ACCA-13: The Truth (part 4)

Soon after, word of Jean Otus' royal lineage spreads to each of the districts, and news of King Falke's failing health hits the waves, instantly upping the tension as the final pieces slot into play. With the revelation of Jean's royal lineage, Chief Officer Grossular calls an emergency meeting with the Five Chief Officers. First, Grossular confirms that Jean is in fact royalty, then to the surprise of the other Chief Officers, he goes on to say that if there is to be a coup d'etat, then it should be lead by none other than ACCA-13 to prevent its dissolution and to ensure peace and stability of the Kingdom. Throughout this whole ordeal, the Five Chief Officers all have shown their distaste for the Crown Prince and their belief in the value of ACCA-13. A quick vote is held, and there is unanimous consent among the Five Chief Officers. ACCA-13 will spearhead the coup d'etat to overthrow the Dowa family.

Chief Officer Grossular suggests ACCA-13 lead the coup.

 

 

 

 

 

Having successfully gained the consensus of the other Chief Officers, Grossular and Ilium meet privately. When a down trodden Grossular voices his concerns that it may not all go according to plan, Lilium aggressively yanks Grossular by the hair, asserting that he is confident that Grossular will ensure it will all go according to plan. In a series of flashbacks, we now learn that it was Lilium and albeit reluctant Grossular who set the plans in motion to create the appropriate scenario for which a coup d'etat can be triggered. Using Grossular's loyalty to ACCA-13 and his desire to protect the Kingdom, Lilium had persuaded Grossular to participate in this conspiracy to overthrow the throne.

Chief Officer Lilium threatens Chief Officer Grossular.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Meanwhile, Jean Otus continues his audits across the Kingdom and arrives at the Furawau district, where Lilium and his family hail. In Furawau, Jean learns that Lilium is a member of a prestigious and wealthy Furawau family, with many of its members holding positions of significance both in ACCA-13 and the legislative. Furawau district is also well known for its abundant natural resources, particularly in oil, and provides 90% of the Kingdom's oil supply. While this has granted the district a certain amount of prosperity and political significance, the importance of the resource to the Kingdom has rendered Furawau limited in its ability to dictate the distribution of its resources, which has been a point of contention since its federation. Meeting with the Furawau branch Chief, who is incidentally the younger brother of Lilium, Jean is offered in no uncertain terms Furawau district's full support in the coup d'etat. From this meeting, Jean walks away with the impression that Lilium and his family is far more vested in the coup d'etat as a means to advance Furawau's interests rather than protecting the Kingdom's future from the Crown Prince.

Returning to Badon, Jean Otus seeks out Lilium, who spares no time and immediately affirms his intent to support the coup d'etat and requests Jean to take the mantle as the new ruler of the Kingdom. Jean agrees on the spot and also notes that during his audits throughout the districts, he has gotten the support of each of the district's branch Chiefs for the coup d'etat.

Jean meets Furawau's branch chief.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

With Jean's audits concluded, ACCA-13 now prepare for the upcoming centennial anniversary of ACCA-13's founding, and all the senior officers from the branch offices and Headquarters gather in Badon. During the ceremony, the Crown Prince is expected to give a speech in lieu of King Falk's absence given his recent downturn in health, and it is this moment that the conspirators plan to announce their coup d'etat to the public, and to take the Crown Prince under custody before installing Jean as the next ruler of the Kingdom. At least, that is the plan as is known to Chief Officer Lilium and his Furawau compatriots.

ACCA-13 officers discuss their plan to overthrow the throne.

 

 

 

 

 

 

It is now the day of the celebration, and up on stage are all the high ranking officers of ACCA-13, including the Five Chief Officers, Director-General Mauve, and Jean Otus. They are also joined by Crown Prince Schwan and his personal guards. Following a rather uneventful series of speeches by each of the senior officers, the Crown Prince takes up the podium to deliver his speech, but is instantly interrupted by an outpouring of armed ACCA-13 officers. Addressing the confused and shocked crowd, Lilium announces that ACCA-13, an agency for peace and stability, is being targeted for dissolution by the Crown Prince once he takes the throne, and in the interests of the people and the future of the Kingdom, ACCA-13 has decided to preempt the Crown Prince. The crowd bursts in clamor in confusion and dismay as people voice concerns over the Crown Prince's aptitude as ruler and the future of the Kingdom, and their wishes for ACCA-13 to continue to exist.

The centennial celebration of ACCA-13's founding.

Crown Prince Schwan surrounded by ACCA-13 officers.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Just as it appears that all the cards are now in the hands of the conspirators, Director-General Mauve steps forward to silence the crowd. Lilium is surprised as this was not part of the plan, but is unable to stop her as she begins to speak. Addressing both the Crown Prince and the crowd, Mauve explains the situation. In expectation of the Crown Prince's expected ascension to the throne, ACCA-13 wished to prepare this theatrical display knowing that the Crown Prince was predisposed to traveling without a large security entourage. The intent was to teach him the importance of his security and responsibility that he has as the future ruler of the Kingdom. Mauve apologizes for such an unplanned event and thanks the Crown Prince for his participation in the act, and wishes for his health and prosperity as the next King. Reading the crowd's negative reaction to Lilium's claim that the Crown Prince wished to dissolve ACCA-13, the he finds no recourse but to accept Mauve's explanation and announce that he is impressed by ACCA-13's concern for him and that he has no intent to do away with ACCA-13.

This is met with applause from the crowd, as a furious and disappointed Lilium turn to the Five Chief Officers and Jean. With a satisfied look, Jean simply explains to Lilium that when all the senior officers gathered in Badon for the celebration, they had conspired separately to prevent Lilium and Furawau's plot from coming into fruition. Having been utterly defeated, Lilium departs the stage, and the following day, it is announced that Furawau has seceded from the federation, taking with them their natural resources. Thus concludes the conspiracy that threatened the Dowa Kingdom into another potential civil war.

ACCA-13: Royal Lineage (part 3)

Through her separate investigation, Director-General Mauve discovers a key piece of information that sheds light on the actual mechanism behind the coup d'etat. It is revealed that Jean Otus and his sister Lotte Otus are grandchildren of the current ruling King of Dowa, and whoever started the rumor that Jean was a co-conspirator, likely seeks to replace Crown Prince Schwan with Jean. Now confident that Jean was not originally a conspirator, Mauve tells Jean of his heritage. Though initially surprised by this revelation, Jean quickly plans his next move with Mauve.

Jean learns of his royal lineage from Director-General Mauve.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

With this knowledge in hand, Jean confronts Nino, his childhood friend and constant watcher, who previously alluded that his role in monitoring Jean comes not just from Chief Officer Grossular, but from someone else he cannot yet reveal. Faced with a Jean now aware of his heritage, Nino now has to contend with the implications it may have on his supposed role as co-conspirator in a coup d'etat, and decides to tell Jean of his family's history.

Nino prepares to tell Jean his family's true background.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jean Otus' mother, Schnee Otus is the second of three sisters and daughter of the current ruling King Falke. During her youth, Princess Schnee frequently traveled to the Kingdom's districts to study and became enamored with life outside of the palace. Unfortunately, her fascination with the outside world also included her passion for politics, raising concerns that she may become a political liability on the royal family. However, filled with love for her curious and worldly daughter, King Falke did not wish to prevent Princess Schnee from pursuing her passion and explore the outside world.

