Post-Conflict Syria: Foreign Occupancy

Introduction

Following the recent and short lived ceasefires of early November, pro government forces have made concerted effort to claim the remainder of rebel controlled areas of Eastern Aleppo. They were met with limited resistance and made successive gains as the rebels opted to retreat and regroup in fear of being cut-off from each other. While there has been a renewed attempt at a limited ceasefire (conducted unilaterally by pro government forces after rejecting a ceasefire motion from the UN) to evacuate both civilians and provide the rebels with an option to abandon their territory, the fall of Aleppo is inevitable and likely will happen in the coming months before the half of 2017. With the fall of Aleppo, the future of Syria will be on the discussion table between the major power brokers at play. As it stands, the following parties will see an opportunity to influence the shaping of Syria post-conflict to various effect: Russia, Iran, Turkey, and smaller Syrian regional agents.


Russia
Russia's involvement in the Syrian conflict is multifaceted, ranging from their interests in maintaining/expanding their geopolitical sphere of influence, concerns over the availability of Middle Eastern oil for the European market, and maintaining the Russian naval installation in Tartus, Syria. However, the immediate effect of a favorable outcome in the Syrian Conflict for the Russians is in ensuring the existence of the Tartus naval facility, as well as opening up the possibility of additional bases. The naval facility in Tartus serves to expand the range of operations of Russian naval crafts deployed in the Mediterranean Sea, and more specifically, allow the resupply and repairing of vessels without necessitating a transit through the Bosphorus Strait. Given the tenuous nature of Turkey-Russia relations, unhindered usage of the strait is not guaranteed, which then could be a focal point of weakness for the Russian Navy's ability to project its power into the Mediterranean.

While a second naval isn't out of the question, an air base would serve to allow Russia to not only project sea power, but also air power without having to rely on the good will of Iran to conduct effective air missions. As previous incidents in the Syrian Conflict has shown, the compliance of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq are essential for the utilization of their air space and can be revoked. There is the outstanding question of the possible repercussions of having an air base that can become "cutoff" from the main body of Russia on the circumstances of political good will of tenuous allies, it is nonetheless something they might pursue.

Iran
As a dedicated strategic ally of Syria, Iran has invested significantly in ensuring the preservation of Assad's rule and to use it as a staging ground from which they can project their power throughout different areas in the region. With the successful suppression of anti government elements, Iran will seek to solidify its position in Syria to increase its effectiveness in conducting operations beyond, as well as within Syria. Iran has made it clear that they have intentions of establishing naval bases in Syria, and while this may come into conflict of the existing Russian naval base and may not materialize in the near future, the continued presence of Iranian military is guaranteed.

Turkey
Although late into the conflict, Turkey has quickly become a significant player through their Operation Euphrates Shield, entering Northern Syria to engage what they call terrorist elements of Kurdish PYG. While Turkish operations against Kurdish elements is not new, the recent political climate in Turkey along with a string of terrorist attacks have resulted in an escalation of operations against PKK, and now, the PYG and YPG. Turkey maintains a stance of hostility against Assad's regime, but have opted to intervene militarily to subdue ISIL and Kurdish rebels. In recent statements, Turkey has made it public their desire to establish military bases in Syria. Given the contentious nature of Turkey's relationship with Syria and its primary backers, the feasibility of such an endeavor remains questionable. Regardless, it is expected that there will be a continuation of Turkish presence for the near future as they pursue ISIL and Kurds in both Syria and possibly Iraq (Turkey's comments on their interests in intervening in the battle for Monsul has been met with objection by Iraq, but given the presence of PKK in Iraq, it remains to be seen if Turkey's security interests supersedes Iraq's unwillingness).

Syrian Militias
The breath of the Syrian Conflict encompassed all regions of the country and the capacity for Assad's forces were limited even from the early stages, necessitating the recruitment of regional militias. As a result of the prolonged conflict, the formal government forces has suffered from extreme demoralization, desertion, suffering from a myriad of organizational problems. The phenomenon of the prevalence of regional militias in the Middle East is commonly observed and often act as points of sectarianism and later, violence on political or religious lines of contention. Based on Russian reports, the growing inability of the formal military has led to the empowering of militias. To reduce the likelihood of a recurring civil war, the regional militias must be demilitarized, but with the poor state of the SAF (Syrian Armed Forces), this will be a difficult feat that will face intense opposition.

A Divided Syria
With the coming end of the Syrian Conflict, the future of Syria will be shaped by the dominant power brokers involved in the conflict. Although Assad has managed to maintain his rule without compromise to his status as President, he will have to rely on the help of his allies in maintaining order and engaging in reconstruction efforts. This will come at a cost as Syria become host to foreign forces for the foreseeable future and will have to juggle power and political relations with local militias.

Although the major foreign powers involved all have voiced their interest in establishing a base of sorts, it remains to be seen whether a compromise can be made. For Syria, reconstruction efforts and foreign aid might be the leveraging point that will make them concede to becoming host to more foreign military bases. However, I remain skeptical on whether those foreign powers can come to an agreement on their willingness to engage in co-occupancy. The prospect of an Iran-Russia co-occupancy may be more likely due to the close alignment of Syria-Iran-Russia, but Turkey remains the odd one out, viewed with suspicion by the three.

