also aligns with Xi Jinping's political strategy of promoting Chinese nationalism through the concept of "The Chinese Dream" in revitalizing China as a prominent political and economic power, which also functions to legitimize and popularize the state and party under Xi Jinping's leadership.

Beyond political centralism through promotion of nationalism, China also continues to double down in its stake in capitalism. This is exemplified by the continued development of the special economic zones in China and addition of new zones and official state advocacy for support and continued expansion of these zones by one of China's Vice Premier, Wang Yang. While strict political compliance and repression of party criticism might secure the current administration's position in the short term, the party understands that the legitimizing powers of a strong economy cannot be ignored.

Rather than trying to understand China as a categorically ideology driven machine, it is more useful to approach it the understanding that the CPC, and by extension, the state and the currently dominant administration as goal oriented entities that will prioritize results (consolidating internal party power and external support from the general populace) over dogmatically following communistic or socialistic ideals. As the next National Congress nears (held roughly once every five years, with the previous being held in November 2012), it will be interesting to see how the party will act in regards to their foreign economic and political policies and how Xi Jinping will act to further consolidate more political power for himself.

The Rational Actor (The North Korea Problem)

Traditional conceptualizations of rationality describes a thought process that is based on reason and fact. Competing modern theories offer a different idea, where the concept of rationality does not make an objective judgement on the quality of the process, but rather considers the thought process within the circumstances of the actor, and how certain choices may be more likely in a given situation. In Political Science, the concept of rationality is often used to explain actions of a state, or in the case of authoritative governments, the actions of a single entity (dominant party or individual). This is a useful tool for political analysts to quantify the decisions of their subject as well as to create predictive models for their future actions.

This alternative conceptualization of rationality is especially critical when trying to understand the actions of "rogue" entities. Given the unique circumstances in which these entities often operate in, it can be very difficult for western born and bred analysts to fully understand seemingly "irrational" actions by these actors that might as well be completely mad. This can be attributable to one of the most common cognitive traps for intelligence analysis, where one's own perspective and values are projected onto the subject.

In the case of North Korea, it can be especially frustrating trying to understand the motivations behind their threats of war and military actions that only lead to tarnishing the North Korea's international reputation and economic prosperity as they are stamped with sanctions and admonished for their hostility. The issue of analyzing North Korea has been more important than it has ever been as they increasingly take the role of the belligerent against South Korea, Japan, and the US by their continued missile tests, and threats of war.

Within the past two years, North Korea has increasingly stepped up their nuclear weapons research and continues to make improvements to their missile delivery capabilities. With each successive test, North Korea has been met with harsh criticisms and economic sanctions. Given the importance of economic prosperity in maintaining a non democratic rule (there is a correlation between relative economic prosperity and the attitude of the populace towards non democratic governments), it would seem folly in knowingly act in a way that would garner further economic sanctions.

However, North Korea is in a unique situation where the general population has exceedingly low capacity for revolution for a number of reasons, leaving the military and the Worker's Party of Korea the only possible avenues of threat to Kim Jong Un's position. When this is taken into consideration, the relative economic prosperity of the country as a whole may be less threatening to the existence of the regime than strife from the upper echelons of the government and military.

By taking the role of the belligerent, North Korea accomplishes two goals; appeasing the military by adherence to the Songun principle, and consolidating hard power into the hands of the top leaders of the military (as Kim Jong Un is considered the commander in chief, this would mean development of the highest grade of military might is in his direct purview of control). In addition, once the long range nuclear missile capabilities of North Korea is realized, it acts as the ultimate tool of deterrence and potentially preventing any direct military actions against the regime in the foreseeable future.

The interesting question then is at which point does military belligerency become a less favorable course of action over diplomacy? From my conjecture, North Korea has to meet several key conditions. First, it must feel secure, which should be facilitated by completion of their ICBM program, allowing them to deliver their nuclear warhead across the Pacific Ocean to hit key areas of the US. Second, the continued degeneration of the cult of personality as the generational divide from Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. This will force North Korea to seek additional sources of legitimacy over grand idolization of their supreme leader. Third, increased standard of living, via economic prosperity and increased access information from outside of North Korea. Currently, it is only the social and political elites that enjoy the privilege of having access to goods and information from outside of the country, but even if the regime does not specifically seek to raise the overall standard of living, it will inevitably climb as North Korea as a whole becomes more prosperous (even if their relative GDP does not increase, given sufficient time, their absolute wealth should increase). Having met basic needs and having greater awareness of the world at large, the revolutionary capabilities of the general population will rise, which will make appeasing them a greater priority for the regime.