To allow the Princess to experience the world as well as to prevent the family's reputation from becoming besmirched, King Falke arranges to have her removed from the Dowa family registry and to send her out to Badon to live as a commoner. To ensure her well-being and to report on her life to the King, Abend of the Guard Corps who serves as Princess Schnee's aide is also sent along with her, but is made to give up his family and position to keep the Princesses existence a secret. To aid in his duties in monitoring the Princess in her new life, Abend also takes his personal aide and his son, Nino. With the plan set, Princess Schnee and Abend's disappearance is explained away by a tour boat that sinks mid voyage to the Peshi district.

A solemn King Falke bids farewell to Princess Schnee.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ACCA-13: Rumors of a Coup D'etat (part 2)

At a meeting between the Five Chief Officers, Chief Officer Grossular notifies the group of a rumor that could endanger the peace and stability of the kingdom. According to this rumor, conspirators are plotting to overthrow the monarchy, and Jean Otus of the Inspection Department is their messenger, using his natural position as an Inspection officer to travel to each of the district to coordinate the plot.

Chief Officer Grossular of the Five Chief Officers.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Concerned that the very department responsible for overseeing ACCA-13 may now bring it ruin, Grossular decides to employ "Crow" of the Internal Affairs to surveil Jean Otus as he travels to each district to conduct his audits. Crow's true identity is Nino, a close childhood friend of Jean Otus. Of particular note, during his meeting with Grossular, Nino tells his superior that the other Chief Officers will soon realize that the rumors of Jean's involvement in the conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy is in fact true, suggesting that Grossular's source of information of the rumors of the coup d'etat and Jean's purported involvement is none other than Nino.

Nino meeting with Chief Officer Grossular

 

 

With Grossular's announcement of a potential coup d'etat plot and his intent to investigate the matter, the stage is now set. Each with their own agendas, senior officers of ACCA-13 begin to move in secrecy, and in caught in the middle of their political machinations is Jean Otus. Named as a possible co-conspirator, Jean suddenly finds himself at the center of attention of the most powerful individuals of ACCA-13.

While rumors of a coup d'etat have always nagged the Kingdom since the failed attempt 150 years ago, several key political events loom on the horizon which give greater credence to its legitimacy. First, the current ruling King Falke has just celebrated his 99th birthday, and while his health is not an immediate concern, the Crown Prince Schwan is also expecting to celebrate his coming of age, which makes him eligible to take the throne. There is an expectation that the King will soon abdicate to allow the Crown Prince to be coronated as the new ruler. It is also no secret among the political elites that the Crown Prince harbors ambitions to strengthen the Dowa family's control over the Kingdom by dissolving ACCA-13 and the legislative. With the fate of the Kingdom's future at hand, what would have been dismissed as mere rumor now warrants greater scrutiny.

Crown Prince Schwan maneuvers to ensure his ascendance.

 

 

 

 

 

After learning about the rumors of a coup d'etat from Grossular, Chief Officer Lilium seeks out Jean Otus. In a discreet meeting in a car, Lilium reveals to Jean what Grossular had told him, of the rumors of a coup d'etat, and that he has been identified as a co-conspirator and messenger. Furthermore, he also reveals that a member of the Internal Affairs is surveilling him, and that Jean may already know this man intimately. Finally, Lilium assures Jean that he does not believe that Jean is involved in the conspiracy and that instead, he believes that Grossular is the true conspirator who is spreading the rumors of a coup d'etat.

Chief Officer Lilium secretly meets with Jean Otus.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Having learned of the the rumors of a coup d'etat from her own sources, Director-General Mauve initiates an investigation but is shortly ordered to cease by Grossular. Undeterred, Mauve seeks out Jean Otus to recruit his help, though fully aware of the possibility that he may be a co-conspirator. In a clandestine dinner meeting, Mauve asks Jean to report back to her after his audits to each of the districts on any information regarding the coup d'etat. She also confides in Jean that while she believes the Crown Prince is a fool who will bring ruin to the Kingdom, a coup d'etat may lead to serious harm to the people if it were to escalate into civil war, which goes against ACCA-13's mission in preserving order and protecting the people. While employing Jean Otus as her agent, Mauve is still unsure of Jean's true allegiances and initiates a separate investigation on Jean and the coup d'etat.

Director-General Mauve recruits Jean Otus as her agent.

 

 

Rumors of Jean's supposed role as co-conspirator and messenger for the coup d'etat spreads throughout the Kingdom, and Jean finds himself in an awkward position as he travels to the districts for his audits. As Jean meets with the branch chiefs during his travels, they attempt to delicately probe Jean's position to ascertain whether he truly is a co-conspirator. Using this opportunity, Jean decides to play into the role as co-conspirator and messenger to learn more about the plot, and to his surprise, he discovers that while there seems to be no concrete plans of a coup d'etat, there is a definite underlying appetite for it among the senior ACCA-13 branch officers. However, what Jean still cannot understand is why a relatively unimportant individual like himself has been named a conspirator in a plot he is not involved in.

Jean with Hare district's branch officers.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ACCA-13: A Tale of Conspiracies (part 1)

For a century, the Kingdom of Dowa and its federation of 13 distinct and diverse nations (now known as districts) united under a single monarchy has continued its existence in peace and stability without much fanfare. This fortune has been credited to the work of the bureaucratic agency known as ACCA-13 that manages the Kingdom and provides government services. However, under this guise of multicultural solidarity and coexistence brews a conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy, threatening to end the 100 years of peace and stability that the Kingdom has enjoyed. With the fate of the Kingdom at play, senior officers of ACCA-13 and members of the Dowa family move to use the situation to their own ends, and at the center of this tale of conspiracies and political intrigue sits Jean Otus of ACCA-13's Inspection Department.

Deputy Chief Jean Otus with his iconic tobacco and lighter.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Dowa Kingdom and the Federation of 13 Districts

In episode 2, we learn a little about the history of the Kingdom of Dowa, namely its violent past and the origins behind the creation of ACCA-13. Roughly 200 years ago, the Kingdom of Dowa united the 12 other nations under its banner leading to the creation of the federation. However, this was short lived as just after 50 years, the 12 nations attempted to secede, leading to a violent struggle for independence.

The 13 districts that make up the Dowa Kingdom

  

The coup d'etat attempt by the 12 nations ultimately failed and the Dowa Kingdom was able to reassert its supremacy, and in order to prevent a future civil war, the Dowa Kingdom negotiated and granted semi-autonomy to the 12 nations and established ACCA-13, a civilian agency that was independent from the Dowa monarchy to manage the Kingdom and to provide government services. The non-militarized nature of ACCA-13, along with its independence from the Dowa family was specifically arranged to emphasize and guarantee autonomy of the districts and to ensure equitable distribution of power in the administration of the Kingdom. Interestingly, the name behind ACCA-31 comes from a since extinct bird called Acca, which symbolizes peace.

The extinct bird of peace, Acca.

ACCA-13

Established after thwarting the coup d'etat attempt by the 12 districts, ACCA-13 is a bureaucratic agency responsible for maintaining peace and stability of the Kingdom by providing government services. Additionally, while not explicitly stated as its mission, the Dowa family likely sought to use ACCA-13 as an oversight mechanism to monitor and deal with dissenting elements to prevent another coup d'etat attempt.