Russia in Aleppo: Strategic Ceasefire

Introduction

        Aleppo is a critical opposition stronghold that represents an ideological thorn against the pro-government forces and a strategic position from which the eastern regions of government control can be contested. Likewise, the city of Aleppo is just as important to the pro-government forces as the opposition controlled areas are under threat of encirclement, with Aleppo standing as one of the last well fortified positions in the east. During the course of the fight for Aleppo, the impact on civilians have been tremendous as neither the opposition nor pro-government forces wish to give up this strategic point. To provide relief to the civilians, there have been several attempts to implement ceasefires to limited effect.

        The fall of Aleppo seems to be an inevitability given the current circumstances as the opposition forces suffer a string of losses. From the perspective of the US, a call for ceasefire and accusation of human rights violations against the civilians of Aleppo is one of the few ways in which the pressure against the opposition can be lessened without direct involvement of US forces. While the US has been successful in rallying international voice against the Russians, the effect has been questionable. Even after Russia severe criticism and losing their seat in the UN Human Rights Council, they seem undeterred and the control of western Aleppo is likely to soon fall under the pro-government forces within a year.

        While on the surface, a ceasefire in Aleppo may appear to run counter to the Russian's objective in routing the opposition in Aleppo, there is stratagem in which the ceasefire is being leveraged to their material, psychological, and political benefit. This is broken down to two parts: shaping the public perception of the Aleppo conflict, and conducting psychological operations to the inhabitants, both civilian and rebel, of Aleppo.

Public Perception

        In the past months, international perception of the Aleppo conflict has been exceedingly negative, particularly against the frequent Russian air raids which have resulted in a high number of civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. However, on October 20th, Russia initiated a unilateral ceasefire which they extended to several days, and were consequently followed by more ceasefires into early November.

        The unusual circumstance of Russia unilaterally initiating a "humanitarian" ceasefire has allowed them to change the public perception of the Aleppo conflict. The initial ceasefire and the consequent extension were carefully crafted and were short in duration to serve two goals; to shape the narrative of the conflict and to respond in real-time to the movements and actions of the rebels, and by keeping the length of the ceasefire to a short duration, they are able to resume military operations on short notice.

        The ceasefire was quick to be dismissed by the opposition, and in response, Russia was able to characterize the rebels as being unreasonable and more than willing to impose further hardship on the civilians of Aleppo. To maximize this opportunity, Russia continually extended the ceasefire, to which the rebels continued to dismiss, which has been publicized through western media to a limited extent, but seem to be gaining some traction nonetheless.

        Although it isn't the case that Russia was successful in generating a momentous shift in western opinion of the Aleppo conflict, it has successfully planted the seed of doubt in the western dialog of a "moderate" rebel fighting against and protecting the civilians from the pro-government forces. The move to unilaterally initiate a ceasefire was a calculated move in which Russia would win in a number of possible outcomes.

1. If the ceasefire successfully convinces the rebels to abandon the city, they would have control of parts, or the entirety of the city.
2. If the civilians evacuate the city, they are able to resume military operations with greater force, allowing them to more quickly and effectively defeat the rebels.
3. If the rebels refuse to leave, they allow the Russians to shape the narrative and appear as the unreasonable party.

Psychological Operations

        The rebels in Aleppo have proven to be resilient in face of overwhelming technological firepower and being outnumbered by the pro-government forces. While the siege of Aleppo continues to have desirable effect in slowly routing the rebels from areas of Aleppo, they have shown their unwillingness to surrender the city. To expedite the fall of Aleppo, Russia has been employing psychological operations to exploit the distress of the citizens and rebels.

        As a matter of the state of the human psyche on the battlefield, there are considerations to the frequency, and intensity of the bombardment of a fortified position in maximizing the negative psychological impact of a prolonged battle on an individual. An extended and intense siege of an entrenched position is commonly used in degrading the morale and mentally exhausting the enemy to reduce their fighting effectiveness. In the case of Aleppo, there are political considerations that prevent an outright indiscriminate and prolonged bombardment on the city. The advantage the pro-government forces have in superior equipment and numbers are mitigated by this fact and the Russian's answer to this has been to remove this mitigating element, whether by encouraging the rebels, or civilians, to abandon the city.

        In consideration of a human's natural responses to a life threatening situation, they are inclined to either fight or flight. Given that the eastern area of Aleppo has been encircled by the pro-government forces, they are in a state of fight with limited means to flight. The brief reprieve in fighting with the offer of a means to escape in the conditions of the ceasefire aims to exploit that exact fight or flight response. The ceasefire also gives an opportunity for the rebels to reconsider their situation and likelihood of survival, whereas a constant barrage of attacks would give them no time to think. A lull in fighting can be a poison that breeds feelings of discontent and this pause in fighting gives them an opportunity to voice their discontent and doubt, which can spread amongst the members, breaking down morale and sowing distrust between the military hierarchy.

        The temporary pause in the fighting also gives opportunity for dissension to breed from within the civilian ranks. While the civilians of Aleppo are non-participants of the conflict, they have been essential for the rebels in holding the city thus far by limiting the fighting capability of the pro-government forces. However, because of how reliant the rebels are in fighting an asymmetric war by leveraging the presence of the civilians, their departure from the city would compromise their ability to defend it. In response to the evacuation corridors set up by the pro-government forces, the rebels have prevented the civilians from leaving the city. This will likely have lasting consequences in the civilian's willingness to tolerate the continued presence of the rebels that brings continued suffering to their daily life, even if they are on some level, sympathetic to the cause.