While I do not believe that the North Korean regime will eventually self destruct, playing the waiting game with North Korea is a risky approach given the destructive capability it holds against South Korea and potentially Japan and US if it refines its ICBM technology. If posed with an extreme existential crisis, it is not unfathomable that they would be willing to risk extreme military action in a bid for survival at great cost. There could be two possible scenarios in which such a case is possible. Internal dissent, causing North Korea to instigate action to assert internal solidarity, and external threat, causing North Korea to play brinkmanship to gamble for respite.Given that a general principle that should be followed is that one should not corner North Korea with an ultimatum that threatens its existence.

Songun, a State at the Barrel of a Gun

Originally, I had intended to write about the topic of rational actors and North Korea, but in a recent event (3-18-2016), North Korea had launched another missile into the Sea of Japan. This has been one of many missile launches that the country has been testing in recent years, and coupled with renewed vigor in nuclear weapons research (shown by their recent underground detonation tests), it only bodes ill for the security in the East Asian region.

Given the complexity of this particular subject, I will limit the focus of this article to a brief overview of the Songun ideology to identify the motivations behind North Korea's actions. Songun is North Korea's "military-first" policy, where the state prioritizes the Korean People's Army in the allocation of resources and political decision-making. While the ideology did not officially become state doctrine until 1995 after the death of Kim Il Sung, the basic idea of placing great importance behind the military has been part of the state's ideological apparatus since the division of the peninsula.

In similar fashion to Mao's ideological slogan of "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", the historical circumstances leading to the creation of the North Korean state, and consequent ideological war (Korean War, 1950-53), the existence of the state was contingent on its ability to protect itself militarily from South Korea and the United States. Coupled with the concept of Juche, calling for the self reliance, much of the state's legitimacy hinged on its ability to remain a sovereign and independent nation (the Worker's Party of Korea is fundamentally a revolutionary party with its basis in overcoming its oppressors).

With the death of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il enacted several policies and ideological declarations to solidify his power base and legitimacy and Songun was instrumental in accomplishing that goal. Internally, there were only a few limited ways in which Kim Jong Il's position could be supplanted, and his actions ensured that these were not possible. First, the cult of personality developed around himself and his father ensured his popularity with the general populace, making him a crowd favorite, and likely martyr if he were to be removed from his position by a political rival. Second, his position as the supreme commander of the military and his policy of "military-first" ensuring his popularity with the military and making an armed coup unlikely.

The important point to take away from this is the inseparable connection between the military as a source of legitimacy for North Korea's leaders. As part of its narrative among the people and the state, North Korea's leader must display strength with internally and externally. Kim Jong Un is also tied to the same source of legitimacy that his father had built up and must maintain a military-centric attitude. Though I had initially thought that he would seek to build an economic source of legitimacy much like the People's Republic of China after the death of Mao (I raise the idea that North Korea's source of legitimacy from a cult of personality and military focus is not sustainable for a variety of reasons, including economic unsustainability and gradual erosion of cult of personality due to a generational drift from the original "supreme leaders"), North Korea remains adamant in maintaining a "military-first" attitude.

In the continued validation of its existence, the North Korean state must show itself, its people, and the outside world that it is militarily capable of providing sufficient deterrence from hostile forces from within and without. And what better way than to get your hands on a weapon that could serve as the ultimate deterrence, the nuclear weapon. While North Korea has been suspected of having nuclear capabilities for some time (through their claims, as well as observations of their detonation testings), the mere ownership of nuclear capacity is not sufficient to stand as an effective tool of deterrence. Only once the nuclear weapon has been given a proper delivery system does it become a credible threat. Given that reasoning, it is not surprising that North Korea is pursuing precisely such a course in research.

CNN - North Korea launches ballistic missiles
CNN - North Korea may have tested components of a hydrogen bomb
The Diplomat - Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Bluster May Be for Home, not Abroad