Structurally, ACCA-13 is a sprawling leviathan that has numerous departments such as the Police Department, Internal Affairs, and the Inspection Department. With its Headquarters situated at the affluent metropolis that is the Badon district, ACCA-13 is able to exert near complete control and oversight over the 13 districts through its branch offices at each of the districts. And to ensure proper administration of each district, officers of the Inspection Department travel to the branch offices to conduct audits on its own members. At the top of ACCA-13 sits the Five Chief Officers who serve as the highest deliberating body within the agency who then delegates execution of their decision to the Director-General.

The organizational structure of ACCA-13.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Five Chief Officers, from left to right:
Pine, Grossular, Lilium, Spade, Pastis

Director-General Mauve.

Jean Otus

Born and raised in the Badon district, Jean Otus is the oldest child of Schnee and Karl Otus, who passed away from a train accident. Having inherited his parents' role as manager of a high-rise apartment complex, Jean lives a mundane but enjoyable life with his sister Lotta Otus, who both share a love for sandwich breads and dining out with their childhood friend Nino.

Jean, Lotto, and Nino enjoy an outing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

During the day, Jean Otus works as the Deputy Chief of ACCA-13's Inspection Department, alongside Chief Owl and his several lively colleagues who always find time to snack on sweets during work hours. Per his duties as Inspection officer, Jean frequently travels to the 13 districts to conduct audits on the work of ACCA-13 officers, but is more often than preoccupied with his sister Lotte's demands for souvenirs. While he normally visits each district once every two years, he is given sudden instructions to audit all 13 districts in just 6 months per instructions from the Five Chief Officers.

Jean brings souvenirs from his audits for his colleagues.
Chief Owl pictured in fore.

 

 

 

 

 

 

While Jean is often overlooked for his nonchalant demeanor and his disarmingly droopy eyes, behind this unremarkable facade hides a complex character filled with duality. Born of average parents, Jean professes that he has no money nor connections, but is the manager of a fancy apartment building home to elites and senior government officials. And although he laments that his salary as a Headquarters officer is lower than that of Badon's branch officers despite being in the same district, he is never seen without a cigarette, which are so expensive and heavily taxed that they are called "hobby of rich folk". Furthermore, despite his responsibility as an Inspection officer to oversee and prevent corruption and fraud within ACCA-13, he is quick to overlook such instances, brushing them off as being "out of his jurisdiction", hinting at his inclination to play by his own morals over rigid rules. And finally, despite having no grand aspirations or strong feelings about the current political system, Jean finds himself swept up in a plot to overthrow the Dowa monarchy.

Indomitable China

In the last several decades, China has grown to be a world superpower in every sense of the word, from being the industrial workhorse of the world, wielding immense political power to sway international events, to developing an increasingly sophisticated and advanced military force comparable to that of the most powerful nations in the world. However, in the backdrop of such a meteoric rise in such a short span following the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the centuries of humiliation and subjugation under foreign powers, China has been a common target of international criticism for a variety of "bad behaviors". One prominent point that the public and press often cite is the Chinese human rights violation, to include most recently, its treatment of a minority ethnic and religious group Uyghurs. However, ever since its inception, China has maintained a ideological zealotry to sovereignty that seemingly renders them immune to international pressure, and certainly their rise in prominence in the international stage has only further cemented their behaviors.

An oft asked question is, why does the international community let China continue its oppression of ethnic minorities like the Uyghurs? More specifically, I read a social media post recently that prompted this piece, which asserted that the whole world should join arms in applying overwhelming and whatever pressure possible to force Chinese submission. While my immediate and visceral reaction was to brush it off as exceedingly naive and uninformed on international affairs, I figured that it was a good opportunity to explore the various tools in the diplomatic kit that the U.S. and other countries have and how effective they have been in achieving their goals. To that end, I will explore what sort of challenges exist in pressuring China, and what the U.S. and the international community have already tried against China in recent years and what their outcomes were.

Tools of the Trade

First, I want to explore the very notion of effecting change in another country. Generally, countries will attempt to influence each other using economics, diplomacy, and/or military with either positive or negative incentives. To give a concrete example, let us explore the following scenario. The U.S. in coalition with international partners imposes broad economic sanctions on China in order to change their behavior in regards to their poor treatment of ethnic and religious minorities in China. To simplify this scenario, the U.S. would be engaging in diplomacy with partners to create a sanctions regime that imposes a negative economic incentive on China. That is to say, if China does not change their behavior, they will suffer economically. However, whether China decides to submit to international pressure or not will depend on several different factors and ultimately, China has to come to the conclusion that continuing their behavior is not worth the negative economic impact from the sanctions.

• Barriers to Success

The concept behind the above example is relatively simple, but effective implementation of such measures is far more difficult, and doubly so in actually achieving your intended outcome. Let us go through the hypothetical scenario step by step and see where we encounter challenges that makes this not such a simple endeavor.

While the U.S. can impose unilateral sanctions against China, this is unlikely to be sufficiently painful enough for China to induce any change. While the U.S. and China are admittedly large trading partners, the relationship is such that the U.S. is proportionately a net exporter of Chinese goods. If the trade between the two countries were to come at a screeching halt, while it is plausible that given sufficient time, other countries could replace China, it would take a gargantuan undertaking of building industrial capacity on a level that no other country is currently capable of for such a wide variety of goods. However, China has the convenience of simply shifting its export of goods to any other trade partner in the world. While China would also suffer from logistical challenges as it establishes new destinations for its goods, comparatively speaking, it would be less costly for China.

Therefore, in order to have maximum impact, the U.S. would need the cooperation of international partners to impose economic sanctions on China. However, the typical mechanism for international sanctions through the UN would not be available given that China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, giving it absolute veto powers. The U.S. then would have to engage in a complicated dance of diplomacy through multiple countries to get their cooperation in sanctioning China. And many of these countries like the U.S. are heavily dependent on China for trade, making any sanctions costly for them and likely politically inconvenient for them domestically.

Let us suppose that such a coalition of international partners were amassed to impose significant economic sanctions against China. While it is difficult to speculate in such a hypothetical scenario, we must consider that ideologically, China has maintained strict adherence to preserving its sovereignty and not bending to foreign intervention. As was the case during the Cold War when western powers sought to prevent the spread of communism, even during the heights of mass famine of "The Great Leap", China sought it in its best interest to actively fight against western economic and military pressure, to the point of engaging in direct combat with UN forces in the Korean War, and indirectly confronting U.S. forces in Vietnam. Considering that the poor treatment of Uyghurs are part of China's greater cultural project of homogenization to solidify the CCP's control over the country against dissidents or factional elements, it would take a great amount of pain for China to reverse course. For China, absolute control over the populace is a matter of survival of the ruling regime, and not simply a sadistic fancy of some spoiled princeling.

Past Efforts

History has much to tell us on U.S. efforts in trying to change China's behavior on the international stage. In short order, I will explore three separate examples, each covering economy, diplomacy, and military.

