Going Nuclear: Why DPRK Won't Give Up

The Situation

The DPRK continues to defy the the international community as it successively tests missiles and nuclear bombs, with the latest nuclear test achieving a yield in excess of 100 kilotons to most estimates, and an array of successful missile tests of varying ranges, capable of hitting targets as far as the US west coast. In response, the UN has levied numerous sanctions and strengthened existing ones to cover not just materials in direct support of military efforts, but to also cover goods and necessities of every day North Koreans. Yet, to the dismay of the rest of the world, the DPRK seems inexplicably resilient against any efforts to dissuade them from their pursuit of nuclear power, and each successive test realizes the worst of our fears; a nuclear DPRK with the capability to carry out its abhorrent threats of complete annihilation of the US and its allies.

There is a growing international unity against the DPRK, and even its closest allies have joined in on the chorus, calling for a cessation of escalatory actions. Despite having quite literally the world against them, Kim Jong Un has made it clear that he has no intent on yielding and will complete his nuclear program at all costs (there is likely no real end to the DPRK's nuclear effort, only a bare minimum threshold of acceptable capability). What are the forces that convince the DPRK that they must develop a capable nuclear force without regard for the costs involved?

In the public consciousness, a common and convenient excuse is to attribute Kim Jong Un with mental instability. Suffice to say, calling someone irrational has the magical explanatory powers for everything without delving into the complexity that is the machination of East Asia geopolitics. Not only is this a poor excuse for unwilling to exercise any critical thinking to properly understand this very dangerous and uncertain situation, it also undermines the severity of the threat in the public consciousness. For the past several decades, the world has continued to laugh at the DPRK. Then they tested their first nuclear bomb. The world continued to laugh at the DPRK. Then they continually tested and succeeded in refining their missile capability. Still, the world continues to laugh at the DPRK, and now they have the ability to shoot missiles with nuclear bombs across the Pacific and destroy American cities. Will we still be laughing moments before a missile lands on our cities?

Nuclear Power at All Costs

What are the factors that influence DPRK's decision making in their willingness to undergo any and all punishment to pursue nuclear power?

• Nuclear Deterrence
• Internal Political Forces
• Ineffective Sanctions Regime

Each of these forces provide the push and pull incentives that inform their conclusion in believing that ultimately, the benefits of attaining a powerful nuclear force outweighs the costs associated with its pursuit. As consequence of these numerous factors influencing their thinking, the prospect of a cessation, let alone a disarmament agreement is a distant fantasy.

Nuclear Deterrence

The most clear benefit behind a nuclear DPRK is classic nuclear deterrence. While the modern landscape has given rise to asymmetric warfare without triggering a MAD scenario, nuclear weapons remain one of the surest ways to dissuade an opponent from engaging in conventional warfare. More interestingly, not only has history solidified their belief for a need for nuclear deterrence, but recent actions by the current administration has given them ample real-time validation of their beliefs.

In recent memory, the US military has acted with the explicit intent to dispose of foreign leaders in three cases: Iraq, Libya, and Syria. These historical cases paint a clear picture in the mind of DPRK; if you are considered an undesirable by the US, you will be subject to military attack.

Iraq

• Dismantled its WMDs
• Unable to trust them, US invades
• Saddam Hussein was executed

Libya

• Discontinued its WMD development after witnessing the Iraq War
• US and coalition forces "intervene"
• Gaddafi is killed by rebels

Syria

• Has chemical weapons, but not the means to threaten US
• US assists anti-government forces in an attempt to remove Assad from power

In a more recent and perhaps most important example, the US and Iran had forged an agreement where Iran would cease nuclear development in exchange for lifting of sanctions. Despite abiding by the terms of the agreement, and having US and international agencies inspect and confirm compliance, the US is threatening to break the agreement. Given these examples, it is unlikely that the DPRK would be inclined to barter in exchange for disarmament.

The message is indisputable; those the US consider an "axis of evil" will not be tolerated and if circumstances permit, they will be dealt with. With that in mind, there is a clear incentive for the DPRK to establish nuclear deterrence, as they believe it to be not just essential to, but perhaps the means of survival itself.