Conclusion

        The unilaterally initiated ceasefire was a strategic move in which Russia sought to manipulate public perception and to conduct psychological operations against the rebels and civilians in Aleppo. The result thus far has been positive as the public perception towards the conflict has made a noticeable shift as the non-compliance to the ceasefire and counter-offensives against the government controlled areas result in collateral civilian casualties. The civilians being prevented from evacuating has made limited headlines in western media as reports by humanitarian third parties detail the usage of mortar to prevent safe evacuation and the use of threat and coercion against civilians that wished to leave.

        If the pro-government forces can replicate this pattern of siege followed by a brief reprieve, the distrust within the rebels and between them and the civilians will grow. Given that Russia has been facing significant political fallout from the siege of Aleppo, by demonstrating that the rebels are just as unwilling to concede or make any concessions to limit the impact on the civilians, they have effectively redirected the criticism fielded against them.

        As the last ceasefire come to a conclusion on the 4th of November, time will show how effective this strategy was in the long run. Time is of the essence for the rebels as they lack the necessary supplies to extend the fighting in Aleppo and rely on unreliable and infrequent humanitarian convoys to bring them food, water, and medical supplies. The counter-offensives against the government held areas thus far have been largely ineffective as the pro-government forces have taken fortified positions unlike when they were previously routed when occupying the outlying areas of Aleppo several months prior. It is likely that these counter-offensives are moves of desperation as the rebels have no good recourse save for abandoning the city. 

An Analysis of the Syrian Ceasefire of September 12, 2016

On September 12, 2016, a ceasefire was brokered between the pro-government and opposition forces, initially set to seven days with 48-hours renewable truce. The included parties were the pro-government forces and elements of the "moderate" opposition, excluding extremist elements (specifically, ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham).

As part of the ceasefire, the following conditions apply:

• A clear separation and identification of the "moderate" elements from the extremist.
• Syrian government to stop flying combat missions where the "moderate" opposition is present.
• Allow unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access to all besieged and hard-to-reach areas.
• US and Russia coordinated military strikes against the extremist elements (ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham).

The primary goals of the ceasefire are two folds. First, to provide much needed humanitarian relief to affected civilians, with a priority given to the besieged city of Aleppo in Northern Syria. Second, to make a coordinated effort against the extremist elements, though no clear efforts have been made as of yet as the details of the ceasefire threatens to stop the cooperation before it begins.

Interestingly, some of the "moderate" elements have voiced their concerns on how the ceasefire may disproportionately benefit the pro-government forces. This paper will look the possible benefits and downsides to the ceasefire for each affected party to ascertain the possible outcome after the initial seven day period.

Affected Parties of Interest

Of the parties involved in the Syrian conflict, this analysis will focus on the following groups and how they are affected by the Syrian ceasefire of September 12, 2016 to September 19, 2016.

• Pro-government forces (Syrian Armed Forces, paramilitary, and Hezbollah)
• "Moderate" opposition forces (SDF, FSA, and other minor/local rebel elements)
• Extremist opposition forces (primarily ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Nusra)
• Foreign Powers (this grouping will cover the US, Russia, and Turkey)
• Civilians

Pro-Government Forces

The pro-government forces have been taking an aggressive stance in taking back territory from the opposition and has regularly challenged contested cities in the last few months. Being on the offensive, the exclusive nature of the ceasefire has some key benefits for the pro-government forces. ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham are excluded from the ceasefire and are targets of the coordinated efforts of the US-Russia operations following the ceasefire. This allows the pro-government forces to essentially "divide and conquer" the opposition.

The condition of the ceasefire requiring "moderate" rebels to separate from extreme elements is key to this "divide and conquer" strategy. While some of the moderates share a common enemy in targeting ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (though FSA and other smaller regional actors have frequently coordinated and cooperated with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), the fact that these extremist elements target and pose a threat to the pro-government forces means that they have to stretch their resources across many areas. The ceasefire will allow the pro-government forces to first, eliminate the extremist elements, then to deal with the more poorly equipped and less capable moderate elements who are far more likely than the former to either concede or make concessions.

Furthermore, by implementing a ceasefire, the more technologically equipped pro-government force has a clear first-strike advantage in being able to engage first with overwhelming force via air support and artillery before an adequate response can be mounted. While it remains to see whether the pro-government forces will violate the ceasefire to target the "moderates", the condition of requiring them to separate from extremist elements creates an ambiguity by which they can conduct operations without clear consequences for violation.

Moderate Opposition Forces

While the broad definition of "moderate" opposition forces does not do the diverse groups with their own interests fair justice, for the purposes of this analysis, they are similarly impacted by the ceasefire and will be considered under this single classification.

The condition of requiring "moderates" to separate from the extremist elements is a key downside that may play a significant role in the coming days. For the opposition forces that employ limited to extended cooperation with extremist elements, the condition of breaking ties may prove fatal to their battlefield capacity. They are left with two choices; remain as they are and face the threat of a combined US-Russia air strikes and coordinated pro-government assaults, or separate and abide by the ceasefire as part of the "moderate" elements and hope that the deal of the ceasefire is upheld by the pro-government forces and Russia. Regardless of the choice, they face the threat of limited to full extermination or in the case of separation, a loss in operational capacity and limiting of options for future alliances with the larger opposition forces (ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham).