• Trade War

Fortunately, we have a convenient example of the recent Trump administration's "trade war" against China, which is ironically a unilateral juxtaposition of the multilateral effort of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement from the Obama administration. Without going into the convoluted details of the justification behind the "trade war", we will simply explore its mechanics and whether a positive outcome was gained. The ultimate goal of the U.S. was to change China's behavior in what was considered unfair trade practices. The leverage that the administration chose to effect a change was unilateral trade tariffs against Chinese goods entering the U.S. with the first measures taking effect in 2018 and additional measures being added until the Biden administration took power in early 2021. Ultimately, while there were several working level negotiations that occurred between the U.S. and China, 2 years of intensely escalating tariffs did not yield in any long term behavioral change in China's trade policy. Instead, many economists estimate that the cost of the tariffs negatively impacted global growth by several percentage points and only served to sour U.S. relations with other countries with whom it tried to compel cooperation.

• Sanctions Enforcement

Since their first nuclear testings in the early 90s, the U.S. along with the international community has enforced strict sanctions regimes against North Korea. However, its two neighbors China and Russia has always proved to be a challenge in pressuring the North Koreans as they continue to trade and allow workers in flagrant violation of UN sanctions. While the U.S. has continuously sought to liaise cooperation from the Chinese through diplomatic channels and through threats of secondary sanctions enforcement, it has had little effect in changing China's willingness to supply North Korea with the precious foreign currency it needs to continue to survive under the sanctions and to continue developing its nuclear capabilities. For China, their decision to circumvent the UN sanctions which they agreed upon as a permanent member on the UN security council has faced diplomatic consequences in the form of deteriorated relations with the U.S. and other likeminded partners, and economic consequences in the form of secondary economic sanctions from the U.S. designating Chinese entities and preventing their use of U.S.-based financial services and institutions. It seems likely to conclude that to the Chinese, these costs are insufficient to the value that North Korea has as a strategic buffer zone to U.S. military forces on South Korea and Japan, making such consequences trivial to what they would lose in return if they were to submit to U.S. demands.

• Vietnam War

During the height of the Cold War in the 60s, the U.S. was attempting to thwart further spread of communism to the greater Asia region to include Vietnam. In part to dissuade Chinese involvement in Vietnam, the U.S. decided to deploy thousands of military throughout the early 60s, which was increasingly met by Chinese military assistance to North Vietnam. From memoirs of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, we get a glimpse of the Kennedy administration's calculus in increasing pressure in Asia in the hopes that, a weakened China suffering from mass starvation from the Great Leap Forward, would feel under prepared to exert its power abroad. Consequently, what was intended to be an incremental buildup of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam to dissuade and counter Chinese forces, it inversely only served to ratchet up the affair on both ends. In simple terms, the U.S. sought to effect change in China's behavior in spreading communist ideology to the region through military pressure, which culminated in a indirect confrontation between the two which the U.S. eventually withdrew from.

Conclusion 

China is a very resilient country. It has weathered the fall of the communist bloc, periods of terrible mismanagement which costed millions of lives, and more recently, it has weathered numerous worldwide financial crises, and even a global pandemic. Yet despite such all that, China seems to be stronger than ever before, and emboldened to project its economic, political, and military might abroad. The threat to its immediate neighbors are a given, but we see China expand its influence to the rest of the world, including entangling Africa under considerable amount of debt, and embedding students, scholars, and skilled workers into the western world. Is it an inevitable conclusion that China overtakes the U.S. as the dominant power in all realms of the international space? Certainly, the traditional methods by which the U.S. has been able to exert its influence to effect desirable outcomes in foreign countries seem wholly ineffective on China, and they appear more than willing to turn the same tools back around against U.S. interests with great success. For years, people have debated on a strategic and graceful U.S. "abdication" of world hegemony to a "burden sharing" policy with China as a means of incorporating China into the international systems that were previously led by the U.S. in the hopes that they become a "responsible" superpower. But there is always the fear that an authoritarian system like China is susceptible to abusing their powers to the detriment of the world. As for me, I don't quite know what the right answer is, but it does appear to me that the methods that the U.S. has employed in the past century simply do not work when it comes to China and there needs to be a paradigm shift in how we approach this problem. And that does not include "simply" sanctioning China until they submit as some people might say.

Cannibalism: The Human Animal

In modernity, the act of cannibalism is a social taboo of the highest order; an act considered so vile that it commonly captures our imagination in the horrors of fiction in the form of human devouring monsters. But what about cannibalism terrifies us so, to the point where the act is reviled by society and subject to harsh punishment of law? In the US, while there are no laws that forbid cannibalism per se, there are state laws regarding the desecration of the body that would prohibit a person from engaging in cannibalism. And throughout the rest of the world, cannibalism is universally condemned as a violation of social norms and a thing of illegality. In contrast, within the animal (and insect) kingdom, occurrences of cannibalism is a fact of life, where the want for survival trumps all, and our humanly disposition against cannibalism is an oddity rather than a norm of living organisms.

The Case of a Stranded Boat
Historically, there have been famous cases where the social norms and laws against cannibalism were tested, and perhaps one of the most well known is the case of Her Majesty the Queen v. Tom Dudley and Edwin Stephens. In short, a crew of four were sailing a yacht when they encountered unfavorable weather which rendered their boat inoperable, and the Captain ordered the lifeboat be lowered and the crew abandoned ship. The crew then had to survive on the lifeboat in dangerous conditions with very limited supplies until they were rescued after 24 days. During this time, one of the member fell seriously ill and was comatose (presumed to be fated to death soon thereafter by the remaining crew), and with their rations depleted, Dudley and Stephens decided to kill the man and consume him. The remaining member of the crew, Edmund Brooks, abstained in the killing and eating. After their rescue, the two men who engaged in cannibalism were put on trial, though their sentences were reduced from the death penalty to 60 days in prison.

The case against the men were that they had committed homicide, and the defense being that the men had acted in their own defense of their live, which incidentally was through murder. And so, this became a classic case of taking another's life for the preservation of self, putting into question just how far the concept of "self-defense" extended in a legal sense. Beyond the legality of it however, there is also the ethical question behind the act of desperate cannibalism. In retrospect, we know that the men may have survived even if they did not engage in cannibalism, given that 4~5 days after killing and eating their former member, the remaining crew were rescued. What is important though is the motives behind the act, and in this case, Dudley and Stephens acted with the belief that if they did not kill and eat Parker, they themselves would eventually meet the same fate.

If we were to suppose that without killing Parker, the rest of the crew would have eventually succumbed to starvation and death, and by killing Parker, they were able to live sufficiently long enough for rescue to arrive, does this change the answer to the morality behind taking another's life for one's own?

The Cannibal
In the case above, there was a irreconcilable difference between what is dictated as just deserts by law, and what was believed to be justice accordance to social principles (the reality of the ruling is more nuanced than that, I admit, but for simplicity of the argument, I will focus on the nature of law and justice and its relation to social norms). That is to say, while murder is a social taboo, the peculiar circumstances in which, the murder of Parker was believed to be necessary to the crew's survival, made the issue far more complicated. And furthermore, the contention did not end at the murder, but also in the act of cannibalism, which has a quality to it unlike others to trigger such a revulsion, violating the very sense of what defines us as humans.