Asymmetrical Equilibrium

Another curious factor in the establishment of a nuclear deterrent is the asymmetry between the DPRK and the US (similarly applicable to ROK and Japan). The idea of MAD was a semi-functional doctrine was during the Cold War era, where the major powers wielded sufficient destructive power to ensure total annihilation of each other. The theory posits that, given sufficient advancement of military capability, the potential of mutual destruction will create, albeit uneasy disincentive for wars. For a variety of reasons, the MAD doctrine as a theory has shown to be ineffective in face of limited and asymmetrical war.

Specifically, in the case of the relation between the DPRK and the US, history has proven that limited and asymmetrical confrontation will not lead to a unilateral nuclear response on the part of the US, let alone a tit-for-tat response against DPRK for its belligerence. Examples range from limited artillery exchanges resulting in the death of ROK civilians, torpedoing of a ROK naval vessel, and cyber-attacks against Japanese companies. In each of these cases, the US and its allies did not respond in kind, but often opted for soft measures via sanctions and the likes.

This concept of asymmetry allows for a formulation of "equilibrium" of sorts, in the sense that mere possession of nuclear weapons will create deterrence without needing to match the US in quantity or quality. This is especially evident in light of the relative threshold for pain that each side is willing to endure. The US, as a far more prosperous and privileged country would be far less willing to incur costs to their own livelihood, especially in the event of a DPRK transgression that affects ROK or Japan, but not the US directly. This among many others are points of leverage that the DPRK has in establishing an asymmetrical equilibrium of deterrence with its relatively inferior conventional and nuclear force.

Perpetual Revolutionary State

As a prerequisite to maintaining a revolutionary state, there is a necessity to establish and maintain an "enemy". As discussed in previous articles, the existence of the revolutionary state has a complex push and pull mechanism. Not only are those in power rewarded for maintaining the status quo, they would be susceptible to a blow-back if the process of national development falls out of their control. The foundation upon which the current regime is built is not conducive to a dramatic change in economic or political ideology. By upholding the status quo, the regime is able to express a high level of control, and thereby direct the means and rate at which the country transform.

Exaltation of the KPA
One of the core components of a revolutionary state and one of the founding principles of the DPRK is the exaltation of the KPA (Korean People's Army). The tenuous grip of the Kim family over the country was originally built upon a socialist and anti-imperialist platform, which necessitates exaltation of the People's Army as the manifestation of the "struggle" against the oppressors. This sort of high valuation of the military comes at a cost. The regime secures its rule through a high concentration of power and violence within a highly stratified elite, but that same apparatus, being one of the very few pillars of  power within the state, has the means to remove the family from power.

In a sort of way, the regime is held upright and entrapped by the same group, preventing it from straying off-course, lest it beget violent backlash. The importance of the military was well understood by Kim Jong Un. As he came into power, the Worker's Party and the KPA saw dramatic changes as senior members were swiftly replaced with members directly loyal to Kim Jong Un, and even went as far as eliminating his estranged half-brother to limit the possibility of a regime change.

The development of a nuclear force is one of the greatest achievement and power that a military force can attain. As such, its development has a multifaceted incentive of being materially important to national security as a deterrence as well as serving to place emphasis on the importance of the KPA to the very survival of the country. It is a powerful propaganda tool that glorifies the military and its achievements, deters outside forces from engaging in conventional warfare, and serves as a powerful negotiating tool.

Limited External Leverage
The DPRK sits in a rather peculiar position with its nuclear development that makes it especially difficult to deal with. While there are some limited analogue in the nuclear development of other countries such as Iran, the DPRK has a unique position that heavily limits the ability of the international community to compel them to abandon its efforts. Unlike many other countries, the DPRK does not value their public face (nearly as much as others) in the global scene, making any form of public shaming or admonishment moot. For a number of reasons not fully explored here, the DPRK does not rely on its reputation nearly as much as other countries for trade, nor does it have a significant expat or diplomatic presence outside of the country, making such efforts very limited in effect.