For those who are not technically part of any extremist elements, they still face the threat of attacks from the pro-government forces and Russia. Given the complexity of the relations in the conflict, it remains difficult to prove or disprove such relations. Without a clearly defined mechanisms for repercussions for violating the ceasefire, the pro-government forces may be liable, as they've done in previous ceasefires, to engage where favorable. Though this will likely result in a swift dissolution of the ceasefire, the first-striker would stand to gain a significant tactical advantage.

Perhaps the one of the few favorable outcome of the ceasefire if properly upheld is the brief respite in the fighting. As the opposition forces are often limited in size, capacity, and unstructured, they likely do not enjoy the advantage of having a robust military organizational capability, namely the use of rotating forces with reserves. While the pro-government forces are able to replenish battle-fatigued troops with fresh reserves on a rotating basis in a structured manner, the militia-like nature of the rebels makes this unlikely for them to employ to proper benefit. The pause in fighting will allow the rebels, who are mostly on the defensive as of September 2016, to get some R&R and time to rebuff their fortifications.

If the full conditions of the ceasefire were to be upheld, the final outcome would still be a net negative to the opposition. As discussed earlier regarding the pro-government forces "divide and conquer" strategy, the loss of a significant threat (extremist elements) would allow the pro-government forces to focus their efforts on eliminating local rebel forces piece by piece. While the "moderates" may be opposed to the extremist elements on an ideological level, their continued existence and threat to the pro-government forces is essential for their continued struggle against Assad.

Extremist Opposition Forces
While the original mission of the ceasefire was to make a concerted effort against the extremist elements, there has been difficulties in actualizing this goal. The tenuous nature of the ceasefire makes it exceedingly difficult for building trust between the factions. The recent incident in Deir ez-Zur has shown the fragility of trust as Russia accuses the US of failing to appropriately coordinate their action in the area, resulting in the death of government forces and potentially aiding ISIL in their efforts against Deir ez-Zur.

Vitaly Churkin, the Russian representative in UN has expressed that this incident has served to further erode their trust in the US's willingness to work with Russia to subdue ISIL and have called into question as to whether there will be any future cooperation after such an incident. With friction between the US and Russia in effectively working together against the extremist elements, it remains questionable as to whether this ceasefire will yield in any effective multilateral action against ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.

US
US officials and representatives still maintain that Assad must be removed from office for a transition of government to occur. However, this rhetoric has seen increasingly less usage in recent months perhaps attributed to the realization of the infeasibility of such a demand. It may also be possible that the US still maintains such a condition internally but have opted to backseat it for convenience as such a stance would make cooperation with Russia difficult.

Given their current position, the US has backed itself into a corner from which it cannot achieve all of its objectives in Syria without prolonging the conflict in hopes of change in circumstances. Without deep commitment, the US backed rebels cannot defeat the pro-government forces, but the current US political climate prevents another case of Iraq with American boots on the ground. Defeating ISIL would eventually result in the defeat of the rebels by process of elimination once the largest threat to Assad's regime (ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) are sufficiently subdued or entirely eliminated. Without complete abandonment of either objective, the "best" move for the US to achieve both is to engage in a war of attrition to test the resolve of Russia and pro-government backers.

Russia
In light of the corner that US has been driven into, Russia's position appears very favorable. Furthermore, the domestic political climate is in high approval of Putin's foreign policy and he encounters little resistance to his ventures in Syria. The economic sanctions against Russia have also proven to be limited in its effectiveness as the Russian economy has slowly started to recover and has been projected to return to positive growths by end of 2017 (World Bank's Russian Economic Report No. 35). The US presidential election will be of great interest for Russia in how the new government will handle Syria, to either deeper involvement or withdrawal. In either case, Russia is in a favorable situation where they will achieve objective victory through US withdrawal or stalemate continued limited involvement by the US.

Civilians
One of the primary purpose of the ceasefire was to provide aid to the affected civilians, particularly those in Aleppo. However, coordination and trust issues have hampered the ability for foreign aid to cross into Syria as they either lack permission to enter or lack confidence in the the guarantee of safety. On September 17, 2016, Vitaly Churkin has made comments in regards to a finalization of an agreement for aid to enter Aleppo via the Castello road. It remains to be seen if such agreements hold and if sufficient aid can be delivered in a short time period, as the ceasefire is due for renewal by September 19, 2016.

Conclusion
The Syrian ceasefire of September 12, 2016 is aimed at providing relief to affected civilians and for coordinating action against extremist elements of the opposition forces. However, the impact of the ceasefire for the involved parties are disproportionate in that it favors the pro-government forces. Given the limited military capability of the rebels and unwillingness for deep involvement by the US, there is no viable alternative in face of this unfavorable deal.

Due to the lack of sufficient US-Russia coordination, the possibility of adequately delivering aid and combating the extremists are doubtful. The "moderate" rebels and the US are left in a situation where the successful accomplishment of the ceasefire objectives would contribute to their eventual defeat, and a partially successful accomplishment to continue their stalemate against Assad's forces. With either side unwilling to concede or make concessions, this conflict is expected to carry on into an indeterminate amount of time into the future.

Change in Turkey's Relative Geo-Political Power

During the course of the Syrian conflict, Turkey has proven itself an unwieldy ally in the US's fight against Assad and ISIL. Given their own interests in the region and preferred outcome of the conflict, their willingness to follow US leadership has always been questionable. However, recent developments in Turkey have changed the landscape and understanding these new developments is critical to identifying their immediate goals and objectives and their consequent actions into the near future.