What is it about cannibalism rouses such a response? From an objective point of view, the consumption of meat is a necessity to one's survival, and we as humans partake in the consumption of meat of other dead beings without raising an eye brow (with the exception of vegans, and particular religious prohibition of certain kind of meats, which is a interesting point to consider as well). If we are capable of consuming the meat of cows and chickens, how is this materially different from that of consuming humans? And even before that, why are certain acts considered "desecration" of the dead? Are they not already far removed from the world of the living, no longer drawing breath to know or care what we do with their corpse?

One explanation behind this human "peculiarity" may lie with our higher cognitive capabilities that allow us to experience a range of emotions, from empathy to various levels of kinship (ranging from the smallest unit of the familial all the way to a sense of single unity as humans). And with our higher cognitive capabilities, we have imbued the dead with the characteristics of the living, elevating a heap of corpse to that of what we call to be "human". In India, we see this mechanism employed to elevate the status of cows to that of a respected being, and therefore, making it a being not appropriate for consumption. And of course, there is religion to consider, among innumerable others, which I will not explore for the sake of brevity; the important point is that cannibalism does not seem to be an adverse behavior as far as reproduction is considered. If the revulsion of cannibalism is an element of social norms without a biological component, is the transgression of these norms worthy of punishment even in circumstances of life and death?

Apart from basic biological necessities (food, water and shelter), human society is tightly bound by rules and norms to uphold the principles that make up our "humanity", away from the animalistic behavior based on primal instinct. In that sense, our proclivity to safeguard these principles is a defense of what defines us as humans, lest we become slave to the "rules of nature" where survival and procreation dictate all. And to those who violate these norms, society is eager to shun, as if to protect and preserve their notion of superiority as "humans" beyond simple biological machines that act in accordance to their natural making.

Conclusion
In the case of the lifeboat, the argument of the murder as a necessary defense of one's own life is a very contentious matter. It is true that in our society, certain acts of violence are permissible (at least legally speaking) if the perpetrator was acting in credible defense of their own life. And yet, the act of cannibalism, or in this case, a murder for the purpose of cannibalism seems to evoke a revulsion as if the act is a kind of attack on our identity as humans. Post-apocalypse fiction is a genre that often tackles this very question of what it means to be human, and when thrust upon the most trying conditions, when we forgo the conventions of our societal norms for the sake of survival become a thing that is less than human?

Bloody Nose for a Cracked Fist

With the lack of progress in achieving a non-military solution to the DPRK's continued belligerence in regards to nuclear development, the possibility of a limited attack (bloody nose) looms menacingly above our heads. In its essence, the use of violence is the physical manifestation of political discourse. That is to say, violence is never a means and an end to itself, but rather, a continuation, and most often, the apex of a conversation between two states. As such, the pursuit of military action must not be an invocation of emotional response, and instead, must be part of a considered and deliberate stratagem to elicit specific reactions.

The Feasibility of Limited Attack
The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (M.A.D.) tells us that the possession of weapons of mass destruction between opposing parties will lead to a scenario in which use of the weapons will result in a full-scale exchange, ensuring the total annihilation of all parties involved. And interestingly, the scale of the destructive power of nuclear weapons allows for a equilibrium between parties of asymmetric nuclear capability. This is in part due to the relative "risk" that is involved in a nuclear exchange, and the asymmetry of "pain tolerance" between states of very disproportionate economic power. To use a silly analogy, a nuclear fight is like that of two people in a pit of oil, one with a single match, and the other, with a whole box of matches.

However, the existence of nuclear weapons is not an end to traditional forms of conflict, and certainly not an end to limited military actions or exchanges between nations. As history has shown us, the military rivalry between the US and Soviet Union did not spell an end to the conflict, and while it did have the effect of preventing a full-out war between the two nations, conflict via proxies took the stage as the language of violence during the Cold War. And similarly, the history between the US (and by association, the ROK) and the DPRK is riddled with small exchanges, and although the DPRK lacked the means of a nuclear strike against either US or ROK in the past, they were not foreign to showing their willingness to use military action.

If the US were to hold itself to its words, the possibility of a limited attack seems very real. With the US unwilling to yield in its demand for de-nuclearization, the continued development of both delivery methods and stockpile may force a response. Alternatively, there is also the possibility that the ordeal with the DPRK will end similarly to Obama's administration's demand for Assad to step down. This demand was not reasonable given the scale of commitment of the US (which severely hampered our ability to leverage our wants in the situation), and despite that, the US maintained this position until the problem became obsolete with the change of the Presidency (though the new incumbent may feel less regard for upholding the threats and promises of the previous administration, the inability to enforce the "red line" serves to undermine US leadership and credibility). Like Syria, the current administration may elect for the same "solution", opting for no real actions while the DPRK continues to defy the US.

The Carrot and Stick
The Trump administration's policy towards the DPRK is as follows: There is no acceptable alternative for the US but for complete de-nuclearization of the DPRK. And unfortunately, there has been no clear details as to what form of de-nuclearization would be acceptable to the US, making it not only a categorical antithesis to the nuclear policy of the DPRK, but also a non-negotiable starting point.

In the use of a limited attack, the US would have to communicate clear terms under which the US will exercise the use of further violence if demands are not met. These terms however, cannot be total de-nuclearization of the country, and must allow for a condition that can reasonably be fulfilled by the opposing party (or at least a demand that can be entertained and perhaps negotiated upon). However, diplomacy has a pre-requisition of mutual trust, and with the hostility and clear lack of trust shown between the two countries, the likelihood of success seem dim (from the perspective of the DPRK, it would be prudent to wait for a new administration that more closely embodies the traditional inclinations of the US, which would make far stabler grounds for negotiations).

Furthermore, the recent successes of talks between the DPRK and ROK will be a challenging roadblock for the US in terms of negotiating with the DPRK. ROK's breakaway from the bloc of US led sanctions against DPRK weakens US bargaining position, especially given the fact that any limited attack against DPRK would require close cooperation and buy-in to the plan by the ROK. And having finally managed to find some common ground and deescalation to the situation, a move to introduce military action into the situation would likely garner harsh repudiation by the international community, isolating the US in its negotiation efforts and possibly endangering the sanctions regime (which is already faltering for innumerable reasons).

Conclusion
In the present scenario, it is difficult to imagine a positive outcome to a limited attack, which would only serve to validate DPRK's efforts for self defense, isolate the US from its allies in negotiations, and escalate tensions when it was just on its way down. As discussed in previous works, the DPRK is not in a position to be negotiated to total nuclear disarmament and a limited attack with such preconditions would necessitate a hard reaction from the DPRK. And with the talks with DPRK and ROK progressing, a limited attack would serve to derail those talks, sour our relation with the ROK, and would ultimately do disservice to the effort of pacifying the peninsula.

While the likelihood of a positive outcome from a limited attack is very slim, the US has maneuvered itself into a terrible position, where we must choose from bad and worse options. And with the credibility of the US at risk, and with the long term dangers of "kicking the can" down the road yet again, military action is still a very real possibility. There is also the added domestic political situation to consider, where the need for domestic approval for midterm elections and a second term Presidency may trump (no pun intended) the negative consequences of such actions.