Sanctions have also been historically ineffective for a number of reasons. The DPRK has practiced the principle of Juche (self-sufficiency) for decades, and while they are far from being completely independent from the outside world, they are careful in becoming too reliant on foreign trade. China, the largest importer and exporter with the DPRK, often takes a soft stance in enforcing sanctions, and coupled with the self enforcing and self reporting nature of UN sanctions, having a significant impact on DPRK trade is exceedingly difficult. Even when properly enforced, the DPRK has proven to be elusive and very proficient in bypassing sanctions by setting up proxy companies, dealing through intermediates, and having a large illicit network that wouldn't be subject to the law in the first place.

Interestingly, the current sanctions regime is tougher and more thorough than anything before. More countries are actively participating in limiting their interaction on both an economic and diplomatic level with the DPRK, and its key allies have started to enforce the sanctions more stringently. In a recent move, the US Treasury was given authority to act against businesses that partake in activities to the benefit of the DPRK. Whether the Treasury will actually go after businesses in an aggressive manner is yet unknown, but this is a move that can have huge implications on the ability for the DPRK to evade sanctions in countries that are may have typically been inclined to look the other way in the past.

Conclusion
For decades, the DPRK has put economic development subservient to national security, culminating to the ultimate form of deterrence by nuclear force. This slow crawl towards the realization of a nuclear DPRK has been a long process, and with each step, the international community sought to dissuade them from achieving it. The DPRK is determine to fulfill their nuclear aspirations, and dissuasion seem impossible. Given the myriad of factors that push and pull them towards this goal, the world cannot expect to simply threaten them into compliance. We must approach the problem with care and work to unravel each of these motivating factors in tandem, rather than simply trying to hammer them into submission via sanctions and nothing else.

US and North Korea: Nuclear Brinksmanship

Between August 8 and August 14, the US and North Korea exchanged heated threats, escalating to nuclear brinksmanship and promises of absolute annihilation. Events of this type typically do not warrant a second thought given the almost casual nature and frequency in which the two countries exchange threats and the lack of genuine concern from said threats. However, this particular instance deserves closer scrutiny for a number of reasons. The unprecedented nature of the threat (typically, the threats are one sided, coming from a belligerent North Korea, but this time, it was instigated by the US in a fashion not too different from the hermit kingdom), the particular circumstances that led to it, and the current political climate in regards to NK-US relations.

The Backdrop

The following recounts the key moments of this event in chronological order

August 8 - The Washington Post publishes, "North Korea now making missile-ready..."

August 8 - President promises, "fire and fury", against further North Korean threats

August 8 - North Korea to review operational plans for missile strike against Guam.

August 9 - North Korea details operational plan against Guam

August 10 - President doubles down on threat against North Korea

August 10 - China's President issues statement, will stand by NK if attacked, but will not if it attacks

August 10 - USAF indicates readiness of bombers at Guam

August 11 - President delivers a more subdued statement on NK without any additional threats following a security briefing

August 11 - President tweets, "Military solutions are now fully in place,locked and loaded..."

August 13 - NSC Advisor, McMaster asserts that war is not imminent

August 14 - Sec. DoD, James Mattis warns an attack against Guam is war, but emphasizes will not start one unprovoked

August 14 - North Korea admonishes US for its aggressive statements and warns of attack if aggression continues

Escalation in such a rapid manner took the world for a spin, as statements from each side came one after another, raising the stakes further. With the situation mostly defused, the world may soon forget this event as another set of empty threat by the "crazy" hermit kingdom. But the circumstances surrounding this event is very peculiar and among North Korean watchers (I find such a label very apt for a number of reasons, as we are mere observers of limited privy into the actual machinations of the North Korean state and often powerless to act in a meaningful way), this incident warrant closer examination on many levels.

The Impetus

According to The Washington Post (WaPo), a report dated July 28 notes that, "The IC assesses North Korea has produced nuclear weapons for ballistic missile delivery, to include delivery by ICBM-class missiles,". The DIA and the ODNI declined to comment on the document. Hours later, during a White House brief on the opioid crisis, when a reporter asks for a comment on the WaPo report, the President threatens with, "fire and fury".