These new developments have significant implications to shaping the future of Syria, whether it be favorable to US interests or not, and to the power balance of the Middle East. In no particular order, these points of interests are as follows: the failed coup d'etat and the consequent centralization of power, deepening of partnership with the Russian Federation, and the recent fracturing and uncertainty of the EU following the "Brexit".

The Coup D'etat
Following the failed coup d'etat, President Erdogan has continued to crack down on various elements of the military, judiciary, and other state elements(of particular note, the removal of state educators is especially interesting, as it may be due to his fears of a deep infiltration of Gulenist supporters in state positions). The impact of this is that all the branches of the government has been consolidated under the power of the President. This was accomplished by the three months of "state of emergency" powers bestowed by the constitution, allowing him to circumvent both domestic and international law.

Historically, the Turkish military were institutionally separated from the civilian government to pose as the final check and balance to the direction of the country. However, the indiscriminate purging of both low and high level members of the military will have a strong chilling effect in discouraging any future attempts for another coup d'etat. With no formal domestic institutions hindering Erdogan, he will have less difficulty in executing plans to their security interests in the Middle East.

Russian Relations
Modern Turkey-Russia relations were built on mutual economic and security interests and both benefited from the partnership. The 2015 incident where Turkey shot down a Russian plane severely soured this relation and the economic and any potential military cooperation between the two were immediately cut. In June, 2016, President Erdogan has personally expressed regret over the incident and have made earnest effort to normalize the relation, which has been met with open reciprocation by Russia. Shortly after, Russia followed with resumption of economic relations and promises of close military cooperation for operations in Syria (presumably for targeting mutual adversaries, namely Kurdish rebels and ISIL).

While Turkey often leverages its western partnership for many of its economic and geo-political interests, the normalization of Turkey-Russian relations allows for recourse for when and if it would face western opposition. That is not to say that their partnership with Russia is a de facto replacement over the west, but having multiple avenues for cooperation opens up new possibilities as well as providing leverage when negotiating with the west. The sharing of military intelligence in particular for operations in Syria is noteworthy given their recent military actions against Kurds in Syria.

EU Membership and Syrian Refugees
EU membership has been long sought after by Turkey for the economic agreements and freedom of movement it would be inducted into. While there are a variety of concerns with the EU members regarding the possible economic and political consequences with Turkey's inclusion into the EU, this is something that has been in consideration for some time. To this point, Turkey has held an unfavorable position in this negotiation, but the recent events in Syria has changed the tide in Turkey's favor. The sudden influx of refugees in particular have proven to be an insurmountable challenge without the full cooperation of Turkey, which it promises in return for visa-free travel for Turks in the Schengen zone.

The recent "Brexit" has also stirred and challenged the status-quo of Turkey-EU negotiations. With the proposed exit of the UK from the EU, trust in the stability of the EU has waned. This may have the consequence of lowering the bargaining power of the EU in regards to Turkey and even potentially change Turkey's mind as to whether they want to commit to a full membership status with a potentially failing union.

Conclusion - Turkey and the Immediate Future
In a span of a single year, the ability for Turkey to act in its own interest without the cooperation of the west and its overall bargaining power has increased substantially. Just in 2016, Erdogan has managed to solidify his domestic power base and consolidate state entities under his control. Internationally, they have formed strong partnership with Russia who is likely to show greater tolerance for Turkey's pursuit of security interests in the region. The Syrian refugee crisis has managed to shift the balance of power in favor of Turkey, giving them significant leverage in negotiations, which they will likely utilize in the near future (as they've already done in regards to freedom of movement for Turks in EU).

With that in mind, Turkey is in a highly favorable position where the west cannot reasonably limit or pose credible threat to prevent Turkey from acting unilaterally for its own benefit. While Turkey may exercise caution in exercising their expanded boundaries and powers, it is likely that they will continue to do so until the political climate undergoes another shift against their favor.

As to what Turkey will do in the future is not certain as Erdogan has shown himself to be a dual figure of both practicality and passion, making him a difficult figure to predict. That being said, based on the current trajectory, the following can be expected to occur in the immediate future:

• Conduct limited military operations against Kurdish rebels which may expand to Iraq.
• Cooperate with Russia with the goal of returning stability to Syria under their terms.
• Seek limited integration into EU while not fully committing to full membership.

Additional Thoughts

The economic and political situation in the Middle East appear ripe for Turkey to make a move to establish itself as a dominant figure in a new Middle East power order. This is especially true when considering the recent drop of petroleum prices that severely damaged the economies of other major players. With the economic and political climate in their favor, Turkey has an opportunity to steer the direction of the Middle East's future. This is not something that they will simply squander.

The Syrian Dilemma: A Practical Solution

The Syrian Civil War rages on well into 2016 with no clear end. While the conflict showed a lot of promise with increasing foreign involvement and refocusing of priorities against the common opposition, ISIS and Al-Nusra proves to be more can capable of holding onto key parts of the region. The prolonged US commitment and the inability to put a closure to the war has been poorly received and some have begun to voice their opinions. In a recent internal memo, dozens of frustrated State Department officers signed a critique of Obama's administration's approach to the conflict.

Specifically, the memo calls for direct use of military force to enforce the CoH that is still in effect, but violated to no consequence. The result of such a stance, the memo notes, is that by raising the cost of violation, the immediate negative impact on civilians in the affected areas would be minimized and would facilitate a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.