North Korea: Nuclear Diplomacy

"Let us sit about, and speak feverishly. Chatting into the wee hours of..."
- Micolash

As a North Korea watcher, the recent fervor of activity, discourse, and interest in the ongoing dilemma of the divided Koreas has been exhilarating and seeing so many people taking an interest in what is normally a niche subject is heartening. However, as with any topic that has a sudden influx of interested persons, talks of ridicule, fantasy, and general ignorance are abound. And with a topic that has so very captured the imagination of every persons with its striking relevance in our daily lives (whether it be the mockery of Presidential tweets or dismay of nuclear war), accurate portrayals, realistic expectations, and measured responses are paramount to the formulation of a well informed public consciousness befitting of our country.

The Triad of the Koreas and the States
The current administration of the United States of America (from hereon, USG) has drawn a strict line on the ground in the terms of negotiation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (from hereon, DPRK). The preconditions to any diplomatic talks is complete denuclearization with no exception, and with no formal diplomatic relation between the two nations, any discussions that occur happen through allied proxies. DPRK on the other hand, has voiced desire, and intent in their willingness to engage in talks without any definitive preconditions or want for guarantees, allowing for greater flexibility. Similarly, the Republic of Korea (hereon, ROK) has shown far greater willingness to engage in talks without being tied to the same line that the USG has drawn, following the promises of conciliatory policy towards the DPRK by President Moon Jae-In.

Given the inflexibility of the USG stance, the DPRK and ROK has engaged in talks and to the surprise of many, quickly resulted in an agreement of participation of the DPRK in the Pyeongchang Olympic games and even agreeing to a combined DPRK-ROK women's hockey team for the winter games. The swiftness of the talks and outcome cannot be understated. Within a span of a single week, the two countries went from a state of high tension to discussing the Olympic games, and even as far as combining the national teams under a single banner of a unified Korea. This speaks volumes of the differences in the sensibilities of the USG and ROK vis-a-vis the DPRK "problem" and the willingness of ROK to breakaway from the USG led bloc, making the rigid USG stance untenable as a leader in Asian International Relation matters.

Live by the Sword, Survive by the Sword
Presently, the topic of a nuclear capable DPRK is of highest importance to the USG vis-a-vis their command of the Pacific and Asia, and more recently, a developing homeland threat. While the USG has repeatedly admonished the DPRK for its insistence at nuclear development, claiming it to be highly destabilizing to the region. From the perspective of the DPRK however, stability in the greater region does not affect them in the same manner as the more advanced nations they are surrounded by. Since the armistice of the Korean war, the DPRK has felt a continual presence of an existential threat from both friend and foe. Being in such a precarious position, surrounded not just by overwhelming economic, political, and military might, but also by nuclear weapons, the DPRK has felt a strong desire for nuclear equilibrium as a guarantor of survival.

Interestingly, Kim Jong Un has proclaimed the recent nuclear advancements and successes as proof of having attained a functional and ready nuclear force, and in accordance to the doctrine of dual-track nuclear and economic development, the country will pursue economic betterment. While this is clearly not a proclamation of ceasing further nuclear development, it does in a way signal how the party perceives the progress of nuclear development; that is to say, they feel that they've achieved some minimum threshold needed for a functional nuclear force. In addition to the renewed efforts of diplomatic engagement with ROK, the implication seems to be that the DPRK feels that they've achieved the initial goals of nuclear development (first, as a military deterrence, and second, as a bargaining tool).

Final Thoughts
The USG has managed to sustain a  position of no-position for decades; by demanding the impossible, they maintained the status-quo of not having to deal with the complexities of negotiating and defining a clear foreign policy strategy. Meanwhile, the DPRK has managed to not only narrowly skirt a potential war in the Korean peninsula, it has also gained a powerful military and political tool, and has already wielded it to great effect against the ROK. The gambit of complete non-compliance in face of the entire international community including its few allies did not dissuade them, nor were they dissuaded by the impressive sanctions regime which they've managed to circumvent with surprising grace and agility. And its rewards were handsome and invaluable, cementing Kim Jong Un's rule over the party and country, ensuring the state's survival for the foreseeable future, gained international respect (or fear) and prominence as a nuclear power, and a power bargaining tool.

Going Nuclear: Why DPRK Won't Give Up

The Situation

The DPRK continues to defy the the international community as it successively tests missiles and nuclear bombs, with the latest nuclear test achieving a yield in excess of 100 kilotons to most estimates, and an array of successful missile tests of varying ranges, capable of hitting targets as far as the US west coast. In response, the UN has levied numerous sanctions and strengthened existing ones to cover not just materials in direct support of military efforts, but to also cover goods and necessities of every day North Koreans. Yet, to the dismay of the rest of the world, the DPRK seems inexplicably resilient against any efforts to dissuade them from their pursuit of nuclear power, and each successive test realizes the worst of our fears; a nuclear DPRK with the capability to carry out its abhorrent threats of complete annihilation of the US and its allies.

There is a growing international unity against the DPRK, and even its closest allies have joined in on the chorus, calling for a cessation of escalatory actions. Despite having quite literally the world against them, Kim Jong Un has made it clear that he has no intent on yielding and will complete his nuclear program at all costs (there is likely no real end to the DPRK's nuclear effort, only a bare minimum threshold of acceptable capability). What are the forces that convince the DPRK that they must develop a capable nuclear force without regard for the costs involved?

In the public consciousness, a common and convenient excuse is to attribute Kim Jong Un with mental instability. Suffice to say, calling someone irrational has the magical explanatory powers for everything without delving into the complexity that is the machination of East Asia geopolitics. Not only is this a poor excuse for unwilling to exercise any critical thinking to properly understand this very dangerous and uncertain situation, it also undermines the severity of the threat in the public consciousness. For the past several decades, the world has continued to laugh at the DPRK. Then they tested their first nuclear bomb. The world continued to laugh at the DPRK. Then they continually tested and succeeded in refining their missile capability. Still, the world continues to laugh at the DPRK, and now they have the ability to shoot missiles with nuclear bombs across the Pacific and destroy American cities. Will we still be laughing moments before a missile lands on our cities?

Nuclear Power at All Costs

What are the factors that influence DPRK's decision making in their willingness to undergo any and all punishment to pursue nuclear power?

• Nuclear Deterrence
• Internal Political Forces
• Ineffective Sanctions Regime

Each of these forces provide the push and pull incentives that inform their conclusion in believing that ultimately, the benefits of attaining a powerful nuclear force outweighs the costs associated with its pursuit. As consequence of these numerous factors influencing their thinking, the prospect of a cessation, let alone a disarmament agreement is a distant fantasy.

Nuclear Deterrence

The most clear benefit behind a nuclear DPRK is classic nuclear deterrence. While the modern landscape has given rise to asymmetric warfare without triggering a MAD scenario, nuclear weapons remain one of the surest ways to dissuade an opponent from engaging in conventional warfare. More interestingly, not only has history solidified their belief for a need for nuclear deterrence, but recent actions by the current administration has given them ample real-time validation of their beliefs.

In recent memory, the US military has acted with the explicit intent to dispose of foreign leaders in three cases: Iraq, Libya, and Syria. These historical cases paint a clear picture in the mind of DPRK; if you are considered an undesirable by the US, you will be subject to military attack.