Points of Interest

1. Is this a genuine article of the DIA?

Reluctance on the part of the DIA and ODNI to comment on the WaPo report is not indicative of its legitimacy, and while NBC News reported that, based on confidential disclosures of unnamed sources, other members of the IC do indeed agree, for the public, veracity of WaPo's report remains wholly unconfirmed (this is not to say that it is not genuine, but it remains a point of interest given that this was the start of the incident).

2. Was the President aware of the report, as either a WaPo and/or a DIA product?

Listening to the transaction between the questioner and the President, this question remains unanswered. Here is the transcript in full:

Reporter - "Any comments on the report on North Korea's nuclear capabilities?"

President - "North Korea, must not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen. He has been very threatening beyond a normal state, and as I said, they will be met with fire and fury, and frankly power, likes of which the world has never seen before."

The answer is highly peculiar, especially the first part in context of the question. The WaPo's publication had nothing in regards to a North Korean threat, nor has there been any new threats made at the time of the questioning. It is unclear whether the President referring to threats categorically, or if he misinterpreted the question as being asked about a particular threat (one perhaps that he is not aware of). Or it is entirely possible that the President did understand the context of the question and simply answered in his own fashion, where he clearly defines a point of contention (the threat) in order to form an aggressive stance towards it (I concede that this one is highly dubious, but for the sake of being charitable, it remains, even if remote, a possibility). Following the last possibility (the President understood the context of the question), does his answering give credence to the legitimacy of WaPo's report? Given the above scenarios, I posit the following possibilities

• The President was not aware of WaPo's report (given they are roughly 1-2 hours apart, this is entirely possible) and misunderstood the question and opted to sternly warn North Korea
• Unwilling to confirm or deny the WaPo report, the President opts to sternly warn North Korea
• Wishing to maintain a "strong front" despite the lack of legitimacy of WaPo's report, the President opts to sternly warn North Korea

Did the President threaten nuclear war with the North Koreans due to a misunderstood question or perhaps without knowing the legitimacy (or even the cognizance of its existence) of the WaPo/DIA report? If we consider that the WaPo notes July 28 as the date of the document, there are only 11 days between it and the President's statement. Therefore, we must also consider the possibility that even if the DIA report is genuine, it may have yet to reach the ears of the President (additionally, the President at the time was away from the White House in New Jersey, giving further credence to such a possibility).

3. Why did North Korea telegraph their operational plan to strike Guam?

Historically, threats by North Korea follow a particular archetype; bombastic and fantastical to the point where it is clearly identifiable as mere rhetoric rather than credible threats. As such, the explicit details released by North Korea is a drastic departure from the norm. I posit the following which is my speculation as to why they decided to telegraph their plan.

As with any significant change in personnel in the US government, the North Koreans are undoubtedly interesting in testing the boundaries of their relationship with the new President. Observation of US politics since the new presidency would have shown North Korea that the new President is fond of showmanship and use of hyperbolic statements to leverage relations. Following the "fire and fury" statement, North Korea was interested in using the opportunity to test, and perhaps extend the boundary of what actions are permissible while avoiding physical confrontation. Furthermore, given the lack of relative confidence levels of verifying the veracity of such threats of a new President, North Korea had to prepare/respond in some fashion regardless.

By telegraphing its exact plans to strike Guam, North Korea signals to the world exactly what it intends in order to avoid a potential incident (or at least limiting the fallout/response of an incident) if they felt compelled to carry out its plan. According to General Kim Rak Gyom of Strategic Force of the KPA, the plan are as follows: Simultaneous fire of four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range strategic ballistic rockets, crossing Shimane, Hiroshima, and Kochi Prefectures of Japan, traveling for a total distance of 3,356.7 km for 1,065 seconds before hitting the waters 30 to 40 km away from Guam. There are several elements here worthy of consideration.