While this approach might have some desired effect (namely, allowing relief to civilians and concentrating efforts to subduing the common opposition), it fails to achieve the an important objective set by Obama. While the primary intent behind US involvement in this conflict is to put an end to it, Obama has made it definitively clear that Assad must be removed from office. However, the situation in Syria at the moment is not ideal for accomplishing all of these different objectives simultaneously and an attempt to do so will yield undesired outcomes. In this article, I will discuss the current political climate in the Middle East and how the objective of removing Assad from office is infeasible without significant costs or compromises.

Russia
Ever since Russia entered the conflict in support of Assad, they have been a significant barrier for the US in expediting a favorable conclusion where he is removed from power. The goals of Russia is relatively clear. Establish some level of stability to where Russian interests in the region, that is, sale of military hardware and maintaining the Tartus Base, is secure. While Assad himself is not critical to Russia's interest, their vested interest in Syria's patronage and lease of land is crucial to their objectives in the region.

Initially, the Russians were committed to securing Assad's regime by conducting air strikes against the anti-government forces, but as the costly conflict rages on, they appear to  be less than enthusiastic about a prolonged conflict. Not only did they agree to the initial CoH, but have also reaffirmed their ongoing adherence to the ceasefire and have actively participated in talks with the US regards to prioritizing the elimination of ISIS and Al-Nusra.

However, Russia's diminished patience and willingness to consider a compromise in combating the common opposition should not be equivocated to abandoning their interests in Syria. If provoked with the possibility of an overt change of regime by the US, an idle reaction is unlikely. Putin has been more than willing to show that Russia will not tolerate western powers interfering with its interests, even to the point of bringing Russia to the brink of a recession under sanctions.

Not only did the sanctions fail to prompt the desired reaction, the Russian economy is recovering (though, this is not to say it is booming as it still remains in single percentage points of contraction, but this is a marked improvement over the the double digit percentage point contractions Russia experienced in 2014-2015) and is projected to return to pre-sanction levels by 2017-2018 at its current pace. Furthermore, maintaining sanctions, let alone increasing them, will prove challenging as many European countries benefited from trading with Russia, nor is the possibility of EU breakdown doing the sanctions any service.

Assad
While the initial efforts of the CoH yielded significant gains as the combined efforts of the signatories of the CoH gained significant ground against ISIS and Al-Nusra, progress has steadily waned (recently, pro-government forces lost southern Aleppo to Al-Nusra). In spite of their combined efforts, the opposition remains strong and the prospects of defeating them can be compromised if the brunt of the ground forces (pro-government elements) become weaker. Given the precarious state of the union of the pro-government forces, forcibly removing Assad from power can have a fractionalizing effect on the temporary "alliance (this including the foreign powers, moderate rebels, and pro-government forces that are prioritizing on the elimination of the common opposition for the duration of the CoH).

In the event that the US does force the issue of instigating a transition of power by overtly forcing Assad to leave office, there would be negative consequences to follow. For one, a political transition would shift the priorities of  the country. With a vacuum of power left by the previous regime, different groups would contend for control of the new government. As a result, the ability to coordinate offensives would falter and so too the capacity to subdue the opposition. This would put Syria at risk of falling to the extremists, which would either force the US to commit further into Syria. Furthermore, the military support that the government begets from its alliance with Iran would not necessarily hold if Assad were to be removed from power by the US.

Forcibly removing Assad or pressuring him through direct confrontation would do little in the way of swaying the Syrian population to be favorable of a regime change. In fact, such a course of action would only serve to reinforce the negative imagery of the US and may push moderates over to the other camp. Instead, if the removal of Assad were the utmost priority in this conflict, a war of attrition would be the strategy of choice. A prolonged conflict would lead to growing internal discontent (both civilian as well as military) which then could be leveraged for a negotiation. However, this is an infeasible course of action given that the US also aims to minimize the war's impact on the civilians and are not keen on allowing ISIS or Al-Nusra to regain ground in Syria thanks to a weakened pro-government force.

The Iranian support of Assad's regime is also a major barrier to this objective. Not only do they provide materialistic support, Iran is also deeply vested in the survival of Assad's regime. Syria is a critical geopolitical ally against its rivals in the Middle East. Not only would a forced removal of Assad prolong the conflict, it would also harm US-Iran relations (given the huge ordeal that was necessary to mend US-Iran relations souring it again in mere months would be a definite loss). Given the reoccurring nature of terrorism, keeping up partnership with Iran will be essential in the ongoing fight against ISIS as well as handling future outbreaks of conflict.

The Practical Solution
The issue with the Syrian Conflict boils down to the inability to achieve the objective of removing Assad from power without significant political and material costs. Not only does it have unacceptably high costs, the course of actions necessary to fulfill such an objective would also run counter to the greater regional goal of subduing ISIS. Rather than compromising on many fronts to achieve an ideological goal of removing an "evil authoritarian", it is more politically and materially practical to abandon the notion that Assad absolutely must leave office.

That being said, this is not a dismissal of the issues that Syria suffered from while under Assad's rule. Rather, the alternative is not any more favorable than the status quo, and may have far more negative consequences as a result of trying to "save" Syria from the Assad regime. In fact, such an assessment is neither new or particularly revealing as other analysts have also made similar claims to the dangers of a Syrian regime change (most notably, assessments made by the DIA discussed in this article: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n01/seymour-m-hersh/military-to-military).