Iraq

• Dismantled its WMDs
• Unable to trust them, US invades
• Saddam Hussein was executed

Libya

• Discontinued its WMD development after witnessing the Iraq War
• US and coalition forces "intervene"
• Gaddafi is killed by rebels

Syria

• Has chemical weapons, but not the means to threaten US
• US assists anti-government forces in an attempt to remove Assad from power

In a more recent and perhaps most important example, the US and Iran had forged an agreement where Iran would cease nuclear development in exchange for lifting of sanctions. Despite abiding by the terms of the agreement, and having US and international agencies inspect and confirm compliance, the US is threatening to break the agreement. Given these examples, it is unlikely that the DPRK would be inclined to barter in exchange for disarmament.

The message is indisputable; those the US consider an "axis of evil" will not be tolerated and if circumstances permit, they will be dealt with. With that in mind, there is a clear incentive for the DPRK to establish nuclear deterrence, as they believe it to be not just essential to, but perhaps the means of survival itself.

Asymmetrical Equilibrium

Another curious factor in the establishment of a nuclear deterrent is the asymmetry between the DPRK and the US (similarly applicable to ROK and Japan). The idea of MAD was a semi-functional doctrine was during the Cold War era, where the major powers wielded sufficient destructive power to ensure total annihilation of each other. The theory posits that, given sufficient advancement of military capability, the potential of mutual destruction will create, albeit uneasy disincentive for wars. For a variety of reasons, the MAD doctrine as a theory has shown to be ineffective in face of limited and asymmetrical war.

Specifically, in the case of the relation between the DPRK and the US, history has proven that limited and asymmetrical confrontation will not lead to a unilateral nuclear response on the part of the US, let alone a tit-for-tat response against DPRK for its belligerence. Examples range from limited artillery exchanges resulting in the death of ROK civilians, torpedoing of a ROK naval vessel, and cyber-attacks against Japanese companies. In each of these cases, the US and its allies did not respond in kind, but often opted for soft measures via sanctions and the likes.

This concept of asymmetry allows for a formulation of "equilibrium" of sorts, in the sense that mere possession of nuclear weapons will create deterrence without needing to match the US in quantity or quality. This is especially evident in light of the relative threshold for pain that each side is willing to endure. The US, as a far more prosperous and privileged country would be far less willing to incur costs to their own livelihood, especially in the event of a DPRK transgression that affects ROK or Japan, but not the US directly. This among many others are points of leverage that the DPRK has in establishing an asymmetrical equilibrium of deterrence with its relatively inferior conventional and nuclear force.

Perpetual Revolutionary State

As a prerequisite to maintaining a revolutionary state, there is a necessity to establish and maintain an "enemy". As discussed in previous articles, the existence of the revolutionary state has a complex push and pull mechanism. Not only are those in power rewarded for maintaining the status quo, they would be susceptible to a blow-back if the process of national development falls out of their control. The foundation upon which the current regime is built is not conducive to a dramatic change in economic or political ideology. By upholding the status quo, the regime is able to express a high level of control, and thereby direct the means and rate at which the country transform.

Exaltation of the KPA
One of the core components of a revolutionary state and one of the founding principles of the DPRK is the exaltation of the KPA (Korean People's Army). The tenuous grip of the Kim family over the country was originally built upon a socialist and anti-imperialist platform, which necessitates exaltation of the People's Army as the manifestation of the "struggle" against the oppressors. This sort of high valuation of the military comes at a cost. The regime secures its rule through a high concentration of power and violence within a highly stratified elite, but that same apparatus, being one of the very few pillars of  power within the state, has the means to remove the family from power.

In a sort of way, the regime is held upright and entrapped by the same group, preventing it from straying off-course, lest it beget violent backlash. The importance of the military was well understood by Kim Jong Un. As he came into power, the Worker's Party and the KPA saw dramatic changes as senior members were swiftly replaced with members directly loyal to Kim Jong Un, and even went as far as eliminating his estranged half-brother to limit the possibility of a regime change.

The development of a nuclear force is one of the greatest achievement and power that a military force can attain. As such, its development has a multifaceted incentive of being materially important to national security as a deterrence as well as serving to place emphasis on the importance of the KPA to the very survival of the country. It is a powerful propaganda tool that glorifies the military and its achievements, deters outside forces from engaging in conventional warfare, and serves as a powerful negotiating tool.

Limited External Leverage
The DPRK sits in a rather peculiar position with its nuclear development that makes it especially difficult to deal with. While there are some limited analogue in the nuclear development of other countries such as Iran, the DPRK has a unique position that heavily limits the ability of the international community to compel them to abandon its efforts. Unlike many other countries, the DPRK does not value their public face (nearly as much as others) in the global scene, making any form of public shaming or admonishment moot. For a number of reasons not fully explored here, the DPRK does not rely on its reputation nearly as much as other countries for trade, nor does it have a significant expat or diplomatic presence outside of the country, making such efforts very limited in effect.

Sanctions have also been historically ineffective for a number of reasons. The DPRK has practiced the principle of Juche (self-sufficiency) for decades, and while they are far from being completely independent from the outside world, they are careful in becoming too reliant on foreign trade. China, the largest importer and exporter with the DPRK, often takes a soft stance in enforcing sanctions, and coupled with the self enforcing and self reporting nature of UN sanctions, having a significant impact on DPRK trade is exceedingly difficult. Even when properly enforced, the DPRK has proven to be elusive and very proficient in bypassing sanctions by setting up proxy companies, dealing through intermediates, and having a large illicit network that wouldn't be subject to the law in the first place.

Interestingly, the current sanctions regime is tougher and more thorough than anything before. More countries are actively participating in limiting their interaction on both an economic and diplomatic level with the DPRK, and its key allies have started to enforce the sanctions more stringently. In a recent move, the US Treasury was given authority to act against businesses that partake in activities to the benefit of the DPRK. Whether the Treasury will actually go after businesses in an aggressive manner is yet unknown, but this is a move that can have huge implications on the ability for the DPRK to evade sanctions in countries that are may have typically been inclined to look the other way in the past.

Conclusion
For decades, the DPRK has put economic development subservient to national security, culminating to the ultimate form of deterrence by nuclear force. This slow crawl towards the realization of a nuclear DPRK has been a long process, and with each step, the international community sought to dissuade them from achieving it. The DPRK is determine to fulfill their nuclear aspirations, and dissuasion seem impossible. Given the myriad of factors that push and pull them towards this goal, the world cannot expect to simply threaten them into compliance. We must approach the problem with care and work to unravel each of these motivating factors in tandem, rather than simply trying to hammer them into submission via sanctions and nothing else.

US and North Korea: Nuclear Brinksmanship

Between August 8 and August 14, the US and North Korea exchanged heated threats, escalating to nuclear brinksmanship and promises of absolute annihilation. Events of this type typically do not warrant a second thought given the almost casual nature and frequency in which the two countries exchange threats and the lack of genuine concern from said threats. However, this particular instance deserves closer scrutiny for a number of reasons. The unprecedented nature of the threat (typically, the threats are one sided, coming from a belligerent North Korea, but this time, it was instigated by the US in a fashion not too different from the hermit kingdom), the particular circumstances that led to it, and the current political climate in regards to NK-US relations.

The Backdrop

The following recounts the key moments of this event in chronological order

August 8 - The Washington Post publishes, "North Korea now making missile-ready..."

August 8 - President promises, "fire and fury", against further North Korean threats

August 8 - North Korea to review operational plans for missile strike against Guam.