• Number and type of rockets to be used to avoid misinterpretation and inappropriate reaction by the US
• Notes crossing of Japanese airspace to assuage potential concerns from Japan
• Notes flight time and exact location of target to telegraph trajectory to avoid misreads of missile destination
• Specifies hitting water to telegraph their intent to use force, but not directly on a civilian or military target

Additionally, the North Koreans had the foresight of adding that the execution of the plan would be contingent upon the leader's will, leaving themselves an out to the situation if necessary. This leads me to believe that the North Koreans were very much serious on making real on their threat and wanted the world to know this.

The Outcome

After several days of back and forth, the situation has finally calmed on August 14, as US officials made it clear that while the US is militarily ready to respond to any threat, there will not be a preemptive strike against North Korea as the President may have alluded to. Similarly, North Korea has made the statement that they will not go forward with the plan on attacking Guam at the current time.

Most people will look back on this event as nothing more than another one of North Korea's "shenanigans", but in truth, we bore witness to the foundation of North Korea/US relations for the duration of our current presidency.

From this event, North Korea has learned a wealth of information that will be to their benefit.

• The President makes hyperbolic statements without the intent to act upon them
• US officials will contradict the rhetoric espoused by the President
• Functionally, US foreign policy towards North Korea has not visibly changed
• China has limits in its patience towards North Korea's antics, but their fundamental security interests have not changed in relation to the US
• If they elect to interpret the President's response as confirmation of the DIA assessment, they now have knowledge of the fact that the US IC considers their nuclear capability as having advanced significantly

As North Korea continues to advance its ICBM technology, we will see a continuance of similar incidents into the foreseeable future. North Korea deems its nuclear capability an absolute requirement to its survival, and the US considers a fully nuclear capable (ability to threaten mainland US is the next step, as they are likely more than capable of threatening South Korea and Japan already) to be absolutely unacceptable. With neither side showing willingness to yield and with official channels of diplomacy effectively broken (North Korea and US do not maintain an embassy in each other's countries, and while there are back-channels for talks with North Korea, officials caution against optimism), tensions will reignite, each time hotter than before.

The North Korean Problem

The Background
Recent political events have once again have brought the Korean peninsula to the forefront of international news. With the election of a new US President who promises much more strident stance against enemies of the nation, coupled with the new successor to the DPRK regime who promises security and prosperity in face of international oppression, the world is bearing witness to the threat of unprecedented nuclear war. At the same time, ROK has undergone a series of political turmoil through the Presidential scandal and the question of Asia power balance between physical security and economic prosperity. Complicating the matters further, PRC has been slowly undergoing a transformation in its political climate as President Xi consolidates power directly under his purview, which is becoming scarily reminiscent of a more rigid and top down political structure as was in PRC's recent past, reversing the gradual slope towards democratic forms of governance in the recent years.

While such a threat has often come and gone in the past, the sheer political circumstances of the period has brought the threat closer to reality than perhaps it ever has. Those that may dispute the likelihood of an actual conflict point to past instigation by the DPRK where actual physical confrontations were had and some number of lives lost, but never materialized into a full blown war. As fortuitous as it may be that the current round of escalations did not end up in any firing of weapons with the intent to kill, the precariousness of the current political situation with the real threat of increasingly advanced weaponry being deployed on either side drastically raises the costs of exercising restraint and being on the receiving end of a first strike. Unlike the past, the DPRK is gradually losing the assurance of a "Chinese Option" as the PRC shows a greater willingness to concede to international demands for punishing DPRK for its actions.

Although it is unlikely that a single incident will trigger outright war between the two nations, the rate of escalation, due to the nature of the close proximity of the two countries with advanced weaponry, will be exceedingly fast. To be sure, the threshold for war still remains relatively high and single minor incidents of physical altercations will not likely lead to war; however, the world is seeing an unprecedented level of political and military uncertainty that will have lasting impact into the relation of key nations invested in the Korean peninsula. While many believe that based on a superficial view of just the military capabilities of the DPRK versus the ROK/US, the clear gap in capabilities would disproportionately favor the ROK/US, and therefore dissuade any attempts by the DPRK. However, a modern Korean War would not be a conventional war that is decided on sheer military firepower or technological prowess.