In conclusion, the most sensible course of action would be to abandon the goal of removing Assad and instead focus on the effort in subduing ISIS and Al-Nusra and bringing stability to the country. As to what could be done afterwards, Syria would be in a position where they require significant foreign aid to recover. This is where support should come with conditions for Syria to providing a more inclusive political process and integrate neutral third party observers to ensure that they are conducted in a fair manner. If the intent of the US is to allow a chance for the moderate dissenters to have a voice in the new government, the elimination of the common opposition takes precedence (to ensure a peaceful transition, the CoH will have to be strictly upheld as suggested by the State Department officers after the elimination of the opposition).

The Workers' Party of Korea and the 7th Congress: Future Implications of Peace and Cooperation

In recent months, there has been an outburst of activities as the UN passed Resolution 2270 in response to the North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles tests and the North Korean party's Congress was held with international coverage. The UN Resolution rebuffed its sanctions and demands against North Korea, and its severity and compliance by the international community will likely have serious impact on the North Korean economy. Some have taken these developments as indicative of an imminent collapse of the North Korean state. However, such predictions are neither new nor are such claims any more likely than it had been in the past. The 7th Congress has been very insightful in understanding the state of North Korea and stand antithetical to the claims to their impending demise. This article will explore some of the recent revelations made by the Congress and implications behind the UN Resolution.

The North Korean Party and Stability

The stability of the North Korean government is often called into question in regards to its possible longevity. Over the recent years, some of the strongest indicators of possible internal strife and lack of unity within the Workers' Party of Korea was during the change in leadership from Kim Jong Il to his son, Kim Jong Un. The transition was followed by attempts to consolidate power and complying party unity through purges and executions. While the true extent of the purges are unlikely to be revealed, many of the high profile members thought to have been removed from power or executed resurfaced during the Congress, with some bearing lower status, and others in more important positions. In light of recent events, it is more likely that the purges were less indicative of instability and were more focused on establishing a power foundation for Kim Jong Un's rule.

I myself have questioned the continued stability of the North Korean state given the ongoing dilemma of legitimacy (namely, through leader exaltation, extreme military preference, and anti-colonialism) and have posited in the past that it may be inevitable for the party to pursue legitimacy via economic prosperity. As seen during the Congress, Kim Jong Un acknowledged the importance of economic development and has gone as far as praising the improvements made by changes to agriculture models (smaller work teams, and allowing greater share for producers). The Congress also marked the announcement of a five-year economic plan, and while no details were provided, it shows a refocusing of priorities. If the state was so mired by internal conflict or instability, economic plans would be the least of their concerns.

The 7th Congress was a hallmark of solidarity within the Workers' Party of Korea, reaffirming the power under Kim Jong Un, and establishing a new position of "Chairman", reminiscent of the position held by Mao Zedong in PRC. While the position itself is unlikely to bestow Kim Jong Un with any explicit powers that he doesn't already have as First Secretary, this is an interesting development in conjunction with the numerous promotions and demotions in the recent years in building a power base for his rule. It will be fascinating to see if and how reforms are advanced with the power of party solidarity (this is especially reminiscent of the power consolidation in CPC by Mao Zedong, followed by massive projects to reform the country's economy). If anything, the North Korean state has never been more stable and capable than in the past several decades.

International Integration

The Congress showed many signs of North Korea's possible willingness to integrate itself into the international community. First, the decision to include foreign journalists to "cover" (regrettably, the journalists were not given full access to cover the event from within the auditorium, but the gesture itself was very telling) the monumental event was not only surprising, but also very promising in that it was a clear sign that they wanted the world to know of North Korea's plans and intentions going into the future with Kim Jong Un at the helm of the country.

Some of the topics discussed in the Congress also directly addressed the international community and brought to attention topics of great interest. The most significant were those that directly addressed the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons development and call for cessation by the UN. What was surprising was not the acknowledgement of the opposition against North Korea's nuclear weapons development efforts, but that Kim Jong Un noted the following, "responsible nuclear weapons state, our Republic will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes, ... and it will faithfully fulfill its obligation for non-proliferation and strive for the global denuclearization." (7th Congress, Kim Jong Un's speech translated by the Korean Central News Agency). While this can easily be discounted as obligatory lip service, even such an interpretation has substantial implications in that it may be indicative of North Korea's concern over their international appearance and willingness to show their intentions to the rest of the world.

Furthermore, the recent speech delivered by Kim Jong Un makes it clear that North Korea is not against (and to some degree, has been) making significant efforts towards negotiating with South Korea and the US in discussing its nuclear capabilities. To quote: "The WPK and the DPRK government will improve and normalize the relations with those countries which respect the sovereignty of the DPRK and are friendly towards it, though they had been hostile toward it in the past". North Korea has made significant efforts towards negotiating with South Korea and the US in discussing its nuclear developments. Unfortunately, their honest efforts to integrate has been met with cold indifference by South Korea and US as they refuse to come to negotiations before North Korea makes serious efforts to stop nuclear developments. This may be a terrible opportunity lost as such a diplomatic stance being so outright unequivocally rejected might reflect negatively on Kim Jong Un, who may be forced to take a more hawkish stance to maintain party solidarity and control over the state. It would not be surprising that after being so utterly rejected by the international community that they become secluded and detached from the rest of the world again.