August 9 - North Korea details operational plan against Guam

August 10 - President doubles down on threat against North Korea

August 10 - China's President issues statement, will stand by NK if attacked, but will not if it attacks

August 10 - USAF indicates readiness of bombers at Guam

August 11 - President delivers a more subdued statement on NK without any additional threats following a security briefing

August 11 - President tweets, "Military solutions are now fully in place,locked and loaded..."

August 13 - NSC Advisor, McMaster asserts that war is not imminent

August 14 - Sec. DoD, James Mattis warns an attack against Guam is war, but emphasizes will not start one unprovoked

August 14 - North Korea admonishes US for its aggressive statements and warns of attack if aggression continues

Escalation in such a rapid manner took the world for a spin, as statements from each side came one after another, raising the stakes further. With the situation mostly defused, the world may soon forget this event as another set of empty threat by the "crazy" hermit kingdom. But the circumstances surrounding this event is very peculiar and among North Korean watchers (I find such a label very apt for a number of reasons, as we are mere observers of limited privy into the actual machinations of the North Korean state and often powerless to act in a meaningful way), this incident warrant closer examination on many levels.

The Impetus

According to The Washington Post (WaPo), a report dated July 28 notes that, "The IC assesses North Korea has produced nuclear weapons for ballistic missile delivery, to include delivery by ICBM-class missiles,". The DIA and the ODNI declined to comment on the document. Hours later, during a White House brief on the opioid crisis, when a reporter asks for a comment on the WaPo report, the President threatens with, "fire and fury".

Points of Interest

1. Is this a genuine article of the DIA?

Reluctance on the part of the DIA and ODNI to comment on the WaPo report is not indicative of its legitimacy, and while NBC News reported that, based on confidential disclosures of unnamed sources, other members of the IC do indeed agree, for the public, veracity of WaPo's report remains wholly unconfirmed (this is not to say that it is not genuine, but it remains a point of interest given that this was the start of the incident).

2. Was the President aware of the report, as either a WaPo and/or a DIA product?

Listening to the transaction between the questioner and the President, this question remains unanswered. Here is the transcript in full:

Reporter - "Any comments on the report on North Korea's nuclear capabilities?"

President - "North Korea, must not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen. He has been very threatening beyond a normal state, and as I said, they will be met with fire and fury, and frankly power, likes of which the world has never seen before."

The answer is highly peculiar, especially the first part in context of the question. The WaPo's publication had nothing in regards to a North Korean threat, nor has there been any new threats made at the time of the questioning. It is unclear whether the President referring to threats categorically, or if he misinterpreted the question as being asked about a particular threat (one perhaps that he is not aware of). Or it is entirely possible that the President did understand the context of the question and simply answered in his own fashion, where he clearly defines a point of contention (the threat) in order to form an aggressive stance towards it (I concede that this one is highly dubious, but for the sake of being charitable, it remains, even if remote, a possibility). Following the last possibility (the President understood the context of the question), does his answering give credence to the legitimacy of WaPo's report? Given the above scenarios, I posit the following possibilities

• The President was not aware of WaPo's report (given they are roughly 1-2 hours apart, this is entirely possible) and misunderstood the question and opted to sternly warn North Korea
• Unwilling to confirm or deny the WaPo report, the President opts to sternly warn North Korea
• Wishing to maintain a "strong front" despite the lack of legitimacy of WaPo's report, the President opts to sternly warn North Korea

Did the President threaten nuclear war with the North Koreans due to a misunderstood question or perhaps without knowing the legitimacy (or even the cognizance of its existence) of the WaPo/DIA report? If we consider that the WaPo notes July 28 as the date of the document, there are only 11 days between it and the President's statement. Therefore, we must also consider the possibility that even if the DIA report is genuine, it may have yet to reach the ears of the President (additionally, the President at the time was away from the White House in New Jersey, giving further credence to such a possibility).

3. Why did North Korea telegraph their operational plan to strike Guam?

Historically, threats by North Korea follow a particular archetype; bombastic and fantastical to the point where it is clearly identifiable as mere rhetoric rather than credible threats. As such, the explicit details released by North Korea is a drastic departure from the norm. I posit the following which is my speculation as to why they decided to telegraph their plan.

As with any significant change in personnel in the US government, the North Koreans are undoubtedly interesting in testing the boundaries of their relationship with the new President. Observation of US politics since the new presidency would have shown North Korea that the new President is fond of showmanship and use of hyperbolic statements to leverage relations. Following the "fire and fury" statement, North Korea was interested in using the opportunity to test, and perhaps extend the boundary of what actions are permissible while avoiding physical confrontation. Furthermore, given the lack of relative confidence levels of verifying the veracity of such threats of a new President, North Korea had to prepare/respond in some fashion regardless.

By telegraphing its exact plans to strike Guam, North Korea signals to the world exactly what it intends in order to avoid a potential incident (or at least limiting the fallout/response of an incident) if they felt compelled to carry out its plan. According to General Kim Rak Gyom of Strategic Force of the KPA, the plan are as follows: Simultaneous fire of four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range strategic ballistic rockets, crossing Shimane, Hiroshima, and Kochi Prefectures of Japan, traveling for a total distance of 3,356.7 km for 1,065 seconds before hitting the waters 30 to 40 km away from Guam. There are several elements here worthy of consideration.

• Number and type of rockets to be used to avoid misinterpretation and inappropriate reaction by the US
• Notes crossing of Japanese airspace to assuage potential concerns from Japan
• Notes flight time and exact location of target to telegraph trajectory to avoid misreads of missile destination
• Specifies hitting water to telegraph their intent to use force, but not directly on a civilian or military target

Additionally, the North Koreans had the foresight of adding that the execution of the plan would be contingent upon the leader's will, leaving themselves an out to the situation if necessary. This leads me to believe that the North Koreans were very much serious on making real on their threat and wanted the world to know this.

The Outcome

After several days of back and forth, the situation has finally calmed on August 14, as US officials made it clear that while the US is militarily ready to respond to any threat, there will not be a preemptive strike against North Korea as the President may have alluded to. Similarly, North Korea has made the statement that they will not go forward with the plan on attacking Guam at the current time.

Most people will look back on this event as nothing more than another one of North Korea's "shenanigans", but in truth, we bore witness to the foundation of North Korea/US relations for the duration of our current presidency.

From this event, North Korea has learned a wealth of information that will be to their benefit.

• The President makes hyperbolic statements without the intent to act upon them
• US officials will contradict the rhetoric espoused by the President
• Functionally, US foreign policy towards North Korea has not visibly changed
• China has limits in its patience towards North Korea's antics, but their fundamental security interests have not changed in relation to the US
• If they elect to interpret the President's response as confirmation of the DIA assessment, they now have knowledge of the fact that the US IC considers their nuclear capability as having advanced significantly

As North Korea continues to advance its ICBM technology, we will see a continuance of similar incidents into the foreseeable future. North Korea deems its nuclear capability an absolute requirement to its survival, and the US considers a fully nuclear capable (ability to threaten mainland US is the next step, as they are likely more than capable of threatening South Korea and Japan already) to be absolutely unacceptable. With neither side showing willingness to yield and with official channels of diplomacy effectively broken (North Korea and US do not maintain an embassy in each other's countries, and while there are back-channels for talks with North Korea, officials caution against optimism), tensions will reignite, each time hotter than before.