China
The primary concerns of the PRC as it pertains to the DPRK can be summed in almost exclusively security concerns. In part due to the hostilities between the two Koreas, both PRC and the US are heavily invested in the region both militarily and politically. The maintinance of the balance of power in the East Asia has been a highly contested issue and will continue to be the case as the PRC becomes increasingly capable, both militarily and economically, to challenge the dominance of US influence in the region.

Specifically, the continued existence of the DPRK is a crucial matter for PRC for security reasons due to the close relationship the ROK shares with the US as a host to a sizable US military force. For the same reason the US was opposed to the deployment of Soviet weapons into Cuba during the Cold War, PRC is opposed to any form of increase in US military presence in the Pacific, let alone directly in the Korean peninsula. The concerns of a close proximity of US force to the Chinese mainland at the current moment is in part alleviated by the physical separation provided by the existence of the DPRK, and thus its fall would be a major concern to PRC for that reason alone.

With respect to the PRC's security interests in the Korean peninsula, any action that escalates buildup of forces or raises the likelihood of war is detrimental to their interest. The ongoing nuclear development and consequent deployment of THAAD is one example of such escalation. While the escalation of threats and counter-threats have yet to breach the threshold for war, the breakout of formal conflict has the consequence of potentially resulting in the defeat of the DPRK.

Such would be an unacceptable outcome for the PRC and would be enticed to act in one of two ways; assist in repelling the ROK/US forces to prevent the defeat of the DPRK, or invade the DPRK in a simultaneous attack as ROK/US draws the attention of the vast majority of the KPA forces in a bid to establish a buffer zone against the ROK and the Chinese mainland. As to which would yield in a more favorable outcome is difficult to surmise given that it would be contingent on the circumstances of the conflict and results of the first 48 hours of the conflict. On the same token, it does not seem likely for the PRC to risk open conflict against the US to ensure the survival of an ally of limited use that offers arguably net negative returns, and is increasingly troublesome to support.

DPRK
Given the exceedingly precarious situation of their existence, the tension in the Korean peninsula is of utmost concern to the DPRK. With very few allies to rely on and with numerous foes to be cautious for (of both internal and external sources), the foremost matter of the state is survival. This is the prime impetus for the majority of their actions, such as the development of an effective nuclear arsenal to provide the "ultimate" deterrence against external forces, while cultivating unquestionable obedience and loyalty to combat internal dissent.

While the development of advanced weaponry helps even the odds against their inability to match the ROK/US forces in conventional means (both in sheer size and effectiveness), it has resulted in responses in kind through deployment of additional troops and weaponry as well as increase in frequency and breadth of exercises and drills by the ROK/US. A resumption of the Korean War is certainly the last resort for those involved, but doubly so for the DPRK. Despite the rhetoric of a strongman and bravado against its foes, a conventional war would without question end poorly for everyone involved.

In order for the DPRK to commit to an actual war, there must be sufficient expectation of a positive outcome, or conversely, belief that their existence is at an eminent threat. The former may seem unusual given the clear superiority of the ROK/US forces over the KPA. However, it is important to consider the various elements of asymmetry in the two nations that go beyond purely military capability. To list a few, there are likely differences in the willingness to engage in total war, the willingness to violate international norms and laws, and the consideration (or lack thereof) for collateral damage to civilians and non military infrastructures. These self imposed "conditions" of warfare would be a significant factor in determining whether the DPRK has a realistic chance of not necessarily conventional victory over ROK/US, but a means by which they can bargain for a favorable outcome.

The latter scenario is also a growing concern as each side threatens preemptive action in response to the increasing threat of the other. The ROK/US concerns over the development of an effective nuclear weapons delivery system has led to thinly veiled suggestions of preemptive action to prevent the DPRK from attaining said capability. Conversely,  the DPRK has threatened action against what they perceive as invasion and assassination operations exercises by the opposition, and have regularly produced and distributed written and video content of promising destruction of their enemies. Fortunately, these threats have been limited to just words without any significant action behind them. However, the reality of the preemptive strike for either side cannot be ignored; given sufficient reason and appropriate circumstances, either side may become convinced that the threat of the opposition can only be dealt with by a swift and overwhelming first strike.