Conclusion

In a previous article, I posited the notion that nuclear security is one of the conditions that must be met before diplomacy can become a more viable option over military belligerency. It is interesting that following a successful nuclear test, and display of some level of advancement to their missile delivery system, the state has been more amicable in extending a diplomatic hand. The manner in which the North Korean state has handled the tests and international response is reflective of their foreign policy strategy of nuclear deterrence into formal diplomacy.

Rather than an imminent collapse, the North Korean state has never been so unified and so capable as it is now. Not only have they attained limited nuclear proficiency, and possibly the ability to project its nuclear power well beyond its immediate region through a intercontinental missile delivery system, they have attained party unity to action reforms. Moreover, they have shown full willingness to negotiate the matter of nuclear development and the sanctions against them. While it is unlikely that they will surrender current and future developments as Iran has done, the possibility of a non-conflict resolution seems realistic.

The Syrian Civil War: Victorious Ceasefire

After nearly five years of conflict, the Syrian Civil War saw a brief respite with the truce on the 27th of February, 2016. The idea behind it was simple; bring the primary belligerents to the table and discuss terms of each party and to allow humanitarian efforts to be deployed to the war stricken regions. However, the the temporary cessation of hostilities between the "moderate" rebels and the government forces opened the opportunity for redirection of their focus to a common enemy, the ISIL. The initial expectations of the truce was very straight forward. With the combined efforts of all parties, the greater evil was to be swiftly defeated, allowing for the rebels and the government to non violently settle their differences through diplomacy, not war.

In the first few months of the ceasefire, the diplomatic efforts seemed to be a resounding success as neither side dared to be the first in challenging the limits and focused their efforts in routing ISIL. The initial success of the ceasefire and consecutive victories against ISIL gave hope to the possibility of bringing the Syrian Civil War to a diplomatic conclusion, but underneath the facade of cooperation, the Syrian government forces saw an opportunity to their predicament.

Leading up to the ceasefire, the Syrian government suffered increasing criticism from the international community as attention from the Ukraine crisis shifted to the middle east (a common trend in the pattern of a prolonged conflict getting little to no attention in the first two years, gaining increasing attention for the following two years, and then fading into obscurity and left to be resolved by more directly invested parties). The increase in international attention not only brought political pressure to form a transitional government, but bolstered the ranks of the rebels and terrorists as they found success in local and international recruitment.

Given the nature of the conflict, the government forces are stretched thin across large amounts of territories against a multifaceted enemies. This poses several key challenges to the government forces, making the fight against the opposition particularly difficult. Because the opposition is composed of many factions, they lack a single command or logistics structure. This means that successive victories do not necessarily impact the opposition in a negative way as it would if they were a single entity.

Compounding to this issue is the fact that the vast majority of the opposition forces are local rebels, meaning that they can spring out in grassroots fashion from a number of locations, even from government controlled territories. Gaining territory and maintaining effective control over it requires rather heavy investment if the locals of the area have anti-government (more specifically, anti-Assad, as there are rebel groups that support the existence of a greater Syrian government, but not with Assad in power) sentiments.

With these conditions in mind, the ceasefire accomplished several key political and military goals for the government forces. First, the ceasefire gave the Syrian government reprieve from criticism by showing that they were "considering" diplomacy (although I would posit that they never really intended to listen to the opposition). It also effectively stopped large scale fights for a good duration, allowing the international focus in Syria to drop out of the spotlight in favor of other hot new topics. Another tactic employed during the ceasefire was propaganda to convince rebels to lay down their arms and to reintegrate to the state's fold. The lull in fighting was an excellent opportunity for the Syrian government to convince tired insurgents to surrender with the promise of being treated amicably.

Second, groups that were not part of the ceasefire agreement were open targets. While the most prominent groups not part of the ceasefire are ISIL and Al Nusra, any number of small factions could have also been excluded from the ceasefire. In addition, given the contentious nature of rebel factions and alliances, it is not an impossibility for the government forces to single out a group as being "terrorists". Even when the government forces violate the ceasefire against a single group, it is very unlikely that they are to suffer any consequences as the tangentially related rebel groups have little vested interest in coming to their aid. Rather, it is more likely that assisting would result in them getting singled out as well (Russia has adamantly claimed that they will retaliate with force against any groups that violate the ceasefire, although this undoubtedly do not apply to the government forces).

While the initial goals of the United States were to bring down Assad's government and to defeat ISIL, at the current time, it is likely that Assad will not step down, as he is in the best position he has been since the start of the civil war. The ceasefire was intended as a means of putting the civil war on hold to stem the growing tide of ISIL, but it has been instrumental in shifting the balance greatly in favor of the Syrian government. Through the ceasefire, they were able to play the idea of vanguard against terrorists, and starting the process of dividing and conquering all opposition.

While the idea of a transitional government may have been a possibility to save himself, Assad is no longer fearful of losing his station, and will not consider a move in which his power is called into question. In fact, it is entirely possible that Syria went into the ceasefire with no intentions of making peace with the rebels in the first place. According to UN diplomats, the Syrian government representative does not give any consideration to the propositions of the opposition, and acts only to mock and provoke them.

The Syrian Civil War has raged on for more than five years, and it is far from over. Territories have been taken, and retaken by countless factions, and lands continue to change hands to this day and the Syrian government have yet to resolve fundamental political, social, and economic issue that resulted in the rise of the rebellions. I don't doubt that the conflict will continue to rage for several more years to come. However, it is clear that the rebels no longer have the sufficient strength and support to bring the Syrian government to a compromise.