ROK/US
Unlike the DPRK which, through political ideological as well as practical reasons, have long yearned for and called for reunification, the ROK is less than enthused at the prospect of reunification (the DPRK would stand to gain from such a scenario, but the ROK would face a torrent of political, social and economic complications of integrating a largely unskilled and disconnected population not to mention political conflict due to sharing a border with the Chinese mainland). Instead, the primary concern of ROK/US largely rests in trying to maintain a level of stability while counter balancing the growing Chinese power and influence in the region. At the same time, security concerns must be weighed against economic interests of the two nations, particularly in maintaining a level of working relationship with the PRC.

The rising tensions in the Korean peninsula is a large concern for the ROK/US, where the inevitably of a nuclear DPRK (although they claim to being a nuclear power currently, their means of delivery, yield of warheads, and quantity have yet to raise sufficient concern to warrant immediate action) puts them in a difficult situation. Policy makers and experts disagree as to whether diplomatic or military means are the most effective in deescalating and slowing down the development of nuclear capability and so far, DPRK has made it the highest priority of the state and have accelerated development without pause.

Although there are insufficient motivating factors for ROK/US to start a war unprovoked, the continued development of nuclear capability has put the possibility of a preemptive strike a reality. In its current state, diplomatic relation between the ROK/US and the DPRK is at an all time low, and the soft leverages against DPRK through its allies have also diminished and military measures have served to only antagonize and accelerate development efforts. The latest efforts have amounted to further sanctions against DPRK persons and corporations to increase the economic pressure. While arguably, decrease in foreign capital and procurement of vital goods will hinder nuclear development, it will do little to change the driving incentives that have led to it in the first place.

With the current level of missile delivery system, the DPRK is able to threaten the ROK but not the US. However, there is a clear effort to attain reliable ICBM capability to deliver nuclear warheads across the Pacific. While there is no certainty as to how the US would react if the DPRK was able to successfully demonstrate ICBM capability, it would undoubtedly raise grave concerns. Without additional privy to operational plans at a military level, I can only give conjectures, but it is not unreasonable to think that if the DPRK were seen to be making a clear move for war by means of troop movement or significant missile site activity, the chances of a preemptive strike in lieu of a DPRK attack is possible.

Final Thoughts
For the major actors involved in the Korean peninsula tension, each side has their own share of interests, concerns, and threshold for war. The rising tension in the peninsula have yet to break this theoretical threshold, but the rise is indisputable, and the prospect of war have never been as high as it is now. In spite of the doom and gloom however, reality suggests there is still much headroom left sans any unforeseen disaster immediately triggering a hostile military response. This is because for those involved, a Korean war would serve to threaten not only threaten to permanently damage the stability in the region, and whether victorious or not, those involved will likely suffer significant casualties in both lives and livelihood.

In lieu of an actual conflict that brings about the formal end of the Korean War with a violent conclusion, it is more likely that we will bear witness to a DPRK limping along into the future for at least the next several decades under Kim Jong Un's rule. The next pivotal shift will come with the end of the current generation where we will see either a continuation of the Kim regime with a Kim progenitor, or a more party based rule akin to the PRC. As the DPRK continues to grow economically, the country will see the standard of living gradually rise, and eventually, there will be a necessity to, at least partially, integrate itself with the global community.

From a ROK/US perspective, a war is only as likely as it is to start it themselves. However, the stakes of inaction as the DPRK develops its nuclear capability is not an effective long term solution. While inaction may avoid war in the immediate present, there is no guarantee that it will in prevent all future Korean wars. The peculiarity of DPRK's political environment leaves ample room for scenarios in which, given certain conditions are met, may be inclined to force a confrontation. With recent developments in the DPRK/PRC relation and US/PRC relation, new avenues of leverage against the DPRK may appear in the form of more effective sanctions. While historically, sanctions have never been sufficiently effective in inducing compliance from the DPRK, genuine cooperation and political pressure by the PRC may yield favorable results.

With a new ROK president who promises increased effort to resolve the issue by diplomatic means, I am hopeful of new positive developments. I acknowledge the myriad of criticisms that exist against previous diplomatic efforts, particularly those against the Kaesong industrial project. And given that Moon Jae-In has made it clear that the resumption of the Kaesong project is in serious consideration, skepticism to the diplomatic efforts are not unfounded. However, many experts, including myself (to be clear, I consider myself a hobbyist, not an expert) firmly believe that a general rise in economic well-being is a key means by which the DPRK can transform into a less hostile state (or at least a more predictable one). At the same time, I am also cognizant of the fact that in the current state of affairs, an influx of funds will most certainly be utilized in nuclear and related military projects without any benefit to the common North Korean at large. I am cautiously hopeful that a combination of diplomatic re-engagement with economic integration with carefully designed actions targeting military procurement and development will have a meaningful effect and avoid a Korean War.

Cognitive Traps - The Monolithic State

In consideration of the motives and actions of a country, there is a tendency to attribute to it a singular intent and will as if it be a monolithic entity. In a fashion akin to personification, we sometimes come to look at the state no different from a single being, as if this "thing" is the grand amalgamation of the values and philosophies that is likened to the nation. This phenomenon of humans personifying non-human things is a familiar subject to the social sciences, where it is understood as a mental strategy in dealing with elements unknown and rationalizing events that we do not fully understand. For political analysts however, this can be a fatal cognitive trap that fogs the reality of the political sphere under the fiction of the monolithic state entities.

While this may arguably be a thing of common sense, it is precisely those that are most evident which often eludes us through complacency and lack of practice. For an analyst, it is one of our most important tenant in conducting sound analysis to avoid attribution of characteristics based on our personal experiences, perspectives, and assumptions. Yet, in practice, this is perhaps one of the most difficult challenge those in the profession face and as such requires utmost vigilance and diligence to ensure it does not pervade our thinking process. As we struggle to understand the unknown with incomplete information and elements of uncertainty, we inevitably seek mental shortcuts, such as the simplification of the complex bureaucratic machination that is the state into a monolithic entity.

For example, take the similarities and differences between US-Russia relations from the previous and current administration. A monolithic view of the US as a single and continuous entity would be insufficient to adequately explain the change in the relationship despite a lack of change in the official stance with the new administration. To understand this issue, it is necessary to look at the stance taken by the administration (in both official and unofficial capacity), the execution of policy, and Russia's actions.

During the previous administration, the official foreign policy towards Russia was a duality of limited military coordination against similarly aligned interests, but politically and economically, the foreign policy poised Russia as an opposition in response to their various international transgressions. And perhaps more importantly to the topic, there was a high level of consistency and coordination between the various agencies and spokesperson in establishing a clear stance and acting in accordance to it.

In comparison, the current administration has given mixed signals as to how it will shape its relationship with Russia. The POTUS himself has made unofficial remarks to his admiration of Russia and his desire to shift US foreign policy to that of closer military and possibly political cooperation, going as far as hinting at the possibility of revisiting the Russia sanctions. However, most of official stances from the DoD and DoS in regards to Russia have not meaningfully changed from that of the previous administration. While the official stance itself has not changed, the discrepancy between the stances of the POTUS and the various supporting agencies will likely cause issues down the line. Without consistency and proper coordination of strategy from the Trump administration, Russia will be empowered to take action that they otherwise might not have taken under the previous administration.

Under the framework of a monolithic state entity, the change in US-Russia relation cannot be adequately explained given the continuum of an unchanged official foreign policy and is unable to account for a dramatic shift in narratives through a new administration. A superficial look at states as a giant single organism fails to catch the nuances of the many actors and institutions involved in the development of what is generally called a "policy". To avoid this cognitive trap, it is necessary to consciously force yourself to clarify and breakdown larger pieces into smaller elements. For instance, when referring to the actions of a larger entity, remain cognizant of the institutions and key figures involved, and the relation of the action against affected actors and any historical relevance that may exist.